J .  rlo  11  an d  iC os e 


By  J,  Holland  Rose,  LittD, 


The  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Era 
1789-1815 

The  Personality  of  Napoleon 

(The  Lowell  Lectures,  Spring,  1912) 

The  Development  of  the  European  Nations 

1870-1900 

The  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Era 
1789-1815 


THE 
ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

1871—1914 


BY 


J.  HOLLAND  ROSE,  Litt.D. 

Fellow  of  Christ's  College  and  Reader  in  Modern  History 
in  the  University  of  Cambridge,  Corresponding  Member 
of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW   YORK   AND    LONDON 

Ubc  Iknicfterbocker  press 

1915 


GIFT  OR 


,1 


CO 


'cH  PREFATORY  NOTE 


T  DESIRE  gratefully  to  acknowledge  the  valuable 
advice  given  by  the  following  while  the  sheets  of 
this  volume  passed  through  the  Press:  Sir  Adolphus 
W.  Ward,  Litt.D.,  Master  of  Peterhouse,  J.  B.  Bury, 
F.B.A.,  Regius  Professor  of  Modern  History,  and  J.  W. 
Headlam,  M.A.,  both  of  King's  College,  Cambridge.  My 
hearty  thanks  are  also  due  to  the  following  for  help  in 
the  arduous  task  of  research:  E.  R.  Adair,  B.A., 
Peterhouse,  P.  Vos,  B.A.,  Gonville  and  Caius  College, 
E.  la  M.  Stowell,  Corpus  Christi  College,  and  Miss  Lilian 
Whitehouse,  formerly  of  Girton  College,  Cambridge.  In 
so  controversial  a  subject  as  this,  1  wish  it  to  be  under- 
stood that  I  take  sole  responsibility  for  the  statements 
in  this  volume. 


J.  H.    R. 


Cambbidob, 

December  4,  1914 


CONTENTS 


I.  Anglo-Gbrman  Rivalry  (1875 — 1888) 

n.  The  Kaiser 

III.  Germany's  World-Policy     . 

IV.  Morocco:  The  Bagdad  Railway 

V.  Alsace-Lorraine  .... 

VI.  The  Eastern  Question  (1908—1913) 

VII.  The  Crisis  op  1914      . 

VIII.  The  Rupture         .... 


APPENDIX 

I.     Ship-Building  Programmes  op  England 
AND  France  (1905—14) 


II.     German  Plans  en  Soute-West  Africa 
Indsx       •        ..... 


Germany 


PAGB 

1 

21 

45 

68 

91 

115 

134 

162 


189 
190 
195 


ANGLO-GERMAN  RIVALRY  (1875—1888) 

Qui  trop  embrasse  mal  etreint. 

(Bismarck's  favourite  motto.) 

German  writers  often  assert  that  the  British  Empire 
is  the  result  of  the  conscious  and  persistent  eSort  of  our 
people  towards  the  achievement  of  World-Empire.  We, 
on  our  part,  beheve  that  Germany  has  in  recent  times 
adopted  a  World-PoHcy  which,  almost  of  necessity,  has 
brought  her  into  conflict  with  the  British  race.  Which 
of  the  two  peoples  has  of  late  been  the  more  expansive, 
the  more  aggressive,  is  a  question  which  can  be  finally 
and  decisively  answered  only  by  future  historians  who 
have  at  their  disposal  documents  necessarily  withheld 
from  the  present  generation.  But  it  has  seemed  to  me 
desirable  to  try  to  bring  together  into  these  lectures  as 
much  evidence  as  is  now  forthcoming,  for  the  formation 
of  at  least  a  provisional  judgment  on  this  great  topic. 

At  some  points,  notably  as  regards  the  final  rupture 
with  Germany,  the  documentary  evidence  is  fuller  than 
has  ever  been  forthcoming  on  contemporary  events; 
and  we  may  approach  the  final  stage  of  our  inquiry  with 
a  feeling  of  confidence  that  the  main  conclusions  are  not 

B.  L.  1 


2  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

likely  to  be  reversed,  but  only  more  clearly  focussed. 
May  I  also  venture  to  give  my  experience  as  to  the 
completeness  and  trustworthiness  of  British  ofl&cial 
papers  presented  to  Parliament?  After  studies  in  our 
archives  extending  over  the  best  part  of  twenty  years,  I 
can  testify  to  the  honest  editing  of  the  Papers  presented 
to  Parhament.  In  scarcely  any  case  have  important 
passages  been  suppressed.  Rarely  do  documents  leap  to 
light  that  shame  the  memory  of  British  Ministers,  at  any 
rate  since  the  time  of  the  Younger  Pitt.  I  remember  on 
one  occasion  making  a  remark  of  this  nature  to  the  late 
Dr  Samuel  Rawson  Gardiner.  I  said  to  him  that  the 
more  thoroughly  British  foreign  policy  was  examined, 
the  better  it  came  out.  He  at  once  replied :  "  It  always 
"does;   it  always  does." 

I  do  not  propose  to  discuss  here  the  psychological 
question  w^hether  there  is  a  radical  and  incurable  hostihty 
between  the  North  German  and  the  British  nature;  or 
whether  a  war  between  their  two  Empires  was  inevit- 
able. The  former  question  is  too  academic  for  these  times ; 
the  second  question  is  futile.  A  careful  study  of  all  the 
causes  leading  to  war  must,  I  think,  lead  to  the  conclusion 
that  scarcely  any  war  is  inevitable;  and  that  the  use  of 
that  epithet  is  merely  a  slipshod  way  of  avoiding  an  exam- 
ination of  all  the  causes  leading  to  the  rupture.  No  war 
is  inevitable,  unless  human  passion,  folly  and  blundering 
are  inevitable ;  and  they  are  not  inevitable  unless  mankind 
is  a  mere  puppet  show  jerked  by  bhnd  fate.  Let  us  clear 
our  minds  of  all  befogging  notions.  Let  us  discuss  the 
evidence ;  let  us  seek  to  understand  the  characters  of  the 
chief  actors,  and  we  shall,  I  beheve,  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  this  terrible  war  could  have  been  avoided. 


ANGLO-GERMAN  RIVALRY  (1875—1888)         3 

We  may  leave  on  one  side  all  the  earlier  disputes 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany.  It  matters  little 
now  whether  Bliicher  did  or  did  not  save  us  from  de- 
struction at  Waterloo,  as  the  Kaiser  has  vauntingly 
declared;  or  that  the  British  Press  sympathized  keenly 
with  Denmark  in  1864,  when  she  was  overwhelmed  by 
Prussia  and  Austria;  or  that  certain  British  steamers 
laden  with  coal  for  the  River  Seine  were  sunk  by  Prussian 
cannon  in  1870.  All  those  events  belong  to  a  bygone  age. 
A  new  order  of  things  came  about  in  1871,  when  tri- 
umphant Germany  became  an  Empire;  and  King  WilUam 
of  Prussia  became  DeutscJier  Kaiser  at  the  palace  of 
Versailles.  Very  many  of  our  people  rejoiced  at  the  unity 
of  Germany  and  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  III.  No 
feeling  of  security  was  possible  while  he  was  in  power. 
"Condemned  to  be  brilliant"  was  the  verdict  acutely 
passed  on  him  by  a  French  thinker;  and  few  persons 
believed  it  possible  that  a  German  Emperor  would  ever- 
be  open  to  the  same  charge.  The  Germans  were  a 
quiet,  safe,  home-loving  people.  The  French  were  fickle, 
ambitious,  dangerous.  Central  Europe,  the  weakness  of 
which  had  so  often  tempted  the  aggression  of  Bourbon 
and  Hapsburg,  was  now  secured  by  the  ascendancy  of  the 
House  of  Hohenzollern.  "That  Germany  is  to  stand  on 
"her  feet  henceforth,  and  not  be  dismembered  on  the 
"highway,  but  face  all  manner  of  Napoleons  and  hungry 
"sponging  dogs,  with  clear  steel  in  her  hand,  and  an 
"honest  purpose  in  her  heart — this  seems  to  me  the  best 
"news  we  or  Europe  have  had  for  the  last  forty  years  or 
"more."  Such  was  Carlyle's  verdict  after  Koniggratz 
in  1866 ;  and  after  Sedan  it  remained  his  verdict  and  that 
of  very  many  Britons. 

1—2 


4  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

On  the  other  hand,  British  sympathy  with  Repubhcan 
France,  when  subjected  to  the  crushing  terms  imposed 
by  the  victors  in  1871,  aroused  great  irritation  in  Germany. ' 
The  tone  of  Bismarck  and  the  military  caste  had  always 
been  hostile;  and  Sir  Horace  Rumbold  testifies  to  "the 
"extraordinary  ill-will  towards  us"  which  was  then  mani- 
fested^. 

The  friction  between  the  two  great  branches  of  the 
Teutonic  family  became  acute  at  the  time  of  the  war- 
panic  of  the  year  1875.  Early  in  that  year  the  French 
Republic  gained  strength  by  two  important  measures. 
That  of  Feb.  25  gave  it  the  beginning  of  a  constitution. 
That  of  March  28  strengthened  the  army  by  adding  a 
fourth  battalion  to  every  regiment.  This  was  enough 
for  the  military  party  at  BerHn.  They  did  not  complain 
of  those  measures.  They  complained  of  the  sharp 
censures  of  some  of  the  French  and  Belgian  bishops  on 
Bismarck's  anti-Papal  policy.  The  Chancellor  himself 
conjured  up  the  spectre  of  a  Romanist  League  against 
Germany,  and  uttered  these  words:  "If  France  does  not 
"throw  over  her  papal  pohcy,  I  will  not  defer  making 
"  war  upon  her  till  she  is  ready ;  and  I  know  that  she  will 
"be  ready  in  two  years^." 

The  frank  brutahty  of  this  utterance  is  characteristic 
both  of  the  man  and  of  the  Junker  class  whence  he 
sprang.  His  words  were  echoed  in  all  Prussian  news- 
papers ;  and  a  sharp  crisis  ensued.  German  writers  have 
since  endeavoured  to  minimise  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
by  asserting  that  the  whole  affair  was  a  trifle,  due  to  a 

*  Sir  H.  Rumbold,  Recollections  of  a  Diplomatist,  i.  175,  ii.  297. 

*  Broj^lie,  La  Mission  de  M.  de  Gontaut-Biron  d  Berlin,  pp.  1G6,  182 
(Eng.  edit.  Part  in.). 


ANGLO-GEKMAN    RIVALRY    (1875—1888)        5 

few  hot-heads  at  Berlin.  How  misleading  this  was  you 
will  judge  if  I  read  a  letter  from  Professor  GefEcken^  to 
Sir  Robert  Morier  (British  envoy  at  Munich),  published 
in  the  Memoirs  of  the  latter.  After  stating  that  Bismarck 
was  heading  towards  war,  he  continues: 

There  is  to  be  a  great  coup,  and  Belgium  is  the  object.  I  do  not 
say  that  he  is  positively  bent  upon  war,  because  he  would  be  obliged 
to  create  a  situation  where  Germany  seemed  to  be  the  attacked 
party;  and  this  is  not  easy,  because  the  Cabinets  [of  Europe]  are 
cautioned,  and  there  is  neither  a  blind  French  nor  a  blind  Austrian 
camarilla  pushing  to  war ;  but  he  is  resolved  to  annihilate  Belgium, 
which  he  declares  to  be  the  central  government  of  the  poHtical 
Catholicism,  and  the  heart  of  coaUtional  conspiracies.  He  would 
easily  consent  to  a  partition  of  that  country  between  Holland  and 
France  so  that  the  French  might  definitely  accept  the  loss  of  Alsace 
Lorraine.  He  speaks  contemptuously  of  England,  because  it  would 
not  be  able  to  give  effective  military  assistance  to  Belgium. . . . 
Might  not  your  Queen  write  to  him  [the  Emperor  William]  and  tell 
him  plainly  what  Bismarck  aims  at  and  that  England  can  never 
abandon  Belgium  ? 

The  last  sentences  are  significant ;  for  they  prove  that 
neither  Bismarck  nor  Geffcken  doubted  the  binding 
character  of  our  obligation  to  defend  Belgium.  Bismarck 
sneeringly  said  that  we  could  not  save  Belgium,  if  Prussia 
attacked  her;  but  even  he,  with  his  cynical  disbehef  in 
the  sanctity  of  treaties 2,  did  not  doubt  that  we  ought 
to  make  the  attempt.  Geffcken,  a  German  constitutional 
Liberal,    took    it    for    granted   that   we   should   defend 

1  Morier,  Mems.  n.  333.  Geffcken  (1830-1896)  formerly  a  diplomat 
a  close  friend  of  the  Cro^vn  Prince  Frederick  William,  then  Professor  of 
Law  and  Constitutional  History  at  Strassburg  (1872-1880).  The  letter  is 
of  March  27,  1875.  For  the  fears  of  Belgium  see  MeTtia.  oj  Prince 
Hohenlohe,  vol.  n.  p.  143  (Eng.  edit.). 

•  Bismarck  ;  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  vol.  n.  p.  270  (Eng.  edit.). 


6  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Belgium,  as  we  were  bound  to  do  by  the  treaty  ol 
1839. 

Sir  Robert  Morier  believed  tbe  danger  of  a  German 
attack  on  France  to  be  acute;  and  two  conversations 
which  he  had  with  the  German  Crown  Prince  at  Munich, 
did  not  allay  his  apprehensions.  In  fact,  the  Crown 
Prince  admitted  that  Moltke  badly  wanted  war^.  Hos- 
tilities would  probably  have  followed  but  for  these  saving 
influences — the  peace-loving  character  of  Kaiser  WiUiam  I 
and  of  the  Crown  Prince  Frederick  William,  the  inter- 
vention of  Russia,  and  the  personal  appeals  of  Queen 
Victoria  to  Kaiser  William  I. 

On  this  last  topic  we  have  no  definite  information 
except  that  such  appeals  were  made  and  had  the  support  of 
the  Crown  Princess — a  fact  which  accounts  for  Bismarck's 
spite  against  that  illustrious  lady^.  Bismarck's  letter  of 
Aug.  13,  1875,  to  the  Emperor  also  shows  that  Queen 
Victoria  had  written  to  the  latter  stating  that  it  was 
easy  for  her  to  prove  that  her  apprehensions  were  not 
exaggerated.  The  Queen,  therefore,  had  good  authority 
for  believing  in  a  forthcoming  attack  by  Germany  upon 
France^. 

As  to  the  attitude  of  the  British  Government  little  is 
known.  But  that  little  is  enough.  Lord  Odo  Russell, 
then  British  ambassador  at  Berlin,  informed  his  brother, 
Arthur,  that  Bismarck  manifested  great  irritation  with 
Prince  Gortschakofi  because  of  the  intervention  of  the 

1  Sir  R.  Morier's  Mems.  n.  333-345. 

*  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  in.  242:  Bismarck,  ojp.  cit.  n. 
191-3,  249-253. 

•  Bismarck;  Some  Secret  Pages  oj  his  History,  iii.  325-7.  Prof. 
Oncken  in  the  Cambridge  Mod.  Hist.  vol.  xn.  141,  Beeks  to  minimise 
the  incident. 


ANGLO-GERMAN    RIVALRY    (1875—1888)        7 

Russian  Government  on  behalf  of  France,  and  that  shortly 
afterwards  he  complained  to  Lord  Odo  Russell  "of  the 
"preposterous  folly  and  ignorance  of  the  English  and 
"other  Cabinets,  who  had  mistaken  stories  got  up  for 
"speculations  on  the  Bourse  for  the  true  policy  of  the 
"German  Government.  *Then  will  you,'  asked  Lord  Odo, 
"  'censure  your  four  ambassadors  who  have  misled  us 
"  'and  the  other  Powers'?"  Bismarck  made  no  reply^. 
Further,  M.  Gavard,  charge  d'affaires  at  the  French 
Embassy  in  London,  reports  that  Lord  Derby,  Foreign 
Secretary,  uttered  these  words :  "  Such  an  act  of  aggression 
"(i.e.  by  Germany  against  France)  would  arouse  in 
"Europe  general  indignation,  which  would  nowhere  be 
"stronger  than  in  England.  Germany  herself  would 
"not  brave  such  a  manifestation  of  opinion.. .  .You  may 
"count  on  me;  you  may  count  on  this  Government  not 
"failing  in  its  duty.  I  give  you  in  this  matter  all  the 
"assurances  that  can  be  given  by  the  minister  of  a  con- 
"stitutional  sovereign^."  Lord  Derby  went  further.  He 
instructed  Lord  Odo  Russell  energetically  to  support  the 
peaceful  counsels  which  the  Tsar  of  Russia  was  then 
urging  at  Berlin.  On  May  9,  M.  Gavard  met  Lord 
Derby  at  the  diplomatic  circle  at  the  Foreign  Office,  and 
pressed  him  for  a  further  statement  of  his  views,  because 
mere  moral  considerations  had  never  stopped  Prince 
Bismarck.  Lord  Derby  then  explained  that  he  spoke 
of  moral  indignation,  "which  forms  those  Coalitions  under 
"which  the  first  Emperor  [Napoleon]  succumbed  in  spite 
"of  all  his  genius^." 

*  Sir  M.  Grant  Duff,  Notes  from  a  Diary  (1886-8),  vol.  I.  p.  129. 
Bismarck's  disclaimers  {Reflections  and  Reminisce. nas,  n.  188-193)  are 
obviously  insincere. 

•  C.  Gavard,  Vn  Diplomate  d  Londres,  pp.  242-3.  •  Rid.  p.  246. 


8  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  ^YAR 

In  the  year  1875  the  attack  on  France  desired  by  the 
Prussian  military  party  did  not  take  place,  mainly  owing 
to  the  urgent  representations  of  the  Tsar  Alexander  II. 
At  Petrograd  he  saw  the  French  envoy,  General  Leflo, 
and  repeated  his  earher  assurances  that  France  must  be 
preserved  in  a  condition  of  strength.  He  did  more.  He 
proceeded  to  Berlin;  and  after  all  the  world  had  been 
alarmed  by  Blowitz's  revelations  made  through  The  Times, 
he  had  no  difficulty  in  inducing  the  Emperor  Wilham  to 
discountenance  all  thoughts  of  war^. 

Of  set  purpose  I  have  avoided  details  in  order  to  bring 
out  the  salient  facts.  They  are  as  follows:  Whatever 
were  Bismarck's  plans,  it  is  certain  that  the  military 
men  at  BerHn  were  in  earnest  in  their  threats  to  Paris. 
It  is  also  certain  that  Russia  and  Great  Britain  most 
urgently  reprobated  any  such  threats.  Those  Govern- 
ments made  it  clear  that  any  unprovoked  attack  by  Ger- 
many on  France  would  bring  about  the  most  vigorous 
measures  against  the  aggressor;  and  that  probably  all 
Europe  would  take  up  arms  to  repel  the  attack.  There 
was  no  formal  aUiance  between  Great  Britain  and  Russia 
on  this  question.  But  they  took  this  course  of  action 
because  duty  and  interest  alike  prescribed  it;  and  all  the 
more  because  Belgium  was  threatened. 

One  point  more  claims  attention.  The  case  of  1875  is 
well  known  in  Germany.  All  pubhc  men,  all  newspaper 
editors,  are  aware  that,  from  1875  onwards,  it  has  been 
a  maxim  of  Russian  and  British  policy,  that  France  shall 
not  be  suddenly  taken  at  a  disadvantage  and  crushed. 
In  fact,  the  German  Chancellor,  during  his  memorable 
interview  with  Sir  Edward  Goschen  at  Berlin  on  July  29, 

*  H.  S.  de  Blowitz,  My  Memoirs,  ch.  v. 


ANGLO-GERMAN    RIVALRY    (1875—1888)        9 

1914,  admitted  that  to  be  one  of  the  cardinal  points  of 
British  policy.  The  conclusion  is  obvious.  We  are 
bound  to  conclude  that  the  German  expressions  of 
surprise  at  our  intervention  in  this  war  are  due  either  to 
unaccountable  ignorance  or  to  a  flimsy  pretence  of 
ignorance. 

The  affair  of  1875  was  very  important  in  many  ways. 
It  enabled  France  to  found  her  Republic  and  to  recover 
strength;  and  it  created  distrust  of  Germany.  The 
suddenness  with  which  Russia  and  Great  Britain  inter- 
vened made  Bismarck  angry  at  the  time  and  nervous 
for  the  future.  Evidently  his  Three  Emperors'  League, 
formed  in  the  year  1872,  did  not  count  for  much  when 
Russia's  interests  were  nearly  at  stake.  He  longed  for 
a  close  union  with  Russia,  and,  less  so,  with  Great  Britain. 
Now  both  ententes  were  uncertain.  What  wonder  that 
he  wrote:  "The  idea  of  coalitions  gave  me  nightmares ! i" 

Accordingly,  he  deferred  action  of  all  kinds  until  he 
could  be  sure  of  his  ground.  Thus,  colonial  expansion  was 
postponed  until  after  the  years  1881-2.  Bismarck's 
views  on  the  colonial  question  are  very  remarkable.  In 
1873  he  declared  that  colonies  would  be  only  a  cause  of 
weakness,  for  they  could  be  defended  only  by  powerful 
fleets,  and  "Germany's  geographical  position  did  not 
"necessitate  her  development  into  a  first-class  maritime 

"  power Many  colonies  had  been  offered  him,  but  he 

"had  rejected  them  and  wished  only  for  coaling-stations 
"acquired  by  treaty  from  other  nations^." 

Even  down  to  the  year  1883  Bismarck  continued  to 
discountenance  the  growing  agitation  for  German  colonies. 

*  Bismarck;  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  ii.  250-3. 

•  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  li.  337. 


10  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

But  early  in  1884  he  suddenly  veered  round,  greatly  to 
the  surprise  of  Lord  Ampthill  (Odo  Russell)  and  the  British 
Government.  The  reasons  for  this  change  of  front  are 
probably  as  follows.  In  1882  a  number  of  merchants  and 
others  had  founded  the  German  Colonial  Society,  which 
soon  set  on  foot  a  formidable  propaganda.  Now,  a  General 
Election  for  the  Reichstag  was  Ukely  to  occur  in  the  autumn 
of  1884,  the  results  of  which  were  doubtful ;  and,  as  Lord 
Ampthill  remarked,  the  cry  of  "Colonies  for  Germany" 
might  be  very  prejudicial  to  the  supporters  of  the  Chan- 
cellor. Thus,  according  to  Lord  Ampthill's  belief,  it  was 
the  nation  which  led  Bismarck  to  adopt  a  colonial  policy^. 
That  fact  should  be  remembered. 

Some  such  departure  was  natural.  For  the  adoption 
of  a  protectionist  regime  by  Germany  in  1879  soon  led 
to  the  result  generally  accruing  from  such  a  policy — viz. 
over  production ;  and  this  in  its  turn  led  the  over-producers 
to  clamour  for  new  markets  where  they  could  sell  at 
their  own  prices.  Thus  Bismarck  was  logically  bound 
to  take  up  the  colonial  policy  as  a  result  of  his  pro- 
tectionist policy. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  believe  that  he  was  by  no  means 
loth  to  enter  on  that  path;  for  in  1884  the  diplomatic 
situation  favoured  Germany  to  the  highest  extent.  In 
1879  she  had  framed  a  defensive  alliance  with  Austria 
which  decisively  checked  Russia's  forward  moves;  and, 
in  passing,  we  may  remember  Lord  Salisbury's  bene- 
diction on  the  Germanic  alliance:  "To  all  those  who  care 
"for  the  peace  of  Europe  and  take  an  interest  in  the 
"independence  of  nations,  I  would  exclaim  *A  crowning 
•*  *  mercy  has  been  vouchsafed  to  the  world.'  " 
•  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Oranville,  XL  p.  339. 


ANGLO-GERMAN    RIVALRY   (1875—1888)      11 

Four  years  later,  this  defensive  league  was  strength- 
ened by  the  accession  of  Italy.  Thus  was  formed  the 
Triple  Alliance.  It  is  well  known  that  the  adhesion  of 
Italy  resulted  from  her  intense  annoyance  at  the  seizure 
of  Tunis  by  France ;  and  that  seizure  was  first  suggested 
by  Bismarck  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin^.  Thus,  the  same 
event  busied  France  in  North  Africa  and  strengthened 
Germany  in  Europe.  Another  event  in  the  year  1882  was 
favourable  to  Germany.  British  intervention  in  Egypt 
against  Arabi  Pacha  served  to  embroil  us  with  Turkey. 
The  Sultan,  Abdul  Hamid,  never  forgave  us  for  that 
action;  and  Germany,  profiting  by  his  bad  temper,  soon 
began  that  flirtation  with  "the  unspeakable  Turk"  which 
led  up  to  grandiose  schemes  in  the  Levant. 

Of  those  schemes  more  in  the  sequel.  Here  I  wish 
to  point  out  the  extreme  caution  of  Bismarck.  He 
undertook  nothing  of  moment  in  the  colonial  sphere 
until  he  was  sure  of  his  position  in  Europe  and  saw  possible 
rivals  committed  to  a  forward  policy  elsewhere;  France 
and  Great  Britain  in  Africa,  Russia  in  Central  Asia. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  rejoiced  at  these  colonial 
adventures;  for  they  led  his  rivals  into  spheres  remote 
from  Germany.  Bismarck  and  his  underlings  knew  a 
good  deal  about  Russia's  policy;  for  at  Berlin  on  March 
24,  1884,  he  signed  a  treaty  with  her  and  Austria  which 
in  effect  revived  the  Dreikaiserhund  of  1872.  (It  was 
ratified  in  the  following  September  at  Skiernewice.)  For 
the  present,  then,  he  felt  absolutely  safe  in  Europe ;  and 
he  probably  was  aware  of  Russian  plans  of  expansion 
towards  India.  In  November  1884  his  able  subordinate, 
Bucher,  said  to  Busch:  "Just  keep  a  sharp  look-out  on 
*  Crispi,  Mems.  n.  98-109;   Blowitz,  My  Memoirs,  p.  165. 


12  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

"the  news  from  Afghanistan.  Something  will  happen 
"there  soon."  Bucher  was  right.  Russia  soon  annexed 
Merv,  thereby  bringing  about  sharp  tension  of  feeling 
in  England,  which  the  Duke  of  Argyll  described  as 
Mervousness. 

Therefore,  in  1884,  the  general  situation  was  peculiarly 
favourable  to  Germany.  She  had  formed  a  strong  alliance, 
then  the  only  alliance  in  Europe.  The  other  Powers 
were  engaged  in  centrifugal  efforts.  Thus  Germany  could 
safely  join  in  the  hunt  for  new  markets.  We  need  notice 
here  only  the  chief  of  her  enterprises,  viz.  in  South  Africa. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Bismarck  and  many  other 
German  patriots  looked  with  eager  interest  at  the  Boer 
Republics  of  South  Africa.  The  victory  of  the  Boers  at 
Majuba  Hill  (Feb.  1881)  and  the  tame  surrender  of  the 
Gladstone  Government  to  their  demands,  spread  a  deep 
impression  of  the  weakness  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
power  of  the  Boers.  Nowhere  was  that  impression  so 
deep  as  in  Germany;  and  the  notion  of  German  supre- 
macy in  that  part  of  the  world  rapidly  gained  strength. 
It  was  no  new  programme.  Even  before  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war  of  1870,  merchants  of  Hamburg,  Bremen 
and  Frankfurt  had  urged  Bismarck  to  found  a  colony  in 
a  temperate  climate,  and  South  Africa  was  suggested. 
A  scientific  expedition  set  out  to  view  the  land,  and  it 
received  a  warm  welcome  from  President  Burgers  of 
the  Transvaal  Republic.  But  their  report  "was  not  so 
"favourable  as  to  overcome  the  objections  of  Prince 
"Bismarck,"  who  considered  that  Germany  already  had, 
as  he  phrased  it,  'too  much  hay  on  the  fork'  "to  make  any 
"large  scheme  of  colonization  prudent^."     In  1875  the 

*  Sir  Bartle  Frere,  How  the  Transvaal  Trouble  arose,  p.  258. 


ANGLO-GERMAN    RIVALRY    (1875—1888)      13 

programme  was  changed.  A  German  resident  in  South 
Africa  urged  on  Bismarck  the  acquisition  of  Delagoa  Bay 
from  Portugal,  with  a  view  to  sending  a  steady  stream  of 
German  immigrants  into  the  Transvaal  "to  secure  the 
"future  dominion  over  that  country,  and  so  to  pave  the 
"way  for  the  foundation  of  a  German- African  Empire 
"of  the  future."  In  that  time  of  doubt  and  uncertainty 
Bismarck  did  not  take  up  the  proposal.  But  he  kept  it 
before  him,  with  a  view  to  furthering  some  such  scheme 
when  Germany's  position  in  Europe  was  better  assured. 
In  1876  the  Boers  sent  a  deputation  to  Berlin  to  request 
protection  from  Germany.  What  passed  is  not  known. 
But  it  is  probable  that  their  resistance  to  Britain's  recent 
decree  of  annexation  was  due,  in  part  at  least,  to  hopes 
of  assistance  from  Germany.  Probably  the  Russo- 
Turkish  war  of  1876-7  and  the  subsequent  friction  between 
Russia  and  Germany  postponed  action  by  the  latter; 
at  any  rate  Kriiger  and  a  Boer  deputation  which  pro- 
ceeded to  Berlin  and  other  capitals,  to  protest  against 
the  recent  annexation  by  Great  Britain,  met  with  no 
encouragement^.  During  that  time  of  tension  in  Europe, 
Sir  Bartle  Frere  annexed  Walfisch  Bay  to  the  British 
dominions  (1878).  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the 
bay  had  attracted  serious  attention  from  the  merchants 
of  Hamburg  and  Bremen,  and  that  the  loss  of  that 
harbour  rankled  deep. 

Early  in  1883  the  procedure  of  the  German  merchants 
was  as  follows.  A  Bremen  merchant,  Luderitz,  bought 
from  a  chief  a  tract  of  land  at  Angra  Pequena,  a  second- 
rate  harbour  some  200  miles  north  of  the  Orange  River, 
and    asked    the    German    Government    for    protection. 

^  Mems.  oj  Paul  Kriiger,  p.  145. 


14  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Thereupon  Bismarck  inquired  from  the  British  Govern- 
ment whether  it  would  protect  Liideritz.  Our  Govern- 
ment was  utterly  callous  as  to  his  safety;  but  it  had  to 
consult  the  Cape  Colony  about  what  was  behind  him. 
Delays  therefore  multiplied,  and  Bismarck  became 
annoyed,  because  the  General  Election  was  coming  on, 
and  his  enemies  would  taunt  him  with  weakness  unless 
he  scored  a  colonial  success^.  Finally,  Lord  Granville 
declined  all  responsibility,  but  declared  that  annexation 
of  that  district  by  Germany  would  be  an  act  of  encroach- 
ment on  Her  Majesty's  rights.  At  this  Bismarck  was 
furious.  He  resented  both  the  long  delay  and  the 
somewhat  cavalier  answer.  His  son.  Count  Herbert 
Bismarck  (then  at  London),  had  also  been  nettled  by 
Lord  Granville's  question  whether  Germany  was  not 
contemplating  an  extension  inland  from  Angra  Pequeiia 
towards  the  Transvaal.  Young  Bismarck  replied  hotly 
"That  is  a  question  of  mere  curiosity. .  .that  does  not 
"  concern  you^."  Of  course  it  did  concern  us  very  nearly, 
and  his  display  of  temper  was  more  illuminating  than 
the  fullest  reply. 

Finally,  a  settlement  was  reached.  We  needed  to 
buy  ofi  German  opposition  to  our  occupation  of  Egypt; 
and  we  did  so,  virtually,  by  giving  up  Angra  Pequena 
and  nearly  all  the  coast  as  far  north  as  the  Portuguese 
possessions.  Bismarck  was  greatly  pleased  with  the 
surrender.  It  came  just  in  time  to  enable  him  "to  bowl 
over"  his  enemies  in  the  Reichstag,  and  the  conclusion 
of  the  affair  produced  a  most  excellent  impression  through- 
out Germany — of  course   exactly   the   reverse  in   Cape 

*  Lowe,  Prince  Bismarck,  n.   241. 

»  Bismarck  ;  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  in.  120. 


ANGLO-GERMAN    RIVALRY    (1875—1888)      15 

Colony,  wluch  had  annexed  that  coastline,  and  now  had 
to  witness  the  reversal  of  its  patriotic  act^.  Thus  was 
laid  the  foundation  of  German  South- West  Africa.  Thus 
began  the  friction  between  the  British  and  German 
Empires  in  colonial  affairs. 

Friction  was  equally  acute  on  the  eastern  side  of 
South  Africa.  The  chief  point  in  dispute  was  St  Lucia 
Bay,  in  the  north  of  Zululand.  Germany  laid  her  schemes 
for  securing  that  bay  outright  (it  was  before  Tongaland 
was  British).  Herr  Liideritz  tried  to  repeat  there  the 
same  device  as  at  Angra  Pequena,  viz.  purchase  and  then 
a  claim  for  protection.  But  Germany  was  too  vigorous. 
She  had  some  dealings  with  envoys  of  the  Boer  Republics^ ; 
and  at  the  same  time  she  discussed  with  Portugal  the 
purchase  of  Delagoa  Bay.  This  was  too  much  even  for 
the  long-suffering  Gladstone  Ministry.  Fortunately,  it 
hunted  up  an  earlier  purchase  of  that  same  land  from  a 
former  chieftain;  and,  what  was  far  more  important,  it 
sent  H.M.S.  Goshawk  to  hoist  the  British  flag  at  St  Lucia 
Bay  with  an  intimation  to  Berlin  that  that  flag  would 
be  kept  flying  (October  4,  1884)3. 

Even  after  the  annexation  of  the  St  Lucia  Bay  district, 
a  large  party  of  Boers  protested  against  that  action  and 
attempted  to  found  there  the  "New  Republic,"  while 
the  ubiquitous  Liideritz  asserted  his  claim  to  60,000  acres 
in  that  neighbourhood.  When  the  "New  Republic"  got 
into  difficulties,  Piet  Joubert,  a  Minister  of  the  Transvaal, 
came  thither  and  suggested  that  its  founders  should  give 

*  Fitzmaurice,  n.  353-5. 

*  Ibid.  369.  Bucher  put  down  the  German  failure  to  Lord  Rose> 
bery's  sharpness  and  Count  H.  Bismarck's  want  of  astuteness  {Bismarck; 
Some  Secret  Pages,  m.  144). 

*  Govt.  Blue  Book  C.-4587,  p.  13. 


16  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

their  country  to  the  Germans  "  on  the  understanding  that 
"the  latter  would  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  Her  Majesty's 
"Government  to  allow  of  this  departure  from  the  Con- 
"vention."  The  British  Commissioner,  hearing  of  this 
proposal,  reported  it  to  the  Home  Government,  which 
remained  firm.  The  British  flag  therefore  continued  to 
fly  at  that  important  point,  despite  the  annoyance  of  the 
German  colonial  party  at  the  complaisance  of  Bismarck 
on  this  question^. 

Here,  then,  as  elsewhere,  German  merchants  were  far 
more  pushing  than  their  Government.  But  its  pohcy  of 
"peaceful  penetration"  towards  the  Transvaal  was  so 
far  threatening  as  to  cause  an  important  British  move  in 
the  autumn  of  the  year  1884.  Sir  Charles  Warren  waa 
then  despatched  to  South  Africa  with  a  small  expeditionary 
force.  Strengthened  by  loyal  colonists,  it  proceeded  to 
Bechuanaland,  drove  out  the  parties  of  Boers  who  were 
raiding  or  half  settling  that  land,  and  annexed  the  whole 
territory  to  the  British  Crown.  The  results  were  epoch- 
making.  Great  Britain  secured  the  highway  leading 
northwards  to  the  Zambesi;  and  she  also  drove  a  solid 
wedge  of  territory  between  the  Boer  Republics  and 
German  South-West  Africa.  The  importance  of  that 
success  will  be  obvious  if  you  can  imagine  German 
territories  coterminous  with  the  Transvaal  RepubUc 
during  the  Boer  War^. 

Kriiger  did  much  to  keep  open  the  hopes  of  the 
German  colonial  party.  On  one  occasion  he  spoke  as 
follows  to  a  party  of  Germans  at  Pretoria:    "As  a  child 

»  Govt.  Blue  Book  C.-4587,  pp.  87,  91,  110,  119;  Bismarck ;  Some 
Secret  Pages,  in.  p.  144. 

^  For  the  Bechuana  Question  Bee  John  Mackenzie,  by  W.  D.  Mackenzie, 
ohs.  XL-xiv ;  also  his  articles  in  the  Contemporary  Beview  for  1884-5. 


ANGLO-GERMAN    RIVALRY    (1875—1888)      17 

**  grows  up,  it  requires  bigger  clothes,  the  old  ones  will 
"  burst ;  and  that  is  our  position  today.  We  are  growing 
"  up,  and  although  we  are  young,  we  feel  that,  if  one  nation 
"  tries  to  kick  us,  the  other  will  try  to  stop  it. ...  I  feel 
"sure  that,  when  the  time  comes  for  the  Republic  to 
"wear  still  larger  clothes,  you  will  have  done  much  to 
"bring  it  about."  The  meaning  of  these  words  is  fairly 
clear.  The  Boer  Repubhcs  hoped  to  acquire  the  whole 
of  South  Africa;  and  in  that  adventure  they  confidently 
expected  the  help  of  Germany. 

In  other  regions  Germany  gained  enormously.  The 
Cameroons  (1885),  German  East  Africa  (1886-1890), 
German  New  Guinea  (1884-5),  were  the  three  spheres 
where  she  acquired  large  tracts  at  the  expense  of  British 
firms.  Samoa  and  other  islands  fell  to  her  later,  Samoa 
not  fully  till  1900.  In  the  prosecution  of  some  of  these 
designs  German  actions  were  at  times  signally  un- 
scrupulous. The  acts  of  Dr  Nachtigal  on  the  Guinea 
coast  and  of  Dr  Peters  in  East  Africa  showed  with 
what  dexterity  'scientific'  expeditions  could  be  used  for 
the  purpose  of  steahng  many  marches  on  the  British 
Government  and  securing  many  thousands  of  square  miles 
from  native  chiefs.  As  a  piece  of  diplomatic  cunning,  the 
revelations  of  Bucher  respecting  a  German  scheme  to 
seize  Zanzibar,  are  almost  unique.  It  failed  only  because 
the  German  agent,  Rohlfs,  bragged  about  his  mission  at 
Cape  Town^;  and  consequently  Kirke,  our  Consul  at 
Zanzibar,  was  able  to  take  precautionary  measures. 
Even  so,  however,  he  was  unable  to  save  British  interests 
in  the  Hinterland,  which  now  forms  German  East  Africa. 

^  Bismarck ;    Some  Secret  Pages,   m.   145 ;     Pari.   Papers,  Africa^ 
No.  I.     For  Samoa  see  R.  L.  Stevenson,  A  Footnote  to  History. 

B.  L.  2 


18  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Another  curious  episode  concerns  the  Kiel  Canal.  It 
is  not  generally  remembered  that  Bismarck  was  the  first 
seriously  to  propose  the  cutting  of  that  canal  and  the 
cession  of  Heligoland  by  Great  Britain^.  This  appears 
from  a  Memorandum  of  Lord  Granville  in  the  spring  of 
1884.  Count  Miinster,  the  German  ambassador  at 
London,  broached  the  subject  of  Hehgoland  to  Lord 
Granville  in  the  following  terms: 

It  was  a  place  of  no  importance  to  us  in  its  present  state,  whereas 
it  would  be  of  immense  importance  to  Germany,  to  ourselves,  and 
the  whole  world,  if  it  was  made  into  a  good  harbour  of  refuge.  This 
would  be  an  expensive  work  for  us  to  undertake.  We  could  not 
be  expected  to  go  to  such  an  expense,  whereas  Germany  would  be 
quite  ready  to  undertake  it.  Prince  Bismarck  wished  to  cut  a 
oanal  into  the  Baltic,  which  also  would  be  a  great  advantage  to 
us  as  the  most  powerful  nation  of  the  world.  But  Heligoland, 
which  of  course  would  be  always  open  to  our  ships,  would  be  a 
necessary  key  to  such  a  plan. 

Count  Miinster  said  it  was  as  good  as  impossible  that  Germany 
and  England  should  ever  be  at  war ;  but  the  cession  of  HeUgoland 
would  strengthen  the  good  feeling  of  Germany  towards  this  country 
to  an  extraordinary  degree. 

Lord  Granville  here  interjected  the  remark  that,  doubt- 
less, the  surrender  of  Gibraltar  to  Spain  would  strengthen 
the  good  feelings  of  Spain  towards  us  in  an  extraordinary 
degree.  After  this  damping  comment.  Count  Miinster 
was  more  reserved,  and  begged  Lord  Granville  not  to 
mention  the  matter  to  any  of  his  colleagues. 

There,  then,  the  affair  ended  for  the  present.     But, 

*  He  proposed  the  canal  in  1873,  but  was  successfnlly  opposed  by 
Moltke  and  the  military  party.  Bismarck  ;  Reflections  and  Reminiscenctt 
(vol.  n.  pp.  32-4).  The  scheme  met  with  more  favour  in  1885  {ih.  p.  34). 
On  the  value  of  Heligoland  to  Germany  see  C!ount  Reventlow,  DiuUch- 
land*  auswdrtige  Politik  (1888-1913),  pp.  44-9. 


ANGLO-GERMAN    RIVALRY    (1875—1888)      19 

in  recent  times,  William  I  and  Bismarck,  not  the  present 
Kaiser,  originated  the  notion  of  the  Kiel  and  North 
Sea  Canal.  That  Bismarck  shrouded  the  scheme  with  a 
philanthropic  glamour,  and,  with  the  same  specious 
professions,  sought  to  wheedle  us  into  the  cession  of 
Hehgoland,  only  marks  his  sense  both  of  the  gullibihty 
of  the  British  public  and  of  the  good  nature  of  Lord 
Granville^.  In  this  case  he  somewhat  overshot  the  mark. 
It  is  worth  noticing  that  the  colonial  expansion  of 
Germany  occurred  at  a  time  when  she  had  no  fleet  adequate 
to  cope  with  the  British  fleet.  In  truth,  the  British 
Government,  both  that  of  Mr  Gladstone  and  that  of 
Lord  SaHsbury,  looked  upon  that  expansion  as  a  natural 
and  commendable  development.  Mr  Gladstone  went  so 
far  as  to  utter  these  words  of  benediction:  "If  Germany 
"is  to  become  a  colonising  Power,  all  I  can  say  is,  God 
"speed  her.  She  becomes  our  ally  and  partner  in  the 
"execution  of  the  great  purposes  of  Providence  for  the 
"advantage  of  mankind.  I  hail  her  in  entering  upon 
"that  course,  and  glad  will  I  be  to  find  her  associating 
"with  us  in  carrying  the  light  of  civihzation,  and  the 
"blessings  that  depend  upon  it,  to  the  more  backward 
"and  less  significant  regions  of  the  world."  Mr  Joseph 
Chamberlain,  though  less  benevolent,  was  equally  specific. 
On  January  5,  1885,  he  said — "  If  foreign  nations  are 
"determined  to  pursue  distant  colonial  enterprises,  we 
"  have  no  right  to  prevent  them  " ;  but  he  added  that 
we  would  protect  our  colonies  if  they  were  seriously 
menaced^. 

*  See  Prince  Hohenlohe's  Memoirs  (Eng.  edit.),  n.  311 :  "Gladstone 
may  remain  in  office.  It  will  be  good  for  us,  bad  for  England  "  (Nov.  2, 
1884). 

*  Mr  Chamberlain's  Speeches  (1914),  I.  p.  136. 

2—2 


20  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Lord  Salisbury  also  was  friendly  to  Germany,  regarding 
her  as  a  possible  check  on  Russia^.  After  1886  she  became 
so  to  some  extent,  a  fact  which  probably  explains  the 
extreme  complaisance  of  the  Sahsbury  Cabinet  to  that 
of  Berlin  in  1890. 

This  topic  must  be  dealt  with  later.  Here  I  have 
sought  to  show  that  the  German  mercantile  class  pushed 
on  its  Government  to  a  colonial  policy;  that  Bismarck 
(the  incarnation  of  prudence  after  1875)  entered  reluct- 
antly on  that  new  and  doubtful  path;  and  that  German 
colonial  aims  met  with  no  opposition  from  Great  Britain, 
except  where  her  vital  interests  were  at  stake. 

*  Bismarck  ;  Some  Secret  Pages,  m.  143. 


II 

THE   KAISER 

Principes  pro  victoria  pugnant,  comitea  pro  principe. 

(Tacitus,  Germania,  ch.  14.) 

Among  no  people  has  the  leader  and  ruler  counted 
for  more  than  among  the  Germans.  With  them  personal 
influence  has  prevailed  over  the  dictates  of  law  and  of 
a  constitution.  Tacitus  noticed  that  peculiarity  among 
the  ancient  Germans.  In  the  tribal  assembly  the  chief 
carried  his  proposal  more  by  his  individual  influence  than 
by  the  authority  of  his  office.  So  also  in  Beowulf,  the 
chief  is  the  designer  of  plans,  the  comrades  are  merely 
his  followers,  led  by  his  forethought,  nerved  by  his 
example,  and  rarely,  if  ever,  questioning  his  decision. 

The  same  is  true  of  recent  times.  The  Great  Elector 
and  Frederick  the  Great  made  Prussia.  Under  the  two 
imwarhke  successors  of  Frederick,  the  Kingdom  declined 
in  strength  and,  in  fact,  nearly  perished,  until  Bliicher 
and  Gneisenau  arose  to  lead  the  Prussians  once  more  to 
victory.  The  contrast  between  that  "King  Waverer," 
Frederick  Wilham  IV,  and  the  victor  of  Sedan,  Wilham  I, 
is  starthng;  but  look  at  the  trio  surrounding  Kaiser 
Wilham — Bismarck,  Moltke,  Roon — and  the  riddle  is 
solved.     In  ordinary  times  the  German  is  home-loving, 


22  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

passive.     Under    a    great    leader    he    displays    the    old 
Berserkir  rage. 

This  dependence  of  Germans  on  their  leaders  may  be 
explained  thus.  Their  geographical  situation  was  weak; 
for  they  had  no  well-defined  natural  boundaries.  There- 
fore a  vigorous  lead  had  to  make  up  for  the  lack  of  natural 
advantages.  Also  their  laws  and  institutions  were  never 
thoroughly  Romanized.  Accordingly,  until  a  recent 
time  the  Germanic  State  has  been  weak,  and  the  idea  of 
law  has  not  dominated  Ufe  as  it  has  among  the  Latin 
peoples.  The  Germans  have  therefore  depended  more 
than  any  people  on  their  great  men.  On  the  appearance 
of  an  inspiring  leader,  their  docility  is  phenomenal. 

In  the  present  age,  a  leader,  who  is  also  ruler,  has  called 
forth  to  utmost  tension  all  the  energies  of  the  German 
race.  He  has  accomphshed  this  feat,  owing  to  the  con- 
ditions of  German  national  hfe  and  the  charms  of  his 
personality. 

His  character  is  more  complex  and  enigmatical  than 
that  of  any  sovereign  of  our  time,  indeed,  since  that  of 
the  first  Napoleon.  There  are  very  diverse  strains  in 
his  nature.  Its  basis  is  Hohenzollern ;  and  he  seems  to 
have  forced  to  the  front  this  side  of  his  being ;  for  he  is  a 
man  of  strong  will-power,  as  nearly  all  the  Hohenzollerns 
have  been.  Occasionally,  as  in  the  case  of  Frederick 
WiUiam  II  (1786-1797)  there  have  been  sovereigns 
remarkable  for  love  of  vicious  pleasures;  but  in  the  main 
the  Prussian  Kings  have  worked  hard  and  lived  simply. 
They  have  been  energetic  Commanders-in-Chief,  not 
remarkable  for  width  of  view  or  variety  of  attainments. 
Macaulay  has  thus  trenchantly  described  Frederick 
William  I,  father  of  Frederick  the  Great;    "The  business 


THE    KAISER  23 

"of  life,  accoiding  to  him,  was  to  drill,  and  to  be  drilled. 
"The  recreations  suited  to  a  prince  were  to  sit  in  a  cloud 
"of  tobacco  smoke,  to  sip  Swedish  beer,  to  play  back- 
"  gammon  for  three  half-pence  a  rubber,  to  kill  wild 
"  hogs,  and  to  shoot  partridges  by  the  thousand."  The 
Macaulay  touch  is  always  too  staccato.  Still,  it  is  true 
that  the  life  of  the  old  Hohenzollerns  was  rough,  almost 
boorish. 

There  were,  however,  two  prominent  exceptions — 
Frederick  I  (1688-1713)  and  Frederick  William  IV  (1840- 
61).  The  latter,  the  great-uncle  of  the  present  Kaiser, 
was  a  man  of  varied  attainments;  and  to  him  we  ilaust 
pay  attention ;  for  it  is  clear  that  the  Kaiser  inherits,  in 
the  main,  two  sets  of  tendencies.  The  former  of  these  is 
derived  from  his  grandfather,  William  I  (1861-1888),  a 
man  of  simple,  rigid,  and  yet  not  unkindly  nature,  of 
the  usual  Prussian  type;  while  his  predecessor,  his 
brother,  Frederick  Wilham  IV,  was  a  man  of  singularly 
versatile  genius,  but  utterly  deficient  in  steadfastness  of 
aim.  In  conversation  he  pleased,  in  action  he  disgusted, 
everybody.  Quick  to  speak,  overflowing  in  ideas,  roman- 
tic in  his  outlook  on  life,  he  was  the  ornament  of  every 
social  circle,  but  the  despair  of  every  Cabinet.  That 
cosmopolitan  statesman,  Baron  Stockmar,  saw  him 
during  a  royal  visit  to  the  British  Court  in  1842  for  the 
purpose  of  acting  as  godlather  to  His  late  Majesty, 
Edward  VII.  In  a  confidential  interview  the  King 
exhibited  his  powers  of  speech  and  his  restless  ambition. 
During  an  hour  he  dilated  on  the  precarious  position  of 
Belgium.  He  felt  certain  that,  in  case  of  a  Franco- 
Prussian  war,  France  would  at  once  seize  the  Belgian 
fortresses.     Even   in   time   of   peace,    he   said,    Belgium 


24  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

tended  to  gravitate  towards  France.  This  was  dangerous 
for  Germany,  and,  as  the  natural  protector  of  Germany, 
he  suggested  that  the  best  course  of  action  for  Belgium 
would  be  to  enter  the  Germanic  Confederation.  He  set 
forth  his  views  enthusiastically  and  eloquently,  and 
seemed  somewhat  surprised  when  Stockmar  maintained 
that  Belgium  was  resolved  to  uphold  its  independence. 
Stockmar  found  him  a  man  of  sentiment,  poetical,  in- 
clined to  mysticism,  a  dreamer  in  politics,  and  by  no 
means  a  statesman^. 

In  fact,  his  lack  of  statesmanship  was  always  apparent. 
Thus,  after  instituting  a  Prussian  United  Landtag  in  1847, 
he  read  it  an  extremely  irritating  lecture  at  the  opening 
Session — They  were  not  representatives  of  the  people. 
He  derived  his  kingly  authority  from  God  alone,  and  he 
would  never  allow  a  sheet  of  paper  (i.e.  a  constitution)  to 
come  between  "the  Lord  God  in  Heaven  and  his  subjects." 
The  same  thought  led  him  to  reject  the  crown  of  a  demo- 
cratic German  Empire  founded  in  1849.  He  referred 
scornfully  to  the  new  imperial  crown  as  "the  iron  fetter 
"  by  which  the  descendant  of  four  and  twenty  sovereigns, 
"the  ruler  of  16,000,000  subjects,  and  the  lord  of  the 
"bravest  and  most  loyal  army  in  the  world,  would  be 
"made  the  mere  serf  of  the  Revolution." 

This  unfortunate  King  possessed  many  fatal  gifts. 
He  frequently  wove  plans  which  it  was  beyond  his  power 
to  carry  out;  for  he  let  his  faculties  run  hither  and 
thither  and  never  concentrated  them  on  one  practicable 
object.  After  seeing  all  his  plans  miscarry,  he,  in  the 
year  1857,  showed  symptoms  of  lunacy;  and  the  last 
four  years  of  his  Hfe  were  marked  by  hopeless  madness. 
*  Mems.  oj  Baron  Stockmar,  n.  pp.  78-85. 


THE    KAISER  25 

His  younger  brother,  William  I,  was  far  less  imagin- 
ative and  sensitive.  A  plain  man,  who  never  saw  far 
ahead,  he  often  made  mistakes;  but,  as  he  never  talked 
much,  no  one  saw  that  they  were  mistakes;  and  he 
generally  had  the  good  sense  to  retrace  his  steps  before 
it  was  too  late.  After  his  death,  in  1888,  Bismarck  went 
so  far  as  to  say  of  him :  "  When  anything  of  importance 
"was  going  on,  he  usually  began  by  taking  the  wrong 
"road;  but  in  the  end  he  always  allowed  himself  to  be 
''put  straight  again^." 

Now,  that  is  literally  true  at  many  points  of  his  career. 
Probably  his  reign  would  have  ended  in  disaster  but 
for  the  singularly  able  guidance  of  Bismarck  and  his  co- 
adjutors. We  must,  however,  add  that  Kaiser  William  I 
had  a  good  eye  for  character;  and  when  he  found  a 
trusty  counsellor,  he  never  dismissed  him,  however  trying 
the  times.  He  supported  his  Ministers  steadfastly;  and 
he  himself  ran  straight  towards  a  well  defined  goal. 
Distrusting  his  own  abilities,  which  were  slight,  he  heark- 
ened to  good  counsel;  and  therefore  the  reign  of  that 
plain,  unassuming  soldier  ended  amidst  a  galaxy  of  glory. 

Striking  the  mean  between  the  two  brothers,  we 
should  arrive  at  an  interesting  compromise — a  man  rest- 
less in  habit  and  romantic  of  speech,  yet  also  possessing 
great  power  of  organization ;  a  weaver  of  daring  schemes, 
yet  also  patient  and  persistent  in  preparing  for  their 
execution;  an  orator,  yet  also  a  man  of  action;  a  lover 
of  the  arts,  but  pre-eminently  a  soldier.  Such  a  man  is 
Kaiser  William  II. 

He  is,  I  believe,  an  example  of  atavism,  that  is,  his 
nature  recurs  to  that  of  the  previous  generations.  In  few 
^  Bismarck ;  Some  Secret  Pagos,  in,  176. 


26  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

traits  of  Lis  character  does  he  resemble  his  father  or 
mother,  except  in  fondness  for  Htcrature,  art,  and  music ; 
and  those  characteristics  he  shares  with  his  great-uncle. 
As  is  well  known,  his  mother,  formerly  Princess  Royal  of 
Great  Britain,  was  very  clever — far  too  clever  for  the 
Prussian  Court  of  her  days;  and  her  sharp  ironical 
remarks,  no  less  than  her  decidedly  English  ways,  often 
brought  her  into  difficulties.  Further,  the  almost  demo- 
cratic views  of  the  father,  the  Emperor  Frederick,  were 
extremely  unpopular  in  Court  circles,  witness  the  brutal 
remark  of  Busch,  after  his  death,  at  his  relief  of  the 
removal  of  that  "incubus."^  Such  was  the  general  feeling 
among  the  governing  classes;  and  the  present  Kaiser 
seems  to  have  displayed  very  little  filial  affection  during 
the  long  drawn-out  agony  of  that  winter  and  spring  of  1888. 
With  his  mother  he  had  previously  been  on  strained 
terms  owing  to  her  rather  too  open  expression  of  pro- 
gressive views  and  her  fondness  for  England.  His 
annoyance  came  to  a  head,  early  in  the  year  1888,  owing 
to  the  ardent  love  of  his  sister,  Victoria,  for  Prince 
Alexander  of  Battenberg,  a  noble  and  chivalrous  character, 
beloved  by  nearly  everybody  except  his  uncle,  the  Tsar 
of  Russia.  Because  that  marriage  would  have  offended 
the  Tsar,  besides  introducing  one  more  ally  of  England 
into  the  Court  circle,  the  present  Kaiser  and  Bismarck 
bitterly  opposed  it.  The  Empress  Victoria  no  less  firmly 
advocated  it;  but,  finally,  for  reasons  of  State,  she  and 
her  daughter  had  to  give  way.  Bismarck's  Journal  shows 
that  it  was  our  Queen,  who,  during  a  visit  to  Berlin, 
counselled  the  surrender  of  the  happiness  of  her  grand- 
daughter in  order  to  restore  peace  in  the  Imperial  family 

*  Bigmarck;  Some  Secret  Pages,  m.  190. 


THE    KAISER  27 

at  Potsdam.  Queen  Victoria  did  more:  she  brought 
about  a  reconciliation  between  Prince  William  and  his 
mother.  There,  doubtless,  is  the  reason  for  the  veneration 
which  he  has  always  felt  for  the  Queen-Empress.  Her 
death  in  1901  inaugurated  a  period  of  greater  strain 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany.  At  this  point, 
again,  the  atavism  of  his  nature  is  well  marked ;  and  this 
peculiarity,  together  with  the  special  reason  for  gratitude 
to  his  grandmother,  acted  as  a  check  on  his  anti-British 
feehngs.  How  strong  they  were  may  be  judged  by  a 
trifling  incident.  On  one  occasion  his  sister,  Victoria, 
talked  about  being  "at  home"  in  England.  At  once  he 
flung  at  her  an  epithet  which  is  semi-officially  reported 
to  have  been  either  "goose"  or  " sheep." ^ 

Opposition  to  parents  and  to  brothers  and  sisters  is 
often  a  trait  of  very  decided  natures ;  and  it  was  therefore 
traditional  in  the  House  of  Hohenzollern,  which  is  nothing 
if  not  decided  and  determined.  We  think  of  Frederick 
the  Great  in  his  youth,  caned,  starved,  and  once  all  but 
shot,  by  his  bullying  father.  And  the  course  of  the 
Hohenzollerns  has  generally  been  one  of  sharp  zigzags 
during  successive  reigns.  The  revolt  of  the  present 
Kaiser  against  the  peaceful  and  progressive  tendencies 
of  his  father  early  became  evident.  He  was  always  a 
soldier.  At  the  age  of  eight  he  exacted  a  mihtary  salute 
from  a  somewhat  negligent  sentinel^;  and  at  the  age  of 
23  his  portrait  was  thus  limned  by  Bismarck:  "He 
"  wishes  to  take  the  Government  into  his  own  hands :  he 
"is  energetic  and  determined,  not  at  all  disposed  to  put 

*  Bismarck;  Some  Secret  Pages,  m.  184, 188.     M.  Harden,  Monatvhs 
and  Men,  pp.  16,  99. 

*  Maurice  Leudet,  The  Emperor  William  at  home  (Eng.  edit.  p.  27). 


28  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

"up  with  parliamentary  Co-regents — a  regular  Guardsman. 
"  Perhaps  he  may  one  day  develop  into  le  rocher  de  bronze 
"  of  which  we  stand  in  need."  A  little  later  the  Chancellor 
received  from  the  young  prince  a  curious  present — his 
portrait  with  the  ominous  words  written  underneath — 
"Cave,  adsum^." 

The  groundwork  of  the  Kaiser's  character  is  therefore 
stiffly  and  aggressively  old-Prussian.  Apart  from  his 
artistic  leanings,  he  exhibits  a  recurrence  to  the  earher 
type.  His  patriotism  is  intense,  almost  furious;  and 
therein  hes  the  secret  of  his  power.  He  has  evoked  a 
storm  of  patriotic  fervour  such  as  the  world  has  not  seen 
for  a  century  past.  Against  such  a  man  it  is  childish 
merely  to  rail.  To  insult  him  is  far  worse.  Our  duty 
should  be  to  try  to  understand  him;  to  find  out  the 
secret  of  that  influence  which  he  has  exerted  upon  his 
people;  to  absorb  the  best  elements  of  German  national 
strength  into  our  more  torpid  and  ill-organized  society. 

Firstly,  then,  let  us  notice  his  phenomenal  activity. 
He  is  one  of  the  hardest  workers  in  that  nation  of  hard 
workers.  By  example,  as  well  as  by  precept,  he  requires 
the  utmost  amount  of  eflQ.cient  toil  in  every  grade  of  life; 
and  the  motive  everywhere  is  the  same:  it  is  for  the 
Fatherland.  Germany  tolerates  no  drones.  The  hive 
swarms  with  workers;  and  sport,  though  it  has  gained 
ground  of  late,  does  not  absorb  the  large,  the  dangerously 
large,  share  of  the  nation's  energies  which  it  unfortunately 
does  in  these  islands.  In  Germany  the  welfare  of  the 
nation  comes  first,  the  pleasure  of  the  individual  comes 
second;    and  neither  the  Kaiser,  nor  the  pubhc  opinion 

*  "Take  care :  I  am  near  yoo."     M.  Harden,  p.  96;  Bismarck  ;  Some 
Becrd  Pages,  m.  56. 


THE    KAISER  29 

which  he  has  trained,  would  tolerate,  in  times  of  grave 
national  crises,  the  holding  of  great  football  matches  for 
the  sake  of  the  gate-money  which  they  bring  in.  The 
Kaiser's  career  has  been  a  constant  appeal  for  national 
efficiency;  and  hence  the  prodigious  strength  which 
Germany  is  now  putting  forth. 

Kaiser  William  could  not  have  exerted  his  phenomenal 
influence,  had  he  not  been  endowed  by  nature  with 
considerable  personal  charm.  After  the  reign  of  the 
stiff  and  severe  William  I,  and  the  concentrated  tragedy 
of  the  three  months'  reign  of  Frederick  III,  the  advent  of 
the  young  War-lord  was  hailed  with  enthusiasm.  His 
bearing  betokened  the  guardsman,  his  varied  accomplish- 
ments dazzled  the  Court,  his  words  set  the  blood  tingling. 
He  resembled  Henry  V  after  the  cautious  Henry  IV,  as 
limned  by  Shakespeare : 

Ely.  We  are  blessed  in  the  change. 

Cant.     Hear  him  but  reason  in  divinity. 

And,  all- admiring  with  an  inward  wish. 

You  would  desire  the  Kiug  were  made  a  prelate. 

Hear  him  debate  of  commonwealth  affairs 

You  would  say  it  hath  been  aU  in  all  his  study: 

Liist  his  discourse  of  war,  and  you  shall  hear 

A  fearful  battle  rendered  you  in  music: 

Turn  him  to  any  cause  of  poHcy, 

The  Gordian  knot  of  it  he  will  unloose 

Famihar  as  his  garter. 

Here  is  a  very  favourable  account  of  the  Kaiser 
penned  by  the  late  Mr  Edward  Dicey,  just  before  the 
State  visit  to  London  in  the  spring  of  1911. 

No  one  can  be  in  his  company  for  long  without  f eeHng  the  charm 
of  his  presence  and  learning  something  of  the  breadth  of  his  mind. 
He  seems  to  be  able  to  converse  on  anything,  and  to  converse  equally 


30  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

well  on  all  subjects;  nor  is  the  knowledge  he  shows  superficial. 
He  always  goes  to  the  root  of  the  question ;  and  it  would  be  unwise 
for  anyone  not  armed  at  all  points  to  seek  an  audience  with  His 
Imperial  Majesty.  He  talks  quite  openly,  and  in  a  way  which  givei 
•onfidence;  and  he  quickly  turns  from  one  subject  to  another 
just  as  the  conversation  leads  him.  Courteous  and  kind,  he  makes 
you  feel  at  home  at  once ;  and,  while  his  bearing  and  mien  command 
respect,  he  in  no  way  demands  homage*. 

This  natural  and  impulsive  manner  he  inherited  from 
his  mother,  who  could  rarely  resist  the  temptation  of 
saying  a  clever  thing.  But  there  again  the  Kaiser's 
eloquence  and  love  of  oratory  is  akin  to  that  of  his  great- 
uncle.  He  is  one  of  the  ablest  impromptu  speakers  of 
his  Empire.  Two  examples  of  his  art  must  suffice.  In 
November  1901  at  a  meeting  of  the  Institution  of  Naval 
Architects  in  Charlottenburg  he  w^as  present  at  a  lecture 
followed  by  a  discussion.  At  the  end  of  the  discussion, 
to  the  utmost  surprise  of  the  audience,  he  rose  from  his 
seat,  and,  ascending  the  rostrum,  delivered  a  speech 
which  well  summed  up  the  whole  of  the  question  in 
debate.  Never  losing  himself  in  technicalities,  he  made 
the  question  live,  Hghtening  it  once  with  a  touch  of 
humour^. 

The  other  occasion  was  even  more  remarkable.  It 
occurred  during  a  festivity  at  the  University  of  Berlin. 
Arndt's  patriotic  song  of  1813, 

"  Der  Gott  der  Eisen  wachsen  lieB, 
Der  wollte  keine  Knechte," 

had  raised  enthusiasm  to  a  high  pitch,  and  that  en- 
thusiasm bore  the  Kaiser  to  the  rostrum.  The  opening 
•entences  were  somewhat  forced  and  nervous;    but  his 

*  TJie  Empire  Review,  May,  1911. 

*  L.  Elkind,  The  German  Emperor's  Speeches,  pp.  251-3. 


THE    KAISER  81 

will  soon  banished  all  nervousness.  The  full,  sonorous 
voice  began  to  fill  the  great  hall  and  dominate  the 
situation,  until  at  the  end  the  audience  spontaneously 
burst  forth  into  the  patriotic  song —  *'  Heil  dir  im  Sieger- 
kranz^." 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  possesses  the  imaginative  gifts  which 
add  dignity  to  oratory.  His  love  of  Germany's  richly 
storied  past  enriched  the  speech  which  he  dehvered  in 
1902  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  the  city  of  Charlemagne.  After 
dweUing  on  those  historic  associations,  he  launched  out 
on  a  wider  sphere. 

So  powerful  and  so  great  a  figure  was  that  mighty  Germanic 
Prince,  that  Rome  herself  offered  him  the  dignity  of  the  Roman 
Caesars,  and  he  was  chosen  to  enter  upon  the  heritage  of  the 
Imperium  Romanum — assuredly  a  splendid  recognition  of  the 
efficiency  of  our  German  race,  then  entering  on  the  stage  of  history. 
. .  .But  to  unite  the  office  of  the  Roman  Emperor  with  the  dignity 
and  burdens  of  a  Teutonic  king  was  a  task  beyond  the  power  of  man. 
What  he,  with  his  mighty  personality,  was  able  to  accomplish,  fate 
denied  to  his  successors;  and  in  their  anxiety  to  gain  the  Empire 
of  the  World,  the  later  Imperial  dynasties  lost  sight  of  the  German 
nation  and  country  2. 

Would  that  Kaiser  WilHam  had  learnt  that  lesson ! 

There  is  in  his  nature  a  decided  vein  of  romanticism. 
It  appears  in  his  love  of  old  German  hterature — its  sagas 
and  mythology.  As  an  instance  of  the  Kaiser's  skilful 
handling  of  Norse  mythology  for  the  furtherance  of  his 
maritime  designs,  let  me  cite  part  of  his  speech  at  the 
launching  of  the  ironclad,  Heimdall,  at  Kiel  in  1892 : 

We  are  now  called  upon  to  give  the  ship  a  name.  Its  name 
will  be  taken  from  the  earliest  history  of  our  forefathers  in  the 

*  Lamprecht,  Der  Kaiser  (Berlin,  1913),  pp.  74-8. 

•  Ibid.  p.  71. 


32  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

north.  Thou  shalt  receive  the  name  of  the  god  to  whom  was 
entrusted,  as  his  main  function,  the  duty  of  defence:  of  that  god 
whose  bonndcn  duty  it  was  to  protect  and  keep  the  golden  gates 
of  Walhalla  from  every  base  intruder.  As  the  god,  when  danger 
was  afoot,  blew  a  far-sounding  blast  on  his  golden  horn  and  sum- 
moned the  gods  to  battle  in  the  twilight  of  the  gods,  so  may  it  be 
with  thee.     Glide  down  into  thy  element.     Be  thou  ever  a  faithful 

warden  of  the  seas And  if  ever  the  day  comes  when  thou  art 

called  upon  to  do  battle,  deal  destruction  and  devastation  in  the 
ranks  of  thy  enemies*. 

A  ruler  whom  the  gods  wish  to  destroy  they  endow 
with  eloquence.  It  is  a  fatal  gift,  especially  in  a  con- 
tinental potentate.  In  the  main,  the  successful  monarchs 
have  been  plain,  tactful,  silent  men.  From  the  time  of 
Maximilian  I  to  that  of  Napoleon  the  Great,  and  down  to 
William  II,  rhetoric  has  kindled  enthusiasm  in  the  people, 
but  it  has  also  alarmed  neighbouring  Powers.  Never 
has  it  been  more  fatal  than  with  Kaiser  Wilham.  A 
careful  and  sympathetic  observer  admits  that  he 
"becomes  intoxicated  with  his  own  words^."  This  is 
undoubtedly  the  case ;  and  during  many  years  all  peace- 
loving  Germans  trembled  when  it  was  rumoured  that 
the  Emperor  was  about  to  speak  or  had  fired  off  a  political 
telegram.  Finally,  his  Chancellor  had  to  insist  that  both 
speeches  and  telegrams  should  be  subjected  to  some 
measure  of  official  supervision.  After  that,  Europe  was 
much  duller  during  many  a  long  month. 

His  worst  enemies  admit  that  he  is  a  very  interesting 
man;  and,  like  the  great  Napoleon,  he  hides  under  a 
pleasing   surface    that   reserve    of   strength    which,    by 


1  Elkind,  p.  257. 

"  As  at  Doberitz  in   1903  (Lamprecht,  tbid.  pp.  69-77). 


THE    KAISER  33 

imposing  respect  and  a  certain  secret  fear,  doubles  the 
present  witchery.  A  sharp  nod  of  the  head,  a  flash  of 
the  eye,  a  ring  in  the  tone  of  the  voice,  and  you  are 
reminded  that  under  feline  charm  lies  feline  hardness. 

For  the  stern  Hohenzollern  nature  is  there,  enriched 
though  it  was  by  the  Guelph-Coburg  strain.  Those  old 
Hohenzollern  Electors  and  Kings,  who  thrashed  their 
sons  and  dragooned  their  subjects,  bequeathed  to  him  a 
nature  which  no  civilian  trainmg  could  wholly  modernize. 
Kaiser  William's  parents  had  sought  to  bend  his  nature 
towards  industrial  and  economic  studies,  and  therefore 
sent  him  to  school  at  Cassel,  with  an  instruction  that 
the  artistic  side  of  his  nature  was  to  be  developed.  He 
was  to  visit  museums,  factories,  and  mines^.  He  would 
have  none  of  them.  There  and  at  the  University  of  Bonn 
his  chief  interest  was  in  the  army  and  navy.  At  Bonn 
his  student's  room  was  full  of  photographs  of  German 
warships,  the  description  of  which  he  knew  by  heart. 
Voyages  of  adventure  and  discovery  were  his  favourite 
study;  and  he  longed  to  visit  Egypt^.  By  way  of  pre- 
paration, perhaps,  for  that  visit,  he  encouraged  the 
fighting  spirit  among  the  students.  M.  Amedee  Pigeon, 
who  knew  him  well  at  Bonn,  writes  of  his  passion  for 
witnessing  the  students'  sword-duels:  "He  would  stand 
"for  an  hour  around  the  combatants.  How  often  have 
"I  seen  him  pale,  nervous,  attentive,  watching  the 
"play  of  the  duellists. ...  He  was  happy  in  witnessing 
"those  spectacles  where  blood  flows,  where  often  a  bit 
"  of  a  nose  or  a  cheek  is  taken  off  by  the  sword, . . .  and  his 

*  G.  Hinzpeter,  Kaiser  Wilhdm  II  (Bielefeld,  1888). 

*  Leudet,  ch.  n. ;  Reventlow,  pp.  57-05,  100-2,    '  ReicLsgewalt  ist 
Seegewalt  und  Seegewalt  Rdichsgewalt." 


34  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

"pleasure  was  redoubled  in  eluding  the  police,  who  are 
"supposed  to  discountenance  these  duels,. .  .but  who,  in 
•'fact,  tolerate  and  wink  at  them^." 

Everyone  agrees  that  he  was  always  extremely  self- 
willed.  Even  his  tutor,  Hinzpeter,  in  an  almost  official 
panegyric,  admits  that,  while  outwardly  obedient  to 
University  discipUne,  he  went  his  own  way  entirely  in 
the  mental  domain — witness  the  following.  His  first 
tutor  in  matters  religious  belonged  to  the  progressive 
school;  but  he  was  suddenly  replaced  by  an  extremely 
orthodox  tutor.  The  change  made  no  difference  whatever 
to  the  pupil's  religious  beliefs^.  The  incident  does  not 
necessarily  prove  imperviousness  at  all  parts  of  the 
brain ;   but  it  may  be  taken  as  symptomatic. 

A  man  possessed  of  great  will-power  and  personal 
charm  can  generally  dominate  others;  and  the  Kaiser 
has  exercised  a  uniquely  fascinating  and  controlling 
power  over  the  German  people.  As  an  American  writer 
has  said,  wherever  you  touch  the  German  people,  you 
touch  the  Kaiser^.  Here  we  may  cite  as  witness  one 
of  the  most  prolific  and  patriotic  of  the  German  pro- 
fessors. Dr  Lamprecht  of  Leipzig  has  written  the  most 
careful  and  Hfe-Uke  study  of  the  Kaiser  that  has  yet 
appeared.  It  was  founded  on  personal  knowledge,  and 
on  information  procured  from  the  men  about  him.  It 
contains  two  companion  portraits,  one  drawn  in  1901, 
the  other  in  or  just  before  1913.  A  desire  for  exactitude, 
with  which  there  were  doubtless  mingled  considerations 
of  a  prudential  nature,  led  Herr  Lamprecht  to  submit 
the  former  efiort  to  his  illustrious  sitter;    and  it  was 

1  Leudet,  ch.  21.  '  G.  Hinzpeter,  pp.  6-7. 

•  P.  Ciollier,  Oermany  and  the  Germans,  p.  106. 


THE   KAISER  85 

approved.  The  picture  may  therefore  be  regarded  as  a 
full-length  royal  portrait  of  the  standard  Royal  Academy 
type. 

Lamprecht  lays  great  stress  on  the  Kaiser's  powers 
of  persuasion.  He  writes:  "When  one  hstens  to  Min- 
"isters,  one  is  again  and  again  amazed  at  the  extent  to 
"which  they  merely  repeat  the  Emperor's  ideas;  and 
"whoever  has  seen  opponents  coming  from  an  interview 
"with  him  must  have  been  equally  struck  by  the  way  in 
"which  they  were  dominated  by  the  charm  of  his  person- 
"ality,  at  all  events  so  long  as  the  immediate  effect  of 
**his  words  lasted." 

Professor  Lamprecht  points  to  certain  defects  in  the 
Kaiser's  character.  He  instances  his  impulsiveness,  his 
hasty  resolves  and  his  everlasting  restlessness^.  He  also 
remarks  on  the  curious  dualism  of  the  Kaiser's  nature; 
that  reason  and  ambition  are  pushing  him  forward  to 
daring  enterprises;  that  sentiment  and  family  associa- 
tions link  him  with  the  past.  This  is  undeniable.  An- 
cestor-worship the  Kaiser  carries  almost  to  Chinese 
lengths.  He  calls  his  grandfather's  palace  in  Unter  den 
Linden  "a  sacred  spot."  He  speaks  of  "the  sacred 
feet"  of  that  Emperor,  and  asserts  that  William  I,  if  he 
had  lived  long  ago,  would  have  been  canonized,  and 
pilgrims  would  have  come  to  pray  to  his  bones 2. 

As  to  the  Kaiser's  religion,  the  professor  does  not  say 
much ;  and  it  is  pecuharly  difficult  now  to  dilate  on  that 
topic  without  generating  irrational  heat.  It  is  well, 
however,  to  remember  that  Kaiser  William  I  was  a  pious 
man;  but  his  piety  was  coloured  by  his  early  associa- 
tions and  ingrained  ideas.  It  was  a  compromise  between 
*  Lamprecht,  pp.  32-3.  *  Ibid.  pp.  39-40. 

3—2 


36  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Christianity  and  Prussian  militarism.  Outwardly,  he 
professed  the  creed  of  the  New  Testament;  but  his 
guiding  spirit  was  that  of  the  Old  Testament — the 
Prussian  army  was  the  chosen  people  in  arms,  smiting 
the  Canaanites  hip  and  thigh.  In  one  of  his  last  public 
utterances  he  said  to  the  present  Kaiser:  "If  ever  a 
"Government  was  visibly  directed  by  Providence,  the 
"German  Government  has  been  during  these  late  years." 
That  is  the  feeling  also  of  the  grandson.  His  Christianity 
has  somehow  stopped  short  at  the  Book  of  Kings. 

In  hazarding  this  statement,  I  am  in  general  agreement 
with  Professor  Lamprecht,  who  asserts  that  the  Kaiser's 
religion  is  of  a  primitive  type,  and  has  its  roots  in  ancestor- 
worship.  There  is  much  of  truth  in  this  statement. 
Indeed,  a  loyal  subject  of  the  Kaiser  has  set  on  foot  an 
ancestor  hunt  and  has  compiled  volumes  containing 
descriptions  of  2096  of  them. 

As  we  shall  soon  see,  the  Kaiser's  conception  of  the 
future  state  is  that  of  a  kind  of  Walhalla,  where  his 
ancestors  occupy  the  foreground  and  anxiously  watch  his 
exploits.  Lamprecht  admits  that  at  Potsdam  the  Chris- 
tian Deity  figures  as  the  Lord  of  Hosts,  whose  kingdom 
must  be  extended  as  far  as  the  bounds  of  the  yellow 
races  ^. 

Evidently,  then,  religion  and  Weltpolitik  merge  into 
one  another  and  become  almost  convertible  terms.  The 
close  connection  between  them  was  clear  in  the  year  1897, 
when  the  murder  of  two  German  missionaries  in  Kiao- 
Chao  led  to  the  immediate  seizure  of  that  important 
district. 

The  importance  of  rehgion  as  an  instrument  of  govern- 

*  Lamprecht,  p.  42. 


THE    KAISER  37 

ment  has  never  been  more  frankly  stated  than  by  the 
Kaiser.  The  following  words  to  recruits  are  an  example: 
"He  who  is  not  a  good  Christian  is  not  a  good  Prussian 
"soldier;  and  in  no  circumstances  can  he  fulfiJ  what  is 
"required  of  a  soldier  in  the  Prussian  army."  Again: 
"Your  duty  is  not  easy:  it  demands  of  you  self-control 
"  and  self-denial — the  two  highest  qualities  of  the  Christian; 
"also  unlimited  obedience  and  submission  to  the  will 
"of  your  superiors."  And  again:  "As  I,  Emperor  and 
"ruler,  devote  the  whole  of  my  actions  and  ambitions  to 
"the  Fatherland,  so  you  must  devote  your  whole  life 
"to  me^."  He  is  excited  by  martial  display  and  large 
assemblies;  and  it  is  confidently  affirmed  by  Germans 
that  too  much  importance  need  not  be  ascribed  to  his 
after-dinner  speeches^.  In  short,  his  temperament  is  at 
times  almost  neurotic.  The  symptoms  of  that  nature 
are  perhaps  due  to  a  disease  in  the  ears  which  at  one  time 
seemed  serious.  Some  sixteen  years  ago,  Dr  Bucheron,  a 
French  specialist,  wrote  concerning  this  complaint,  that 
it  could  be  cured  partially  but  never  completely  eradicated. 
In  an  acute  form  it  caused  excessive  irritability,  which 
manifested  itself  in  outbreaks  of  rage,  with  relapses  into 
gloom.  Another  symptom  of  the  disease  was  lack 
of  due  affection  for  parents^.  Whether  this  furnishes 
the  explanation  for  the  peculiar  conduct  of  the  Kaiser 
in  1888,  I  will  not  venture  to  say.  Perhaps  that  unfilial 
conduct  had  its  roots  in  an  instinctive  physical  repulsion. 
Both  his  parents  died  of  cancer. 

*  Lamprecht,  p.  43. 

•  W.  von  Schierbrand,  Germany:    the   Welding  of  a   World-Power 
(London,  1902),  p.  19. 

'  M.  Leudet  (Eng.  edit.),  p.  55.     Even  Hinzpeter  (p.  8)  says  he  was 
accused  of  heartlessness  and  obstinacy. 


38  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Outwardly  the  Kaiser  appears  a  strong  and  healthy 
man;  and  he  seems  to  have  recovered  from  the  ear 
trouble.  But  there  is  certainly  something  wrong  with 
him,  as,  for  instance,  his  excessive  liability  to  catch 
cold.  The  question  arises  whether  his  ailments,  be  they 
mental  or  physical,  do  not  account  for  the  peculiarities 
of  his  conduct.  His  actions,  both  in  private  and  in 
pubHc,  display  an  almost  febrile  restlessness.  It  is  an 
open  secret  that  he  often  takes  morphia,  doubtless  in 
order  to  procure  intervals  of  calm  for  himself  and  his 
subjects.  But  the  restless  symptoms  recur,  and  drive 
him  forth  to  review  garrisons,  inspect  ships,  make  speeches, 
and  act  as  a  general  stimulus  to  the  world.  Professor 
Lamprecht  asserts  that  the  Kaiser  becomes  calmer  in 
crises,  and  that  those  who  know  declare  that  he  will 
show  himself  at  his  best  in  great  emergencies^.  That 
remains  to  be  proved. 

A  restless  nature  is  nearly  always  self-assertive; 
and  a  self-assertive  ruler  is  certain  to  be  an  autocrat. 
Louis  XIV  and  Napoleon  never  uttered  more  autocratic 
dicta  than  the  Kaiser.  Witness  these:  "One  only  is 
"master  within  the  Empire,  and  I  will  tolerate  no  other." 
"  Those  who  oppose  me  in  my  work  I  will  crush"  (March  5, 
1890).  "My  course  is  the  right  one,  and  I  shall  continue 
"to  steer  it"  (Feb.  1892).  In  1893  to  the  recruits: 
"There  is  but  one  law  and  that  is  my  law."  Finally, 
under  his  portrait  presented  to  the  Ministry  of  Pubhc 
Worship  at  Berlin  he  wrote  the  motto:  "Sic  volo,  sic 
"jubeo." 

His  son  takes  after  him  in  this  respect.  Hence  the 
apposition    to    parents,    traditional    in    the    House    of 

*  Lamprecht,  p.  72. 


THE    KAISER  89 

Hohenzollem,  is  once  again  acute ;  and  the  imperial  palace 
has  been  the  scene  of  open  quarrels,  often  followed  by  the 
departure  of  the  Crown  Prince  for  the  sake  of  health,  and, 
in  one  instance,  by  his  transference  to  a  distant  garrison 
town.  It  may,  perhaps,  finally  transpire  that  the  crisis 
of  last  July  ended  fatally  owing  to  the  interference  of 
that  hot-headed  young  prince. 

From  the  outset,  the  autocracy  of  the  Kaiser  was 
seen  to  be  a  danger  to  the  peace  of  the  world.  His  first 
proclamation  to  the  army  ended  thus ;  "  You  are  about  to 
"take  the  oath  of  allegiance  and  obedience;  and  on  my 
"part  I  solemnly  vow  always  to  be  mindful  of  the  fact 
"that  the  eyes  of  my  ancestors  are  looking  down  upon 
"me  from  the  other  world,  and  that  one  day  I  shall  have 
"to  render  to  them  an  account  both  of  the  glory  and 
«*the  honour  of  the  Army  "  (June  15,  1888). 

The  distrust  aroused  by  this  debut  of  the  young  war- 
lord did  not  vanish  wholly  ten  days  later  when  he  assured 
the  Reichstag;  "I  am  determined  to  keep  peace  with 
"  everyone  so  far  as  it  lies  in  my  power."  He  added  that 
he  would  not  use  for  aggressive  purposes  the  army,  which 
had  been  strengthened  by  the  Army  BiU  of  Feb.  6,  1888. 
Before  long,  the  Kaiser's  poHcy  became  more  and  more 
expansive,  and  his  utterances  more  and  more  threatening. 
Here  are  some  of  them :  "  Our  future  lies  upon  the  water" ; 
"I  will  never  rest  until  I  have  raised  my  Navy  to  a 
"position  similar  to  that  occupied  by  my  Army" ;  "Ger- 
"man  colonial  aims  can  only  be  gained  when  Germany 
"has  become  master  on  the  ocean." 

The  imprudence  of  these  remarks  is  almost  Bernhardi- 
like.  Or  rather,  we  may  put  it  thus:  that  both  the 
Emperor  and  Bernhardi  have  carried  to  excess  the  rule 


40  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

of  frank  speech  long  practised  with  success  by  Bismarck 
on  the  mendacious  diplomatic  circles  of  Frankfurt  and 
Vienna.  The  British  people  would  not  have  paid  much 
attention  to  these  utterances  but  for  two  important 
considerations.  Already,  by  the  year  1888,  Germany 
had  a  large  colonial  Empire,  sufficient  for  her  present 
needs  and  her  administrative  energies.  Why,  then, 
should  the  young  Kaiser  proclaim  his  land-hunger,  still 
more,  his  devouring  thirst  ?  Again,  if  he  intended  to  make 
both  his  army  and  his  navy  supreme,  such  a  policy 
implied  the  adoption  of  plans  dangerous  to  France, 
Russia,  and  Great  Britain.  Would  these  Powers  allow 
such  a  poHcy  to  be  pushed  on  to  its  natural  conclusion? 
For  that  conclusion  was  nothing  less  than  supremacy 
over  the  rest  of  the  world.  Thenceforth  attention  was 
rivetted  on  the  actions  of  William  II.  Would  he,  as  he 
often  professed,  aim  at  a  peaceful  ascendancy,  in  the 
realms  of  science,  manufacture  and  commerce?  Or 
would  that  mercantile  power  be  only  the  spring-board  from 
which  Germany  would  leap  to  world-supremacy  in  the 
sphere  of  arms  ?  That  has  been  the  question  of  questions 
from  1890  to  1914. 

The  personaUty  of  a  great  man  is  the  more  interesting 
because  it  can  rarely  be  fathomed,  or  because  its  impulses 
result  from  the  clash  of  opposites,  the  triumph  of  which 
can  never  be  accurately  gauged.  On  several  occasions  the 
Kaiser  has  acted  as  a  friend  of  peace.  That  fact  must 
never  be  forgotten.  But  whether  it  resulted  from  a 
fixed  resolve,  or  from  the  temporary  restraint  of  pru- 
dential motives,  can  at  present  only  be  conjectured. 
We  do  not  know  whether  this  war  had  its  origin  in  his 
fixed  convictions  and  resolves;    or,  on  the  other  hand, 


THE    KAISER  41 

whether  his  earlier  peaceful  tendencies  were  overborne 
by  external  pressure  at  Court.  There  is  a  third  alter- 
native— that  his  own  impatience  at  an  admittedly  trying 
situation  led  him  to  force  a  way  out  at  a  time  which  he 
deemed  exceptionally  favourable. 

These  alternatives  we  shall  consider  later.  Mean- 
while, we  have  seen  that  the  Kaiser  is  a  man  of  stimulating 
personahty  and  tremendous  energy.  He  has  energised 
the  German  people  to  a  degree  never  before  known  in 
their  history.  Never  before  have  they  undergone  sacri- 
fices of  man  and  treasure  so  appalling;  and  it  is  certain 
that  they  have  made  those  sacrifices,  in  part,  for  the 
Kaiser,  who  to  them  embodies  the  Fatherland. 

In  this  power  of  calling  forth  devotion,  as  also  in  the 
riddle  of  his  personality,  he  may  challenge  comparison 
with  Napoleon  I.  True,  he  is  a  smaller  man  at  nearly 
every  point,  except  in  regard  to  music  and  the  arts.  He 
is  not  so  successful  an  organiser,  so  acute  a  legislator,  so 
profound  a  strategist,  as  the  Corsican.  But  in  several 
respects  he  resembles  him.  In  both  men  we  notice  a 
union  of  imaginative  faculties  and  practical  gifts.  They 
could  dream  dreams  of  a  world-wide  Empire  and  also 
do  much  to  prepare  for  their  realization.  To  William  as 
to  Napoleon  there  came  the  call  of  the  Ocean;  and  both 
felt  the  glamour  of  the  Orient.  Egypt,  India,  and  parts 
of  America  exercized  a  fascination  on  them ;  and  alliances 
and  fleets,  science  and  engineering,  were  pressed  into  their 
service  with  feverish  haste  in  order  to  be  able  to  face  the 
Island  Power  which  stood  in  their  way.  The  vastness 
of  the  resources  at  their  command  exercized  a  baneful 
influence  upon  minds  which  were  equally  despotic  and 
unbending;  while  the  neurotic  strain  in  their  natures  led 


A2  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

them  to  insist  on  immediate  and  unquestioning  obedience 
both  in  trifling  matters  and  in  questions  of  high  policy. 
With  Napoleon's  sudden  insi stance  that  his  architect 
should  on  the  very  next  day  begin  the  construction  of 
the  Carrousel  Arch,  of  which  as  yet  there  was  no  plan, 
compare  the  following  account  of  William's  fussy  pre- 
cipitation in  regard  to  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs 
(1890): 

The  Emperor  wants  to  settle  every  detail,  orders  the  Secretary 
of  State,  who  has  spent  half  the  night  at  his  desk,  to  submit  the 
latest  telegrams  and  advices  to  him  in  the  very  early  morning,  and 
then  directs  at  once  how  everything  must  be  arranged.  Such  a 
system  leaves  no  room  for  the  quiet  consideration  which  should 
precede  every  decision.  It  is  another  bad  feature  that  His  Majesty 
BO  often  deals  privately  with  envoys*. 

The  mania  for  control,  natural  to  proud  and  restless 
natures,  told  adversely  both  on  the  Corsican  and  the 
Hohenzollern.  The  wider  the  domain  over  which  it 
ranges,  the  more  imperious  becomes  the  craving  for 
command,  until  what  began  with  nervous  interference 
in  details  ends  in  megalomania  fatal  to  a  mighty  Empire ; 
for,  while  the  mind  of  the  ruler  revolves  enterprises  on 
an  ever  vaster  scale,  his  pedantic  interferences  reduce 
counsellors  to  the  level  of  clerks,  thenceforth  unable  to 
moderate  the  impulses  of  a  diffuse  and  unbridled  ambition. 

Such  a  character,  moreover,  tends  to  excite  and  madden 
a  whole  people;  for  men  are  thrilled  not  less  by  great 
enterprises  than  by  the  alluring  genius  which  appeals  for 
their  accomplishment.  Both  Napoleon  I  and  William  II 
had  the  power  of  firing  all  about  them  with  their  own 
feverish  energy  and   of  interpreting   the   half-conscious 

>  M.  Harden,  p.  114. 


THE    KAISER  43 

desires  of  the  multitude.  Each  leader  professed  at  times 
to  work  for  peace;  yet  each  led  his  nation  to  the  brink 
of  disaster  without  foreseeing  the  dangers  ahead.  In 
truth,  both  of  them  possessed  greater  energy  than  fore- 
sight, greater  dri\ring  power  than  steering  power.  They 
were  good  engineers  but  poor  pilots.  Now  and  again  they 
were  obsessed  by  fits  of  passion  that  aroused  fear  and 
distrust;  so  that  we  may  apply  to  the  Kaiser  the  sage 
remark  of  Talleyrand  about  Napoleon:  "He  has  never 
"had  but  one  dangerous  conspirator  against  him — 
"  himself  1." 

If  we  test  these  men  by  comparing  their  position  in 
the  periods  of  their  rise  and  of  their  decline,  we  shall 
find  suggestive  analogies.  By  their  thirtieth  year  they 
ruled  as  unquestioned  masters  over  the  greatest  mihtary 
States  in  the  world;  and  their  neighbours  looked  to  see 
whether  they  would  rest  contented.  As  is  well  known, 
the  Peace  of  Amiens  was,  on  the  part  of  British  IVIinisters, 
an  experiment.  They  wished  to  see  whether  the  First 
Consul  would  not  be  satisfied  with  the  natural  frontiers 
and  the  development  of  the  great  France  which  his 
genius  had  called  to  being.  Similarly,  the  world  has  been 
waiting  to  see  whether  the  magnificent  patrimony  of  the 
German  Empire  and  its  many  colonies  would  suffice  for 
William  II;  or  whether  he  would  challenge  other  States 
of  wide-spreading  lands,  notably  the  British  and  Russian 
Empires  and  the  vast  domains  of  France. 

There  was  much  to  give  him  pause.  The  career  of 
Napoleon,  ending  in  ruin  when  he  challenged  both  Russia 
and  Great  Britain  at  the  same  time,  should  have  pre- 
Bcribed  caution.     But,  just  as  Napoleon  in  1812  hacked 

^  Mdma.  de  TaUeyrand,  u.  p.  13d. 


44  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

his  way  through  to  Moscow,  though  he  had  of  late  been 
studying  the  disastrous  Russian  Campaign  of  Charles  XII 
of  Sweden,  so,  too,  it  would  seem,  Kaiser  William  has 
in  him  that  overweening  pride,  that  perverse  obstinacy, 
which  brooks  no  advice  and  scorns  all  difficulties,  even  if 
he  has  to  bridge  chasms  with  the  corpses  of  his  devoted 
followers.  He,  too,  has  challenged  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  at  one  and  the  same  time,  despite  the  warnings 
of  his  grandfather  never  to  break  with  Russia,  despite 
the  advice  of  Bismarck  not  to  offend  needlessly  the 
Island  Power.  Probably  the  Kaiser  did  not  see  whither 
his  vague  and  grandiose  schemes  were  leading  him;  for 
he  comes  of  a  family  which  prospered  of  late  not  so  much 
by  innate  genius  as  by  the  genius  of  its  counsellors. 
But  surely  ordinary  prudence  should  have  warned  him 
that  he  was  courting  defeat  in  all  quarters,  at  Paris  and 
Petrograd,  at  London  and  Tokio. 

His  mistakes,  or  those  of  his  Ministers,  are  more 
astounding  than  those  of  Napoleon.  For  the  disaster 
of  1814  ought  to  have  flashed  a  danger-signal,  warning 
the  Imperial  watchman  of  1914.  But  now  and  again 
there  arise  rulers  on  whom  experience  is  thrown  away. 
In  them  self-will  is  a  disease;  and  their  social  charms 
serve  but  to  spread  broadcast  the  contagion  of  their 
warlike  enthusiasm.  From  them  and  their  paladins  half 
a  Continent  catches  the  fatal  frenzy ;  and,  under  the  plea 
of  national  honour  or  national  necessity,  rushes  to  its 
doom. 


Ill 

GERMANY'S  WORLD-POLICY 

**  Das  Schichsal  Deutschlands  ist,  also,  England.** 
(RoHRBACH,  "  Der  deutsche  Gedanke  in  der  Welt."    Preface.) 

The  tremendous  energy  recently  put  forth  by  the 
German  people  may  be  ascribed  to  various  causes.  The 
Kaiser  has  during  many  years  exerted  upon  them  a 
uniquely  stimulating  force,  which  has  raised  to  blood  heat 
the  political  temperature  of  that  people,  the  result  being 
that  human  energies  of  all  kinds  are  pressed  into  the 
service  of  the  State  to  a  degree  which  elsewhere  is  unknown. 
Consequently,  the  nation  is  a  fighting  organism  of  un- 
equalled efficiency,  which,  almost  single-handed,  has  held 
at  bay  three  Great  Powers. 

This  outburst  of  national  energy  is  also  due  to  the 
German  Universities.  During  many  years  there  has 
prevailed  in  those  bodies  an  intensely  patriotic  feeling, 
which  may  be  traced  largely  to  the  teachings  of  Treitschke. 
Saxon  though  he  was,  he,  somewhat  hke  young  Korner 
before  him,  became  an  enthusiastic  Prussian;  and  his 
lectures  on  History  at  BerHn  (1874-1896)  helped  on  the 
growth  of  the  new  German  Chauvinism.  He  idolized 
Prussia  because  she  embodied  the  ideal  of  power.     Apart 


40  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

from  her,  Germany  was  backboneless.     With  her,  Germany 

could  become,  nay,  must  become,  a  World  Power.  Strength 

was  the  supreme  political  virtue.     Weakness  the  supreme 

political  vice.      In  Bk  i.  of  Die  Politik  he  defmes  the 

State  as — "the   public  power  of   offence  and  defence." 

He  dismisses  at  once  Hegel's  notion  of  the  State  as  the 

totality   of   the   people.     According   to    Treitschke,    the 

State  is  something  over  and  above  the  people:    "The 

'State  protects   and   embraces  the  life   of  the  people, 

'regulating  it  externally  in  all  directions.. .  .It  demands 

'obedience:   its  laws  must  be  kept,  whether  willingly  or 

*  unwillingly The  State  says :    *  It  is  quite  indifferent 

* '  to  me  what  you  think  about  the  matter,  but  you  must 
**obey.'"     And  again:    "The  renunciation  of  its  own 

*  power  is  for  the  State  in  the  most  real  sense  the  sin 
'against  the  Holy  Ghost." 

Treitschke  asserted  emphatically  that  Germany  ought 
to  expand.  The  triumph  of  1870  must  not  satisfy  her. 
All  great  States,  he  says,  will  continue  to  develop  by  an 
inflexible  law  of  Nature :  "  He  is  a  fool  who  believes  that 
"this  process  of  development  can  ever  cease." 

At  whose  expense  must  Germany  expand  ?  Treitschke 
left  it  in  no  doubt.  A  new  world,  that  of  the  non-European 
peoples,  is  coming  within  the  scope  of  our  activities ;  and 
the  European  States  must  subdue  them,  directly  or 
indirectly.  England  was  first  in  the  race  for  World- 
Empire  ;  and  by  force  or  fraud  she  seized  the  best  lands : 
"England,  while  posing  as  the  defender  of  Liberalism, 
"egged  on  the  European  States  against  one  another, 
"kept  Europe  in  a  condition  of  latent  unrest,  and  mean- 
awhile  conquered  half  the  world.  And  if  she  continues 
"to  be  successful  in  maintaining  this  condition  of  unrest 


GERMANY'S   WORLD-POLICY  47 

''on  the  Continent,  she  will  put  many  more  countries 
"into  her  big  pocket." 

Treitschke,  it  will  be  seen,  furbishes  up  the  romances 
of  the  pre-scientific  chroniclers,  who  tried  to  prove  that 
Louis  XIV  and  XV,  even  the  Great  Napoleon  himself, 
were  the  agents  provocateurs  of  England.  The  insatiable 
islanders  set  the  world  in  a  turmoil  in  order  to  colour  red 
new  lands  beyond  the  seas.  Treitschke  and  his  many 
followers,  if  they  were  logical,  would  affirm  that  Germany's 
annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  due  to  perfidious 
Albion,  because  it  kept  Germany  and  France  at  enmity. 
The  Eastern  Question  would  also  prove  to  be  a  happy 
hunting-ground  for  mares'  nests  of  the  same  general 
description. 

Nevertheless,  his  work  claims  careful  attention.  For 
he  pointed  the  Germans  towards  a  World-Empire.  He 
also  urged  them  to  develop  political  strength  in  order  to 
found  that  Empire  on  the  ruins  of  that  of  Great  Britain. 
Some  German  professors,  notably  Paulsen,  have  combatted 
his  teaching,  but  with  little  success.  The  spirit  of 
Treitschke  has  for  some  few  years  past  dominated  the 
German  Universities,  and  through  them  the  schools  of 
that  land.  Therefore  young  Germans  have  grown  up  to 
believe  that  they  must  one  day  fight  Great  Britain. 

Further,  the  population  question  pushes  Germany 
on.  For  the  most  part  it  is  inland  peoples  that  have 
most  severely  felt  the  pressure  of  a  growing  population. 
Islanders  and  coast-dwellers  can  expand  over  the  seas.  But 
when  inland  peoples  outgrow  their  bounds,  they  must  burst 
them.  Tacitus  in  his  Ger mania  noted  this  tendency  among 
the  Teutons  of  his  day,  and  observed  that  their  young 
champions  frequently  swarmed  oS.  from  the  parent  hive. 


48  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

In  olden  times,  as  today,  the  fertility  of  that  people  has 
been  very  marked.  Consequently,  it  has  become  scattered, 
and  political  unity  has  been  more  and  more  difficult  to 
attain.  These  are  the  dominating  facts  of  German  life. 
The  population-problem  often  recurs;  and  yet  it  is  with 
difficulty  solved  because  the  nation  has  with  difficulty 
acted  as  a  whole. 

After  the  war  of  1870  Germany  attained  political 
union;  but,  even  so,  she  could  not  escape  the  cramping 
conditions  of  her  life.  Nay,  they  fettered  her  more  and 
more,  as  her  prosperity  increased.  Note  the  following 
figures  of  her  population: 

1871  ,.  ..  41,000,000 

1890  ..  ..  49,400,000 

1900  ..  ..  56,400,000 

1913  ..  ..  66,000,000  (?) 

Only  one  European  people  increases  faster,  viz.  the 
Russian;  and  the  Russians  can  overflow  into  Siberia. 
In  earlier  times  our  population-problem  was  serious ;  but 
our  people  migrated  to  new  lands  across  the  seas,  which 
could  be  had  almost  for  the  asking.  Germany,  pressed 
by  the  same  problem,  has  had  to  put  up  with  the  less 
desirable  lands.  Is  it  surprising  that  she  feels  land- 
hunger?  Endowed  with  a  keen  sense  of  national  pride, 
she  was  certain  to  experience  some  such  feeling ;  and  we, 
who  have  expanded  partly  by  force  of  arms,  partly  by  a 
natural  overflow  of  population,  shall  be  foolishly  blind  if 
we  do  not  try  to  understand  the  enemy's  point  of  view. 
The  militant  German  of  today  is  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously harking  back  to  the  primitive  times  when  the 
young  Teutonic  bloods  persuaded  the  tribal  meeting  to 


GERMANY'S    WORLD-POLICY  49 

let  them  lead  forth  a  band  of  warriors  to  a  land  of  plenty. 
The  mythical  Hengists  and  Horsas,  with  their  longboats 
girt  about  with  shields,  foreshadowed  Kaiser  Wilhelm 
sending  forth  his  legions,  his  warships,  his  submarines,  his 
Zeppelins.  The  events  of  today  are  a  hideous  recurrence 
to  the  primeval  state.  Viewed  in  regard  to  its  innermost 
causes,  the  present  war  is  an  attempt  at  a  Volksivanderung ; 
and  the  atrocities  that  mark  its  course  may  perhaps  be 
ascribed,  in  part  at  least,  to  a  superabundant  national 
energy,  which,  finding  itself  cramped,  forces  its  way  out  on 
the  line  of  least  resistance  towards  the  coveted  maritime 
outlets,  Salonica  on  the  South  East,  Antwerp  and  Ostend 
on  the  North  West.  The  longing  for  World-Policy 
(Weltpolitik)  is  merely  a  modern  expression  of  an  old 
Teutonic  instinct. 

In  this  sense,  our  war  with  Germany  is  one  of  people 
against  people.  The  fact  must  be  faced.  It  has  been 
asserted  that  the  war  was  due  to  the  Kaiser  or  to  a  few 
wicked  persons  at  Berlin.  That  is  incorrect.  At  least, 
it  is  only  half  the  explanation.  At  bottom,  the  war  is 
a  determined  and  desperate  efiort  of  the  German  people 
to  force  its  way  through  to  more  favourable  political 
conditions.  They  refuse  to  see  the  great  majority  of 
their  emigrants  for  ever  lost  to  the  Fatherland.  They 
are  resolved  at  all  costs  to  conquer  some  large  part  or 
parts  of  the  world  where  German  colonists  can  live  and 
bring  up  families  under  the  black-white-and-red  flag. 
They  have  definitely  rejected  the  Free  Trade  ideal,  which 
looks  on  the  world  as  potentially  a  single  economic  unit. 
They  have  adopted  with  ardour  the  narrowly  national 
ideals  set  forth  by  the  Kaiser  and  Treitschke.  They  laugh 
at  Free  Trade  theories  as  good  only  for  college  lecture- 

S.  L.  4 


50  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

rooms.  They  also  reject  the  notion  of  economic  spherea 
of  influence,  which  might  possibly  have  satisfied  them  if 
they  had  not  become  obsessed  by  the  new  gospel  of  power. 
But  they  are  obsessed  by  it;  and  they  intend  to  become 
the  great  World-Power. 

Early  in  the  reign  of  the  present  Kaiser  it  was  clear 
that  German  policy  would  take  a  far  wider  and  higher 
flight.  The  policy  of  Bismarck  was  deemed  antiquated. 
The  old  Chancellor  had  sought  by  a  careful  system  of 
alliances  to  secure  the  position  of  Germany  in  Europe. 
He  succeeded.  He  built  up  the  Triple  Alliance;  and 
France  and  Great  Britain  and  Russia  were  politically 
isolated.  He  had  secured  many  colonies ;  but  not  enough 
for  the  young  Kaiser.  The  colonial  movement  was  to  be 
accelerated  and  form  part  of  a  system  of  World-Policy^. 
The  quarrel  between  the  Kaiser  and  Bismarck  in  1890 
must  have  arisen  owing  to  some  question  of  more  than 
personal  import;  for  the  latter  at  once  ordered  his 
secretary,  Busch,  to  sort  his  papers  and  send  them  away 
for  fear  that  the  Kaiser  might  seize  them.  He  also  said 
that  spies  had  been  set  to  watch  him^. 

The  Kaiser  did  not  plunge  heedlessly  into  the  new 
policy;  for,  indeed,  in  conduct  he  is  generally  more 
prudent  than  in  speech.  In  1890  he  framed  an  agreement 
with  Great  Britain  whereby  Germany  definitely  secured 

*  The  Germans  are  generally  unfair  to  Bismarck,  forgetting  that 
most  of  their  colonies  were  acquired  by  him.  Thus,  Prince  von  Biilow 
says  {Imperial  Germany,  Eng.  edit.  pp.  9,  10) :  "  It  is  certain  that 
"  Bismarck  did  not  foresee  the  course  of  this  new  development  of 
"  Germany."  And  again :  "  If  the  course  of  events  demands  that  wa 
"  transcend  the  limits  of  Bismarck's  aims,  then  we  must  do  so." 

"  Bismarck;  Some  Secret  Pages,  m.  309 ;  M.  Harden,  Monarchs  and 
Men,  ch.  m.  The  general  explanation  is  that  the  Kaiser  disliked 
Biamaxek's  anti-socialist  measures. 


GERMANY'S   WORLD-POLICY  51 

possession  of  the  large  domains  now  known  as  German 
East  Africa  and  German  South- West  Africa.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  acquired  Nyassaland  and  Somaliland, 
which,  in  reality,  ought  not  to  have  been  in  dispute. 
And,  in  order  to  clinch  this  not  very  satisfactory  bargain, 
we  surrendered  to  Germany  the  long  coveted  island, 
Heligoland.  It  is  well  to  recall  the  terms  in  which  Count 
Miinster  first  proposed  the  transfer  of  Heligoland  to 
Germany  in  the  year  1884.  He  assured  our  Foreign 
Minister,  Lord  Granville,  that  the  transfer  of  Heligoland 
would  be  deemed  a  most  friendly  act,  and  he  skilfully 
represented  it  as  furthering  the  cause  of  peace  (see 
Lecture  I.).  As  at  that  time  the  colonial  rivalry  of  the 
two  lands  was  very  keen,  the  British  Government  waved 
aside  the  proposal.  But  the  Kaiser  in  1890  renewed  his 
ofiers;  and  they  were  favourably  received  at  London, 
because  Lord  Salisbury's  Government  wished  to  clear 
up  all  outstanding  disputes.  Now,  we  may  admit  that 
it  was  an  extremely  important  matter  to  arrange  the 
"partition  of  Africa"  without  a  war.  Considering  the 
rivers  of  blood  that  have  flowed  for  the  possession,  say, 
of  the  Spice  Islands  in  the  East  Indies,  and  Cuba  and 
Hayti  in  the  West  Indies,  it  was  a  triumph  of  the  cause  of 
peace  to  arrange  a  friendly  partition  of  the  centre  and 
south  of  a  mighty  Continent.  The  previous  decade  had 
bristled  with  contentious  questions;  and  it  was  well  to 
get  three-fourths  of  them  settled  in  a  friendly  manner, 
as  we  endeavoured  to  do. 

Then,  again,  Heligoland  was  worth  far  more  to 
Germany  than  it  was  to  us ;  and  in  such  a  case  the  amicable 
course  was  to  barter  it  away  in  return  for  concessions  by 
Germany.    Further,  the  island  could  have  been  fortified 

4—2 


52  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

only  at  enormous  cost,  which  an  eminent  authority  has 
placed  at  £2,000,000;  and  it  was  quite  certain  that 
Parliament  would  have  refused  any  such  sum  for  an 
islet  which  was  then  deemed  certain  to  disappear  beneath 
the  waves. 

At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  transfer 
was  a  serious  blunder;  for  it  brought  within  the  range 
of  possibility  the  vast  maritime  schemes  of  the  Kaiser. 
Thereafter,  he  pushed  on  the  Kiel  Canal;  and  it  is  sig- 
nificant that  the  opening  ceremony,  on  June  18,  1895, 
became  what  a  German  writer  has  termed  "  a  magnificent 
demonstration  in  favour  of  peace."  The  Kaiser  himself 
described  the  canal  as  "this  new  link  for  the  blessing 
"and  peace  of  the  nations."  But,  as  he  also  referred  to 
the  squadrons  of  ironclads  of  various  Powers  there  present 
as  "a  symbol  of  peace,"  the  exact  nature  of  the  mission 
to  be  fulfilled  by  the  canal  remained  matter  for  doubt. 

The  year  1895  witnessed  a  notable  extension  of  the 
activities  of  Germany.  She  opposed  strenuously  the 
British  proposals  respecting  the  Congo  Free  State,  which 
was  then  becoming  a  standing  disgrace  to  civilization; 
and  sharp  friction  ensued  in  the  Press  on  this  question. 

Far  more  important  was  the  Kaiser's  action  in  the 
Far  East.  Early  in  the  year  1895  China  was  hopelessly 
beaten  by  Japan ;  and  the  victorious  islanders  prepared 
to  retain  their  chief  conquest,  viz.,  the  Liao-tung  Penin- 
sula, with  its  commanding  fortress.  Port  Arthur.  Russia, 
backed  up  by  both  France  and  Germany,  vigorously 
opposed  this  acquisition;  and  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  in 
an  evidently  inspired  article,  declared  that  Japan  was 
obviously  bent  on  encircling  China  and  cutting  her  ofE 
from  commerce  with  the  outer  world.     The  three  Powers 


GERMANY'S    WORLD-POLICY  53 

on  April  23  demanded  that  Japan  should  withdraw 
from  Port  Arthur  and  the  whole  of  the  Peninsula;  and 
Japan,  exhausted  by  the  war,  had  to  give  up  the  chief 
fruits  of  her  triumph.  Ever  since,  she  has  remembered 
that  Great  Britain  took  no  share  in  that  act  of  coercion. 
But  she  has  remembered  the  part  then  played  by  Germany ; 
and  in  August  1914  she  tasted  the  sweets  of  an  ironical 
revenge.  In  her  ultimatum  to  Germany,  bidding  her 
hand  back  the  Shantung  Peninsula  to  China,  she  made 
use  of  the  same  haughty  terms  employed  by  Germany 
towards  her  in  1895. 

In  the  year  1897  Germany  took  a  notable  step  for- 
ward in  World- Policy  by  the  seizure  of  Kiao-Chao.  That 
act  was  due  to  the  Kaiser  himself.  It  was  carried  through 
against  the  protests  of  the  German  Chancellor,  Prince 
Hohenlohe,  and  was  therefore  a  breach  of  the  German 
constitution^.  As  is  well  known,  the  murder  of  two 
German  missionaries  furnished  the  pretext  for  that  high- 
handed action.  However,  Mr  Skertchley,  a  mining 
prospector,  has  stated  that  he  had  recently  published 
a  metallurgical  map  of  that  peninsula  which  showed 
it  to  be  rich  in  minerals.  We  may  therefore  conjecture 
that  the  motive  of  the  Germans  was  subterranean  rather 
than  celestial. 

At  that  time  the  break  up  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
seemed  imminent,  and  England  in  1898  secured  Wei- 
hei-wei  as  a  counterpart  to  Germany's  late  acquisition. 
The  would-be  partitioning  Powers  were  disappointed; 
for  China  displayed  an  obstinate  vitality.  After  the 
Boxer  Rising,  Great  Britain  did  much  to  check  all  schemes 
of  the  Western  Powers  by  concluding  the  very  important 

*  W.  von  Schierbrand,  p.  31. 


54  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

agreement  of  January  30,  1902,  with  Japan.  Not  only  did 
it  proclaim  the  entry  of  Japan  into  the  circle  of  the  Great 
Powers,  but  it  served  to  check  the  inroads  of  the  whito 
race  upon  the  yellow  race  which  the  Kaiser  and  others 
sought  to  justify  by  descanting  upon  "  The  Yellow 
Peril."  Thenceforth  schemes  of  partition  of  China  fell 
into  the  background,  and  so  did  the  Yellow  Peril.  When 
the  whole  truth  is  known,  it  will  probably  be  found 
that  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  gave  pause  not  only 
to  Russia  but  also  to  Germany.  Her  World-Policy,  so 
far  as  concerned  the  Far  East,  must  have  aimed  at 
prizes  far  vaster  than  Kiao-Chao;  but,  as  things  have 
turned  out,  it  began  with  Kiao-Chao,  and  it  ended  with 
Kiao-Chao. 

Herr  Rohrbach,  one  of  the  exponents  of  German 
World-Policy,  especially  in  the  Levant,  has  observed 
that  that  ideal  is  characterized  by  vagueness,  and  that 
with  difficulty  it  concentrates  on  any  one  aim^.  Its 
diffuseness  will  be  apparent  in  this  lecture  and  the  follow- 
ing. Indeed,  this  must  be  my  excuse  for  making  here 
an  abrupt  transition  from  China  to  South  Brazil.  The 
latter  country  has  long  attracted  the  attention  of  the 
German  colonial  party.  Its  climate,  though  sub-tropical, 
is  not  unhealthy;  the  material  resources  are  immense; 
and  during  many  years  there  has  been  a  large  influx 
of  German  immigrants.  Their  numbers  have  been 
variously  estimated  from  a  million  to  as  low  as  350,000. 
The  German  immigration  does  not  equal  the  Italian. 
But  the  Teuton  scorns  both  the  native  Portuguese 
clement  and  the  Italians,  still  more  the  half-castes.  He 
ig  conscious  of  superior  vigour;    and  he  feels  the  power 

^  P.  Eohrback,  Deutschland  unier  den  Weltvolkern,  p.  65. 


GERMANY'S   WORLD-POLICY  55 

of  the  Fatherland  behind  him.  The  German  settlements 
in  Brazil  are  compact:  their  schools  are  supported 
from  home;  10,000  German  school-books  have  of  late 
been  sent  out;  and  the  teaching  of  Portuguese  is  for- 
bidden. The  poverty  of  the  Brazilian  exchequer  has 
long  warranted  the  hope  that  the  country  would  come 
under  German  control.  But  American  opinion,  grounded 
upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  defies  Germany  to  interfere 
in  any  part  of  South  America ;  and  there  is  in  the  States 
a  wide-spread  conviction  that,  if  the  Kaiser  succeeds 
in  this  war,  he  will  next  attack  them. 

It  is  difficult  for  a  Briton  to  form  an  unbiassed  judg- 
ment on  the  Brazilian  Question;  but  of  all  Germany's 
colonial  aims  (and  they  are  surprisingly  wide  and  diffuse) 
those  which  centre  in  Southern  Brazil  seem  the  most 
reasonable.  The  land  is  enormous ;  the  inhabitants  are 
inferior  to  those  whom  Germany  sends  out ;  and  a  German 
Southern  Brazil  would  add  to  the  productivity  of  the 
world  and  to  the  welfare  of  mankind.  But  to  this 
scheme  the  United  States  oppose  an  invincible  opposi- 
tion. Probably  they  are  right;  for,  with  the  spectacle 
of  European  armaments  before  them,  they  naturally 
dread  the  incoming  of  German  militarism  into  the  New 
World,  the  southern  part  of  which,  including  Argentina, 
would  in  that  case  fall  to  the  Teuton. 

In  April,  1897,  the  journal.  Die  Grenzhoten,  naively 
stated — "  The  possession  of  South  Africa  offers  greater 
"  advantages  in  every  respect  than  that  of  Brazil."  The 
assertion  may  serve  to  remind  us  of  the  clash  of  German 
and  British  interests  in  that  land  from  1895  to  the  present 
year.  There  was  much  to  recommend  South  Africa  to 
the  Germans.     Possessing  a  splendid  climate,  in  which 


56  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

the  white  race  attains  to  physical  perfection,  holding 
the  keys  of  the  Indian  and  Southern  Oceans,  peopled, 
also,  mainly  by  Dutch,  and  dowered  by  Nature  with 
the  richest  stores  of  gold  and  diamonds  in  the  world, 
South  Africa  was  for  the  Pan-Germans  the  new  Deutsch- 
land  of  the  South,  a  home  for  myriads  of  Teutons,  a 
source  of  endless  wealth,  the  key  to  the  Orient.  The 
dealings  of  Germany  with  the  South  African  Republic 
and  the  Orange  Free  State  are,  of  course,  not  fully  known. 
We  therefore  must  fall  back  on  the  British  Blue  Books, 
which,  however,  are  at  points  very  suggestive. 

In  the  year  1895  the  condition  of  South  Africa  was 
alarming.  The  discontent  of  the  Outlanders  in  the 
South  African  Republic  (Transvaal)  was  on  the  increase. 
Debarred  from  all  political  rights,  though  their  energy 
and  wealth  filled  the  once  empty  Exchequer,  they 
demanded  the  franchise  and  other  reforms  which  would 
render  their  position  bearable.  As  is  well  known.  Presi- 
dent Kriiger  resisted  their  demands.  He  also  openly 
proclaimed  his  reliance  on  Kaiser  William.  At  an 
official  banquet  given  at  Pretoria  on  the  Kaiser's  birth- 
day (January  27,  1895)  he  said,  "  I  shall  ever  promote 

"the  interests  of  Germany The  time  has  come  to 

"  knit  ties  of  the  closest  friendship  between  Germany 
"  and  the  South  African  Republic — ties  such  as  are 
"  natural  between  father  and  child^." 

These  ties  were  very  profitable  to  both  parties.  Ger- 
mans and  Hollanders  acquired  the  dynamite  monopoly, 
the  spirit  monopoly,  and  many  others,  of  course  for 
large  sums  of  money ;  and  the  Berlin  Government  showed 

^  Fitzpatrick,    The   Transvaal    from    Within,    p.    lOG;    Reventlow, 
Peutschla/uiii  aaswdrtigt  PolUtk,  pp.  69,  70. 


GERMANY'S    WORLD-POLICY  57 

its  gratitude  by  sending  to  Kriiger  decorations  galore, 
until  his  quaint  farmer-figure  was  a  very  Christmas- 
tree  of  gewgaws.  In  the  autumn  of  1895  his  right-hand 
man,  Dr  Leyds,  visited  Lisbon  and  Berlin;  and  he  is 
known  to  have  ordered  quantities  of  arms  in  Germany. 
Everything  seemed  to  portend  a  German  Protectorate 
over  the  Transvaal.  The  Germans  and  Dutch  supported 
Kriiger  against  the  Reform  party,  which  was  therefore 
driven  to  desperation.  On  December  24,  1895,  the 
German  Consul  notified  to  the  Kaiser  that  the  Outlanders 
and  their  British  supporters  were  hatching  a  plot  to 
overthrow  the  Government.  On  the  30th  the  German 
residents  begged  the  Kaiser  to  protect  them;  and  on 
that  day  the  Consul  asked  permission  to  order  up  from 
Delagoa  Bay  a  detachment  of  German  sailors  and  marines 
from  the  warship,  Seeadler.  They  would  have  been  sent 
if  the  crisis  had  not  passed  by  very  quickly,  before  the 
Portuguese  Government  gave  permission  for  their  des- 
patch through  its  territory i.  When  Dr  Jameson's  Raid 
ended  in  utter  failure,  the  Kaiser  promptly  sent  a  telegram 
of  congratulation  to  Kriiger  (January  3,  1896).  This  act 
was  unfriendly  to  us ;  but  far  more  unfriendly  was  the  re- 
solve to  send  German  sailors  and  marines  up  to  Pretoria. 
In  case  Dr  Jameson's  Raid  had  succeeded,  we  should 
soon  have  been  face  to  face  with  a  German  contingent 
at  that  capital.  This,  perhaps,  explains  the  phrase  in 
the  Kaiser's  telegram  to  Kriiger,  congratulating  him, 
"  that  you  and  your  people  have  succeeded  by  your  own 
energy,  without  appealing  to  the  aid  of  friendly  Powers, 
in  defeating  the  armed  forces,"  etc.  If  we  look  at  the 
telegram  in  the  light  of  this  fact,  it  is  less  provocative 
*  F.  Rachiahl,  Kaiser  und  Beich  (1888-1913),  Berlin,  1913,  p.  144. 


58  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

than  appears  on  the  surface.  Indeed,  the  Kaiser's  words 
probably  express  a  sense  of  relief  that  war  would  not 
ensue  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany^.  Further, 
when  the  British  Press  broke  forth  into  unmeasured 
protests  against  the  Kaiser's  interference  in  matters 
which  did  not  concern  him,  the  German  Government 
declared  that  they  were  concerned  about  their  important 
commercial  interests  in  the  Transvaal,  and  that  no  ofience 
was  meant  by  the  Emperor's  telegram  at  the  defeat 
of  "  a  lawless  armed  band,"  organized  by  the  Chartered 
Company.  Technically,  we  were  in  the  wrong;  and 
Mr  Chamberlain  promptly  disavowed  the  raiders. 

On  the  whole,  it  seems  unlikely  that  the  Kaiser 
then  desired  war,  though  he  would  have  accepted  war 
if  his  forces  and  ours  collided  at  Pretoria,  as  would  have 
happened  if  the  Jameson  Raid  had  succeeded.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  the  German  fleet  was  not  in  a  condi- 
tion to  face  the  British  fleet;  and  further,  the  relations 
between  Paris  and  Berlin  were  somewhat  strained  since 
the  month  of  November  1895,  when  the  Radical  Ministry 
of  M.  Bourgeois  came  to  power.  It  was  an  energetic 
Ministry.  "  We  demand  your  confidence,  not  to  exist, 
"  but  to  act " — such  were  his  first  words  to  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies.  He  also  assured  Great  Britain  that  France 
had  only  one  enemy,  of  course,  Germany^.  Thus,  at 
the  time  of  the  Jameson  Raid  the  policy  of  Berlin  was 
dominated  by  two  considerations,  weakness  at  sea,  and 
the  renewed  hostility  of  the  French,  who  by  then  felt 
sure  of  the  support  of  Russia.     At  that  period,  apparently, 

*  I  came  to  this  conclusion  before  reading  the  arguments  of  Reventlow, 
pp.  73-5. 

»  R{iebfahl,  p.  146. 


GERMANY'S   WORLD-POLICY  59 

Geimany  and  Austria  (for  Italy  was  of  little  account 
after  her  colonial  disasters)  did  not  feel  equal  to  a  war 
with  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia,  a  combination 
which  was  then  within  the  bounds  of  probability.  But, 
undoubtedly,  the  friction  between  Britons  and  Germans 
first  became  acute  at  the  time  of  the  Jameson  Raid.  Crispi 
in  his  Memoirs  states  that,  previous  to  that  event,  Kaiser 
William  referred  jocularly  to  a  passing  tifi  with  England, 
"  Bah !  it's  a  lovers'  quarrel^."  But  Count  Reventlow 
significantly  asserts  that  the  crisis  of  1895-6  would  not 
have  ended  as  it  did  if  Germany  had  been  strong  at  sea^. 
She  felt  her  weakness ;  and  in  the  year  1897  the  Kaiser  took 
steps  which  portended  a  great  advance.  He  appointed 
Count  (afterwards  Prince)  Biilow  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  a  man  of  great  energy. 
Secretary  of  the  Admiralty.  Both  men  were  actuated 
by  anti-British  feelings,  though  Biilow  naively  confesses 
that  it  was  needful  to  conceal  them  until  the  new  fleet 
was  ready.  In  1898,  then,  came  the  first  German  Navy 
Law  providing  for  a  great  increase  in  warships  of  all 
classes;  but,  to  his  annoyance,  the  new  fleet  was  not 
ready  by  the  time  of  the  Boer  War^. 

Before  that  struggle  curious  events  happened  at  Jo- 
hannesburg, notably  the  so-called  British  plot  of  May,  1899. 
It  was  probably  trumped  up  by  the  Kriiger  Government. 
Three  of  the  alleged  conspirators  were  agents  provocateurs 
of  that  administration.  A  man  named  Bundy,.  one  of 
the  more  reputable  of  the  persons  arrested,  was  privately 

*  Crispi,  Mems,  m.  p.  328  (Eng.  edit.),  "Bah!  was  aich  liebt.  neokt 
Eich." 

'  Reventlow,  p.  96. 

*  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  pp.  19-31  (Eng.  edit.). 


GO  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

told,  after  the  first  examination,  that  his  evidence  was 
very  unsatisfactory  because  it  did  not  implicate  the 
Reformers ;  and  Kriiger's  son,  chief  of  the  Secret  Service, 
said  to  him  in  private,  "Do  all  you  can  to  prove  this 
"  to  be  a  case  of  conspiracy  on  the  part  of  the  British 
*'  Government,  as  it  will  strengthen  my  father's  hand. . . . 
"  I  will  give  you  £200,  and  you  shall  get  a  good  billet 
"  in  the  Secret  Service."  The  Transvaal  Government 
thereupon  telegraphed  both  to  Paris  and  Berlin  its 
version  of  the  trial. 

Now,  all  this  happened  just  before  the  Bloemfontein 
Conference,  from  which  the  British  Government  expected 
a  peaceful  and  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  Transvaal 
Question.  It  is  clear,  then,  that  Kriiger  placed  great 
hopes  in  Germany;  and  he  was  bitterly  disappointed 
during  the  war,  when  that  Government  did  not  accord 
the  armed  support  for  which  its  people  clamoured.  He 
proceeded  to  Germany,  in  the  hope,  doubtless,  of  forcing 
the  Kaiser's  hand;  but  the  Kaiser,  alleging  a  previous 
hunting  engagement,  declined  to  receive  him.  Rarely 
has  the  German  Press  been  so  outspoken  against  their 
sovereign;  and  its  protests  were  renewed  when,  after 
the  war.  Generals  Botha,  Delarey  and  De  Wet  also  met 
with  no  official  countenance.  The  Pan-Germans  lauded 
the  Generals  to  the  skies ;  and  their  Press  dubbed  Botha 
the  organizer  of  victory ;  Delarey  the  actual  victor ;  and 
De  Wet  the  Bliicher  of  South  Africa.  The  attitude  of 
the  official  world  at  Berlin  was,  however,  quite  correct; 
and  the  moral  of  the  situation  was  pointed  by  a  leader 
of  the  German  National  Liberals.  He  asked  what  was 
the  use  of  all  this  fuss?  Why  did  not  Germans  leave 
Great  Britain  alone  until  their  navy  was  stronger?     Also 


GERMANY'S   WORLD-POLICY  61 

the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  an  official  organ,  even  went  so 
far  as  naively  to  ask — Why  had  the  Boer  Generals  come 
to  Germany,  of  all  countries,  in  order  to  stir  up  trouble? 
The  events  of  October,   1914,  supply  the  answer. 

The  Boer  War  roused  to  fury  the  anti-British  feeHng 
already  strong  in  Germany;  or,  as  Professor  Mommsen 
mildly  phrased  it,  "  The  war  accentuated  the  antagonism, 
*'  but  did  not  produce  it."  Very  noteworthy,  too,  was 
the  influence  of  the  struggle  on  the  agitation  for  a  larger 
Navy.  The  sense  of  irritation  at  the  inability  of  Germany 
to  cope  with  the  British  fleet  was  skilfully  exploited  both 
by  the  Kaiser  and  by  the  German  Navy  League.  In 
1900,  during  that  conflict,  the  naval  programme  of  1898 
was  accelerated.  Many  branches  of  the  Navy  League 
were  founded;  and  every  new  foundation,  every  launch 
of  a  battleship,  evoked  a  stirring  speech  from  the  Kaiser. 
These  orations  were  not,  as  a  rule,  threatening  to  Great 
Britain;  but  now  and  again  came  a  sentence,  such  as 
"  The  trident  must  pass  into  our  hands."  The  meaning 
was  clear  enough.  Kaiser  WilUam  was  bent  on  forcing 
into  a  practical  channel  the  foaming  flood  of  Anglo- 
phobia; and  in  this  he  showed  statesmanship  of  a  high 
order.  Had  he  been  merely  the  garrulous  and  impression- 
able creature  of  our  comic  papers,  he  would  have  let 
the  Germans  froth  and  foam.  Instead  of  that,  he  built 
a  larger  navy. 

These  events  did  not  escape  the  keen  eyes  of  His 
late  Majesty,  Edward  VII.  He  knew  full  well  the  perils 
of  those  years.  He  must  have  discerned  the  danger 
ahead  if  the  Boer  War  were  prolonged.  The  Pan-Germans 
strove  might  and  main  to  lengthen  out  that  war.  The 
Deutsche  Zeitung  went  so  far  as  to  say,  "  Every  work 


62  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

"  of  civilization  [in  South  Africa]  built  with  English 
"  money  must  be  destroyed.  The  land  must  be  devastated 
"  in  such  a  way  that  only  the  Boer  farmer  can  live  in  it." 
The  aim  of  all  that  devastation  was,  so  far  as  we  can 
judge,  to  prolong  the  Boer  War  until  the  year  1904 
when  the  new  German  navy  would  be  ready.  But  that 
unhappy  struggle  ended  in  1902,  partly  owing  to  the 
success  of  the  British  arms,  partly  owing  to  the  generous 
terms  offered  by  the  victors.  The  policy  of  conciliation 
had  the  approval  of  King  Edward;  conciliation  towards 
the  Boers  helped  both  to  end  that  war  and  thereafter  to 
weld  South  Africa  into  an  almost  united  whole. 

Further,  we  probably  owe  to  him  the  friendly  under- 
standings with  other  Powers  which  ended  the  period 
of  what  was  pompously  termed  "  splendid  isolation." 
The  danger  of  that  makeshift  policy  having  been  suffi- 
ciently obvious  during  the  Boer  War,  it  was  desirable 
to  come  to  an  understanding  with  some  Power  or  Powers. 

With  whom  should  it  be?  With  Germany?  That 
was  a  possibility.  On  dynastic  and  racial  grounds  there 
was  much  to  recommend  an  Anglo-German  alliance.  Or 
should  it  be  with  our  old  enemy,  France?  King  Edward 
clearly  believed  that  an  Anglo-French  Entente  was  more 
feasible.  Whatever  the  motives  that  prompted  the 
choice.  King  Edward  advocated  a  rapp'ocJiement  towards 
France;  and,  as  is  well  known,  he  did  very  much  to 
further  it.  The  reasons  for  not  making  the  experiment 
at  Berlin  doubtless  were  that  the  Kaiser  displayed 
increasing  eagerness  in  regard  to  World-Policy;  and 
parliamentary  considerations  led  him  throughout  the 
years  1895-1904  to  rely  more  and  more  upon  the  agrarian 
party,  the  party  of  the  Junkers,  which  was  furiously 


GERMANY'S   WORLD-POLICY  63 

anti-British.  The  questions  directly  at  issue  between  the 
two  countries  were  less  serious  than  those  which  divided 
England  from  France;  but  the  trend  of  German  politics 
rendered  it  more  difficult  to  come  to  an  understanding 
with  our  Teutonic  kinsmen  than  with  our  affable  and 
democratic  neighbours  across  the  Channel.  Efforts  were 
made  both  in  the  British  and  German  Press  to  cultivate 
friendlier  relations;  but  they  failed,  and  largely  owing 
to  the  growth  in  Germany  of  the  Pan- German  movement. 
To  this  we  must  now  advert. 

The  Pan- Germans  aim  at  some  form  of  union  of  all 
peoples  speaking  German  or  certain  of  its  dialects.  It 
is  not  a  new  notion.  Generations  of  students  had 
enthusiastically  intoned  the  famous  line  at  the  end  of 
Arndt's  national  song  of  1813, 

Das  ganze  Deutschland  soil  es  sein. 
And  for  a  brief  space  in  1848-9  it  seemed  that  a  greater 
Germany  might  come  to  being.  The  miscarriage  of 
democratic  Imperialism  in  that  land  is  one  of  the  greatest 
misfortunes  of  the  Nineteenth  Century ;  for  the  federation 
then  contemplated  would  have  harmonized  the  claims 
of  national  unity  with  those  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people.  Further,  the  German  race,  when  fitly  organized, 
could  then  have  shared  in  the  new  lands  beyond  the 
seas  which  were  then  easily  obtainable.  In  that  case 
the  British  Empire  might  not  have  been  quite  so  large; 
but  probably  we  should  not  have  had  this  war,  which, 
on  its  colonial  side,  is  the  deliberate  attempt  of  the 
Kaiser  and  his  people  to  seize  lands  appropriated  by 
earUer  competitors  in  the  race  for  Empire.  As  Bern- 
hardi  says:  "All  which  other  nations  attained  in  cen- 
"  turies  of  natural  development — political  union,  colonial 


64  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

"  possessions,  naval  power,  international  trade — was  de- 
"  nied  to  our  nation  until  quite  recently^." 

The  grievance  was  a  real  one;  and  therein  lay  the 
strength  of  the  Pan-German  movement.  The  clubs  which 
adopted  the  colours  of  the  old  Empire — black,  red, 
gold — sought  to  band  together  all  their  kindred  in  some 
kind  of  organism.  The  first  sentence  of  the  manifesto 
is  as  follows :  "  The  Pan-German  Federation  has  for 
"  object  the  revival  of  German  national  sentiment  all 
"  over  the  earth :  the  preservation  of  German  thought, 
"  ideals  and  customs  in  Europe  and  across  the  ocean, 
"  and  the  welding  into  a  compact  whole  of  Germans 
"  everywhere."  Obviously,  the  crux  of  the  whole  question 
lies  in  the  last  clause;  for  nobody  could  possibly  object 
to  the  preservation  of  German  thought  and  ideals.  But 
what  is  meant  by  "  the  welding  into  a  compact  whole 
"  of  the  Germans  everywhere "  ?  It  must  mean  the 
inclusion  in  a  Greater  Germany  of  the  12,000,000  Germans 
in  the  Austrian  Empire,  and  the  million  or  so  of  Germans 
in  the  Baltic  Provinces  of  Russia.  But  does  it  include 
the  Dutch,  the  Flemings,  and  the  Scandinavian  peoples? 
Many  enthusiastic  Teutons  assert  that  all  those  peoples 
are  branches  of  the  great  stock.  Thus,  the  geographical 
manual  of  Herr  Daniel  declares  that  the  natural  limits 
of  Germany  are  the  River  Narova,  in  Esthonia,  on  the 
North-East,  the  Baltic  on  the  North,  the  North  Sea  on 
the  North- West,  on  the  West  the  hills  separating  the 
Rhine  and  Seine  basins,  and  on  the  South  and  South-East 
the  Bernese  Alps  and  the  Carpathians.  Up  to  the  month 
of  August,  1914,  there  were  a  few  prominent  citizens 
of  Antwerp  who  desired  to  see  the  fulfilment  of  the  Pan- 

*-  Bernhardi,  The  Next  War,  ch.  4, 


GERMANY'S   WORLD-POLICY  65 

German  scheme  of  making  that  city  the  chief  Teutonic 
port. 

The  Pan-German  movement  suffers  from  the  defect 
which  has  always  clogged  the  German  polity,  namely,  in- 
definiteness.  No  definition  of  Pan-Germanism  has  appeared 
which  brought  it  within  the  region  of  practical  politics, 
except  as  the  result  of  a  terrific  war.  For  the  German 
people  is  not  a  compact  entity.  It  spreads,  octopus-like, 
from  the  Alpine,  Tyrolese,  and  Styrian  valleys  to  the 
mouth  of  the  River  Ems,  and  from  the  banks  of  the  middle 
Moselle  to  the  Gulf  of  Finland.  Therefore,  the  welding 
of  these  outlying  portions  into  the  main  body  implies 
the  break-up  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  the  annexation  of 
Luxemburg  and  nearly  half  of  Switzerland,  as  well  as 
the  acquisition  of  the  best  part  of  Russia's  all  too  scanty 
seaboard.  With  the  exception,  perhaps,  of  the  Swiss 
part  of  the  menu,  which  might  come  as  dessert  after 
the  main  repast,  all  these  questions  are,  or  may  be,  at 
stake  in  the  present  war.  An  All-German  Empire  would 
involve  as  terrible  a  political  upheaval  as  the  formation 
of  a  Pan-Slav  Empire  to  which  it  is  a  Teutonic  retort. 

But  there  is  even  more  than  this  behind  the  Pan- 
German  Movement.  For  practical  purposes  it  has  adopted 
the  programme  of  Weltpolitik.  This  again  suffered 
from  the  defect  of  haziness.  So  far  as  I  know,  the 
Kaiser,  who  coined  the  phrase,  has  never  defined  it. 
He  took  refuge  in  vague  statements  like  this  (July  3, 
1900),  "  The  wave-beat  knocks  powerfully  at  our  gates 
"  and  calls  us  as  a  great  nation  to  maintain  our  place 
"in  our  world — ^in  other  words,  to  pursue  world-policy. 
"  The  ocean  is  indispensable  for  Germany's  greatness ; 
"  but  the  ocean  also  reminds  us  that  neither  on  it  nor 

B.  L.  6 


66  THE  ORIGLNS  OF  THE  WAR 

"  across  it  in  the  distance  can  any  great  decision  be  again 
"  arrived  at  without  Germany  and  the  German  Emperor." 

He  uttered  these  words  during  the  Boer  War.  They 
are  open  to  two  explanations.  Either  the  Kaiser  may 
not  have  meant  as  much  as  he  said;  that  is,  in  Disraeli's 
historic  phrase,  "  he  was  carried  away  by  the  exuberance 
"  of  his  own  verbosity."  Or  else  he  meant  that  Germany 
was  going  to  interfere  in  every  great  occurrence  all  over 
the  world.  And  those  who  noted  the  Kaiser's  skill 
as  a  speaker  and  his  feverish  activities  were  bound  to 
take  this  explanation.  Of  the  same  order  were  these 
utterances :  *'  The  trident  must  pass  into  our  hands  " ; 
and  "  Our  future  lies  upon  the  water.'*  They  can  be 
interpreted  only  as  a  definite  and  defiant  challenge  to 
Great  Britain;  and  in  earlier  and  more  heedless  times 
they  would  have  led  straight  to  war.  Fortunately,  the 
Islanders  did  not  lose  their  temper,  but  merely  redoubled 
their  precautions.  So  did  Russia;  so  did  France;  so 
did  the  United  States ;  so  did  Japan.  A  single  pronounce- 
ment of  that  kind  might  be  discounted  as  due  to  a  desire 
to  expedite  a  New  Navy  Bill.  But  those  dicta,  when 
repeated,  could  not  be  thus  explained.  From  Washington 
to  Paris ;  from  London  to  Tokio  the  question  arose,  "Where 
"  will  the  mailed  fist  fall  next?  " 

During  several  years  the  Pan-German  movement 
aroused  much  ridicule;  and  Britons  especially  refused 
to  take  it  seriously.  We  were  wrong.  These  notions, 
which  seem  to  us  fantastic  and  unstatesmanlike,  made 
a  deep  impression  in  Germany  and  German  Austria. 
They  touched  the  romantic  strain,  which  is  strong  in  the 
Teuton,  and  also  appealed  to  his  sense  of  national  pride, 
which  had  been  enormously  inflated  by  the  uninterrupted 


GERMANY'S   WORLD-POLICY  67 

triumphs  of  the  years  1864-1871.  The  Pan- German 
ideal  supplied  the  young  nation  with  two  requisites 
for  action — a  theory  attractive  to  superficial  thinkers 
and  a  fighting  creed  for  the  masses.  It  became  the 
dominant  ideal  of  the  German  race;  and  those  who 
held  to  the  cautious  nationalism  of  Bismarck  were  deemed 
fossilized  survivals  of  an  age  which  would  soon  be  eclipsed 
by  triumphs  greater  than  Sedan. 

We  must  therefore  dismiss  from  our  minds  the  thought 
that  we  are  at  war  merely  with  a  Government  which 
has  blinded  its  subjects.  That  is  inconsistent  with  the 
facts  of  the  situation.  It  is  also  not  a  struggle  with  a 
dominant  military  caste,  which  may  be  overthrown  after 
a  few  defeats.  We  are  at  war  with  a  practically  united 
nation.  The  energy  with  which  wave  after  wave  of 
old  men  and  boys  of  the  German  reserve  or  Landsturm 
swept  on  to  almost  certain  overthrow  near  Ypres  ought 
to  open  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  we  are  facing  a  nation 
in  arms,  a  nation  which  is  resolved  at  all  costs  to  conquer. 
For  the  prize  of  triumph  is  a  World-Empire;  whereas 
defeat  will  imply  that  their  population-problem  will 
be  solved  by  the  most  horrible  of  all  methods,  depopula- 
tion. 


5—2 


IV 

MOROCCO:    THE   BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

In  the  previous  lecture  it  was  apparent  that  many 
strands  went  to  make  up  the  imposing  cable  of  Germany's 
World-Policy.  We  then  glanced  at  two  of  them — South 
Africa  and  Brazil.  But  two  others  are  equally  important 
— Morocco  and  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

The  European  Powers  have  often  endeavoured  to 
secure  a  footing  in  Morocco.  Great  Britain  and  Spain 
were  first  in  the  field;  and  up  to  the  year  1890  their 
interests  in  Morocco  were  supreme.  But  after  that  time 
France  manifested  designs  of  far-reaching  scope.  They 
comprised  all  the  land  from  Cape  Bon  to  the  Straits  of 
Gibraltar;  from  Tangier  to  the  Gulf  of  Guinea.  North- 
West  Africa  was  to  form  a  soHd  block  of  French  territory, 
broken  only  by  a  few  British  enclaves  at  the  Gambia  and 
the  Lower  Niger.  With  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco- 
Russian  alliance  in  1894  and  the  end  of  the  Algerian 
rising  in  1900,  these  vast  plans  gained  in  consistency; 
and  with  the  twentieth  century  Morocco  became  one  of 
the  danger-points  of  the  pohtical  horizon.  At  first  the 
chief  friction  was  between  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Spain.  Their  interests  outweighed  those  of  Germany; 
and  at  that  time  France  looked  upon  us  as  her  worst 


MOROCCO;     THE    BAGDAD    RAILWAY       69 

competitor  in  commercer,  while  Spain  clung  jealously  to 
the  long  cherished  hope  of  conquest  of  the  Moors.  Her 
interests  centred  in  Tangier  and  Tetuan ;  those  of  France 
in  the  North-East  and  East  and  centre;  for,  obviously, 
she  could  not  allow  anarchy  to  prevail  among  the  Moors 
of  the  East,  lest  Algeria  should  once  more  revolt.  The 
interests  of  Great  Britain  were,  in  the  main,  commercial ; 
but  we  could  not  see  unmoved  the  acquisition  of  the 
coast  facing  Gibraltar  by  a  great  maritime  Power;  and 
the  critical  points  were  Tangier,  Ceuta,  and  possible 
coaling-stations  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  For  Germany 
the  most  desirable  points  were  good  harbours  on  the 
south  part  of  the  Atlantic  coast  of  Morocco.  The  best 
were  Mogador  and  Agadir,  though  the  latter  is  a  very 
indifferent  port,  which  never  could  shelter  large  cruisers. 
The  aims  of  the  four  Powers  were  not  hopelessly 
opposed;  but  the  tension  between  them  became  keen 
early  in  the  twentieth  century.  During  the  South 
African  War  France  pushed  ahead  fast  in  Morocco,  the 
propelling  force  at  Paris  being  a  very  masterful  personality. 
Delcasse  represented  the  ardent  national  spirit  of  young 
France,  the  France  which  rejoiced  in  the  Russian  alliance 
and  believed  itself  strong  enough  to  carry  the  tricolour 
into  new  lands.  True,  the  Fashoda  experiment  had 
failed,  owing  to  the  lack  of  the  expected  support  from 
Russia.  Throughout  the  year  1898  and  during  the 
Boer  War  the  French  Press  was  extremely  bitter  against 
us;  but  Delcasse  remained  unmoved  by  the  storm  of 
words.  He,  the  political  heir  of  Gambetta,  saw  in 
England  a  potential  ally,  in  Germany  the  only  enemy^. 

^  R.  Pinon,  France  et  AUemagnef  pp.  97-110;  'Re'vent\ow,DeuUchlanda 
auawdrtige  Politik,  pp.  126-8, 


70  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Foiled  in  the  hope  of  pushing  a  belt  of  French  influence 
across  the  Soudan  and  even  to  the  Red  Sea,  France 
turned  to  Morocco.  Her  opportunity  came  during  the 
South  African  War;  and  in  December  1900  she  "squared" 
Italy  by  agreeing  that  the  Government  of  Rome  should 
have  a  free  hand  in  Tripoli  if  that  of  Paris  worked  its  will 
in  Morocco.  This  compact  explains  why  Italy  lent  but 
a  feeble  support  to  her  ally,  Germany,  in  the  Moroccan 
dispute. 

Delcasse  next  approached  the  Court  of  Madrid.  In 
the  years  1901-2  he  sought  to  frame  a  secret  bargain 
whereby  Spain  should  acquire  North  and  North  Central 
Morocco  and  France  the  remainder.  But  Great  Britain, 
hearing  of  this  clandestine  "deal,"  managed  to  arouse 
Spanish  sentiment  against  an  affair  none  too  flattering 
to  the  national  pride.  The  Ministry  resigned  and  its 
successors  broke  off  the  affair.  Delcasse  then  turned  to 
Great  Britain,  a  Power  which  evidently  must  be  satisfied 
before  the  tricolour  could  wave  at  Fez.  Now,  there 
were  many  topics  in  dispute  between  us  and  France. 
We  had  not  settled  the  West  African  boundary  disputes, 
or  those  relating  to  the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  or  to 
Madagascar  and  the  New  Hebrides.  Above  all,  France 
had  never  forgiven  us  for  occupying  Egypt  in  1882,  though 
she  herself  had  then  refused  to  share  in  the  dangers  and 
burdens  of  the  Egyptian  enterprise.  To  settle  all  these 
outstanding  disputes  seemed  impossible.  Yet,  owing  to 
the  tact  of  Edward  VII,  and  the  skill  of  Lord  Lansdowne 
and  Delcasse,  it  was  accomplished  in  April,  1904,  by  a 
series  of  agreements  which  paved  the  way  towards  an 
Anglo-French  Entente.  The  chief  points  which  concern 
US  here  are  these.    France  recognised  our  position  in 


MOROCCO:    THE    BAGDAD   RAILWAY       71 

Egypt,  while  we  admitted  that  France  had  predominant 
claims  and  interests  in  Morocco,  especially  in  assuring 
order.  France  declared  that  she  would  not  alter  the 
political  status  of  that  land;  and  we  gave  a  similar 
promise  about  Egypt.  But  the  first  secret  article  attached 
to  the  Convention  specified  that  both  France  and  Great 
Britain  might  find  themselves  "constrained  by  force  of 
"circumstances  to  modify  this  policy  in  respect  to  Egypt 
"or  Morocco."  By  this  questionable  device  both  Govern- 
ments left  themselves  a  loophole  for  escaping  from  the 
public  promise.  In  the  third  secret  article  the  Spanish 
sphere  of  influence  was  roughly  defined  as  the  Medi- 
terranean area  of  Morocco^.  The  Franco-Spanish  agree- 
ment, foreshadowed  by  this  secret  article,  came  about  in 
October,  1904,  when  Spain  gained  a  reversionary  claim  to 
that  area. 

The  outstanding  fact  in  the  Anglo-French  Entente  is 
that  the  Powers  earnestly  desired  to  end  their  differences. 
Where  there  was  the  will,  a  way  was  found.  To  Delcasse 
belongs  the  credit  of  terminating  the  feuds  between  the 
two  lands  arising  out  of  the  Fashoda  affair  and  the  Boer 
War ;  and  to  the  Deputies,  e.g.  Deschanel,  who  reproached 
him  with  abandoning  historic  claims  in  Egypt,  he  retorted 
that  the  British  occupation  of  the  Nile  valley  was  an 
accomplished  fact,  and  that  France  would  find  Morocco 
of  a  hundred  times  greater  value  than  Egypt,  especially 
because  the  Moors  would  prove  to  be  excellent  troops  for 
colonial  service.  We  may  note  in  passing  that  there  had 
previously  been  proposals  of  an  Anglo- German- Japanese 

*  E.  D.  Morel,  Morocco  in  Diplomacy,  ch.  x;  Tardien,  Questions 
Mplomatiques  de  1904,  p.  313;  R.  Pinon,  France  et  Alktnagne  (1870- 
1913),  (Appendix),  for  documeuta 


72  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

entente,  but  it  fell  through,  chiefly  because  Germany 
refused  to  take  a  course  of  action  which  might  in  the 
future  tie  her  hands  with  regard  to  naval  programmes 
and  WeJtpoliiik^.  She  further  preferred  to  approach 
Russia  probably  with  a  view  to  joint  aggressive  action 
in  the  Far  East.  The  results  of  her  encouragement  to 
the  Court  of  Petrograd  will  soon  appear. 

Meanwhile  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Spain  were 
gaining  over  Morocco  the  control  of  the  purse.  The 
Sultan  of  Morocco  was  extravagant  and  careless,  therefore 
always  in  debt.  The  state  of  Moroccan  finances  was 
reflected  in  the  prayer  which  is  always  affixed  to  any 
official  reference  to  that  Exchequer — "May  God  fill  it." 
With  oriental  exuberance,  the  same  prayer  is  added  at 
any  mention  of  the  name  of  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer:  "May  God  keep  him  full 2."  The  half  only  of 
the  prayer  was  answered;  for  the  Chancellor  was  always 
full,  but  his  Exchequer  was  always  empty. 

France,  Great  Britain,  and  Spain  undertook  to  play  the 
part  of  a  maleficent  Providence.  As  might  be  expected, 
these  dealings  of  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Spain  with 
Morocco  caused  annoyance  at  Berlin.  At  first,  it  is  true, 
that  Government  showed  surprising  calm  respecting  the 
Anglo-French  agreement,  and  Count  Biilow  declared 
in  the  Reichstag  on  April  12,  1904,  that,  on  the  whole, 
Germany  welcomed  a  good  understanding  between  those 
two  Powers  as  consolidating  the  peace  of  the  world; 
that  the  chief  question  was  as  to  Morocco,  and  German 
interests  in  that  land  were  solely  economic.  This  was 
reassuring  enough;    and  the  Franco-Spanish  agreement 

1  Rcventlow,  pp.  229-235. 

*  Taxdieu,  Questions  diplomatiquea  de  1904,  p.  58. 


MOROCCO:    THE    BAGDAD    RAILWAY       73 

also  aroused  no  protest,  probably  because  its  secret 
articles  were  not  then  known^.  But  in  the  spring  of  the 
year  1905  there  came  a  change  which  is  highly  significant; 
for  it  shows  how  completely  German  policy  depended  on 
outward  circumstances.     In  a  word  it  was  RealpoUtik, 

A  change  in  the  Balance  of  Power  had  come  about 
owing  to  two  chief  events.  Germany  had  completed  her 
naval  programme,  planned  in  1898  and  increased  during 
the  Boer  War.  And  Russia,  early  in  March,  had  sustained 
that  terrible  defeat  at  Mukden  at  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese.  For  the  present,  then,  Russia,  and  therefore 
the  Franco-Russian  AlHance,  could  be  neglected.  Ger- 
many at  once  saw  her  chance.  On  March  12  it  was 
officially  announced  that  Kaiser  Wilham,  in  the  course  of 
a  Mediterranean  cruise,  would  visit  Tangiers,  and  the 
announcement  was  made  in  an  emphatic  manner.  When 
Herr  Bebel,  the  Socialist  leader,  twitted  the  Chancellor 
with  the  hard  and  almost  threatening  tone  of  his  references 
to  Morocco,  he  replied:  "I  must  remind  him  that  the 
"language  and  attitude  of  diplomatists  and  politicians  is 
"regulated  according  to  circumstances.  The  moment 
"that  I  judge  favourable  for  the  setting  forth  of  German 
"interests,  I  choose  it  according  to  my  own  opinion." 
Two  days  later  (March  31)  the  Kaiser  suddenly  landed 
at  Tangiers,  and  declared  that  he  visited  the  Sultan  of 
Morocco  as  an  independent  sovereign,  in  whose  lands  all 
Powers  were  to  hold  the  same  footing  and  enjoy  the  same 
commercial  rights^.  This  was  to  ignore  the  French 
claim  to  exercise  a  certain  measure  of  administrative 
control   in   Morocco,    especially   in   the   parts   bordering 

1  Tardieu,  La  France  et  les  Alliances,  p.  205;  Reventlow,  pp.  228-233. 
"  Tardieu,  La  France  et  les  Alliances,  pp.  207-9. 


74  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Algeria — a  claim  which  Great  Britain  and  Spain   had 
recognised  and  approved. 

Now,  Germany  had  certainly  grounds  for  annoyance^. 
But  the  question  arises — Why  did  she  veil  that  acnoyance 
and  take  no  action  until  March  1905?  The  answer  is 
clear.  Her  action  was  based  on  the  fact  that  Russia, 
and  therefore  France,  were  now  weak.  While  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance  retained  its  original  strength,  Germany 
said  not  a  word  about  Morocco.  She  bided  her  time; 
and,  so  soon  as  the  opportunity  came,  she  shot  her  bolt. 
The  German  historian  Rachfahl  admits  this.  He  says: 
"Because  under  the  surface  of  the  Morocco  affair  lurked 
"the  deepest  and  most  difficult  problems  of  power  (Macht- 
"^rohleme),  it  was  to  be  foreseen  that  its  course  would 
"prove  to  be  a  trial  of  strength  of  the  first  order^." 

That  is  quite  true.  The  importance  of  the  Morocco 
question  does  not  lie  in  the  details.  It  is  easy  to  wander 
about  among  them  and  miss  the  significance  of  the  whole 
affair.  German  writers  and  newspaper  editors  at  once 
declared  it  to  be  a  trial  of  strength  between  Germany  and 
Austria  on  the  one  side,  and  Great  Britain  and  France 
on  the  other.  Italy  and  Russia  stood  outside  the  ring. 
The  question  therefore  was  whether  the  Anglo-French 
Entente  would  prove  to  be  soUd;  or  would  go  to  pieces 
at  the  first  shock.  Germany  intended  to  show  that  she 
was  not  going  to  be  pushed  out  of  world-politics,  or,  in 
the  words  of  the  Kaiser  (July  3,  1900):  "The  ocean 
"  reminds  us  that  neither  on  it  nor  across  it  in  the  distance 
"can  any  great  decision  be  again  arrived  at  without 
"Germany  and  the  German  Emperor." 

^  E.  D.  Morel,  Morocco  in  Diplomacy,  ohs.  xi-xnL 
*  F.  Baohfahl,  Kaiaer  und  Reich  (Berlin,  1913),  p.  233. 


MOROCCO:    THE    BAGDAD   RAILWAY       75 

Germany  was  not  about  to  be  pushed  out  from  Morocco. 
Her  interests  there  were  purely  commercial,  as  her 
Chancellor  admitted ;  and  those  interests  were  guaranteed. 
Moreover,  at  that  time  her  trade  with  Morocco  (though 
fast  increasing)  could  not  compare  in  volume  with  that 
of  Great  Britain  or  France.  If,  therefore,  she  chose  to 
consider  Morocco  as  of  vital  importance  to  her,  it  must 
have  been  for  wider  reasons,  which  were  not  far  to  seek. 
Firstly,  the  statesmen  of  Berlin  hoped  to  shatter  the 
Anglo-French  compact  at  the  very  point  which  had 
cUnched  it,  viz.  Morocco.  But,  secondly,  the  German 
navy  badly  needed  coaling-stations.  Between  the  North 
Sea  and  Togoland  and  the  Cameroons  was  a  very  long 
space  which  she  wished  to  halve  by  some  intermediate 
station.  In  Morocco — say  at  Mogador  or  Agadir — such  a 
station  could  be  found.  And  if  France,  England,  and 
Spain  really  intended  to  partition  Morocco,  Germany  had 
some  right  to  expect  compensation  in  one  of  those  towns. 
That  was  seen  from  the  outset.  Therefore,  not  only  was 
the  Morocco  Question  a  Machtfrage  for  the  purpose  of 
testing  the  Anglo-French  Entente,  but  also  of  procuring 
a  much  needed  coaling-station.  Here  one  must  admit 
the  fatality  of  Germany.  Coming  last  into  the  field  of 
World-PoHcy,  she  could  not  acquire  a  coaUng-station 
without  alarming  everybody.  France,  Great  Britain, 
Spain,  and  above  all  the  United  States  were  annoyed; 
for  Mogador  or  Agadir,  would  be  half  way  to  South 
Brazil;  and  South  Brazil  is  imder  the  shield  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  intervention  of  the  Kaiser  in  Morocco  lost  nothing 
by  the  language  of  his  ambassadors.  It  was  well  known 
at  Paris,  and  therefore  at  Berhn,  that  France  was  not 


7b  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

ready  for  war;  that  alone,  without  the  help  of  Russia, 
she  was  sure  to  succumb.  M.  Rouvier,  President  of  the 
Council  of  ]\Iinisters,  admitted  as  much  in  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  during  the  humihating  debate  of  April  19, 1905, 
which  may  be  termed  the  analogue  of  the  debate  of  mid- 
July  before  the  present  crisis.  A  special  envoy  of  the 
German  Government,  Prince  Henckel  von  Donnersmarck, 
came  to  Paris  and  spoke  as  a  Jupiter  tonans.  He  said 
that  it  was  now  clear  that  the  Anglo-French  Entente  had 
been  framed  for  the  isolation  and  humiUation  of  Germany. 
Was  the  recent  Moroccan  poUcy  that  of  France  or  of  her 
Foreign  IVIinister  ?  The  policy  of  that  Minister  was  aimed 
at  the  Germans,  who  would  not  wait  until  it  was  com- 
pleted. It  was  also  the  policy  of  England  to  destroy  the 
fleet  of  every  rival,  or  better  still,  to  prevent  its  con- 
struction. But  could  the  British  fleet  help  France? 
That  fleet  might  bombard  German  towns  and  destroy 
German  commerce.  None  the  less,  the  milliards  which 
Germany  would  wring  from  France  would  rebuild  both 
towns  and  merchantmen.  Let  France  think  better  of  it. 
Give  up  the  Minister  who  had  made  the  trouble,  and  adopt 
towards  Germany  a  loyal  and  open  poHcy,  such  as  would 
guarantee  the  peace  of  the  world^. 

This  remarkable  pronouncement  disclosed  the  real 
motives  of  the  Court  of  Berlin.  They  were  intended,  not 
so  much  to  promote  the  attainment  of  German  aims  in 
Morocco,  as  to  give  a  brutal  demonstration  of  the  worth- 
lessness  of  the  Anglo-French  Entente  when  contrasted 
with  the  might  of  Germany.  The  purpose  was  to 
separate  Great  Britain  and  France,  not  to  secure  com- 
mercial concessions. 

*  Substance  of  a  conversation  printed  by  le  Gauloia  (June,  1905). 


MOROCCO;     THE    BAGDAD    RAILWAY       77 

The  upshot  was  that  France  decided  to  sacrifice 
Delcasse.  There  is  no  doubt  that  he  had  pushed  ahead 
too  far  and  too  fast.  His  resignation,  which  took  place  on 
June  12,  1905,  was  desirable;  but  that  it  should  take  place 
at  the  imperious  dictation  of  Germany  was  a  Pyrrhic 
triumph  for  the  victor.  It  enraged  everyone.  France 
ground  her  teeth  and  thought  more  than  ever  of  revenge. 
Great  Britain,  no  less  than  France,  felt  the  blow  dealt  at 
Paris;  and  Russia  knew  full  well  that  Muscovite  defeats 
in  Manchuria  accounted  for  the  whole  affair.  For  the 
time  the  RealpoUtik  of  Berhn  succeeded,  but  only  at  the 
cost  of  exasperating  three  Great  Powers;  and  such  a 
success  is  really  defeat.  All  three  Powers  began  to  take 
precautions  for  the  future ;  and  Europe  became  more  than 
ever  an  armed  camp.  France  had  been  alarmed  by 
Germany's  threats;  and  in  the  latter  part  of  1905  voted 
the  sum  of  £60,000,000  to  make  good  the  defects  in  her 
army  organisation,  including  more  than  a  million  for 
strategic  railways^.  The  retort  of  Germany  was  sharp 
and  highly  significant.  In  1906  she  commenced,  among 
other  things,  the  construction  of  a  system  of  strategic 
railways  from  the  Rhine,  about  Cologne,  towards  the 
Belgian  frontier.  Those  railways,  running  through  a 
rather  sparsely  inhabited  country,  aroused  suspicion  at 
the  time.  Only  in  this  year  has  their  terrible  motive 
been  fully  revealed. 

That  Germany's  chief  aim  throughout  was  to  separate 
France  from  Great  Britain  and  from  Russia  appeared 
clearly  enough  during  the  Algesiras  Conference  (Jan. — 
March  1906).  But  she  failed.  Her  efforts  were  marked 
by  too  much  of  Teutonic  vigour,  so  much  so  that  on  one 
*  Tardieu,  op.  cit.  p.  229. 


78  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

occasion  (March  17,  1906)  they  alienated  the  sympathy 
even  of  Mr  Roosevelt.  Though  phed  by  the  Kaiser 
with  three  personal  telegrams,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  replied  that  he  found  the  German  propositions 
unacceptable.  They  were  so  to  all  the  Powers,  and 
finally,  on  March  26,  Germany  had  to  give  way  and 
accept  the  compromise  proposed  by  the  French  pleni- 
potentiaries. The  poHcy  of  Berhn  had  in  turn  gone 
counter  to  that  of  Italy,  Russia,  the  United  States,  and 
even  of  Austria.  This  diplomatic  defeat  clearly  resulted 
from  excess  of  confidence  or  excess  of  zeal.  Oscar  Wilde 
once  said  that  nothing  succeeds  like  excess.  That  may 
be  true  in  up-to-date  literature;  doubtless,  it  is  true 
for  the  modern  theatre ;  but  it  is  not  true  in  the  diplomatic 
sphere.  There  the  advice  of  Talleyrand  to  a  beginner 
is  always  applicable :  "Et  surtout  pas  trop  de  zele.^^ 

The  most  important  result  of  the  Algesiras  Conference 
remains  to  be  noticed — the  Anglo-Russian  Entente. 
That  understanding  between  the  former  deadly  rivals 
would  have  appeared  either  miraculous  or  monstrous  to 
men  of  the  time  of  Beaconsfield.  But  it  is  now  fairly 
clear  that  Russia  took  seriously  to  heart  the  lessons  of 
the  Japanese  War  and  saw  the  folly  of  that  aggressive 
policy  which  had  earned  the  distrust  of  all  her  neighbours. 
For  the  time  she  was  amenable  to  reason,  and  Germany 
was  not.  That  was  the  outstanding  lesson  of  the  Con- 
ference of  Algesiras.  British  and  Russian  diplomatists 
there  discovered  ground  for  common  action.  Therefore 
that  happened  which  always  will  happen  when  a  Great 
Power  tries  to  give  the  law  to  the  others.  They  drew 
nearer  together  for  mutual  support.  This  has  ever  been 
the  outcome  of  Weltpolitik — that  of  Phihp  II  of  Spain,  of 


MOROCCO:    THE   BAGDAD    RAILWAY       79 

Louis  XIV,  of  Napoleon,  of  Wilhelm  II.  The  last-named 
has  succeeded,  firstly,  in  making  the  British  lion  lie  down 
by  the  side  of  the  Russian  bear,  and,  secondly,  in  rousing 
them  to  joint  action.  It  is  his  chief  diplomatic  achieve- 
ment. 

Some  years  earlier,  viz.  in  1900-1,  a  British  writer, 
evidently  a  diplomat,  had  maintained  in  the  pages  of 
the  Fortnightly  Review  that  we  ought  to  come  to  terms 
with  Russia.  But  at  that  time  it  seemed  a  mere  dream. 
Then  came  the  Dogger  Bank  incident,  when  we  were  on 
the  brink  of  war  with  Russia.  But  Morocco  and  Algesiras 
ended  all  that.  After  the  close  of  the  Japanese  War,  the 
Tsar  let  it  be  known  that  he  desired  friendly  relations 
with  Great  Britain ;  and  he  received  Sir  Charles  Hardinge 
in  a  markedly  cordial  manner  at  St  Petersburg^.  Algesiras 
having  furthered  the  entente,  Sir  Edward  Grey  admitted 
on  May  24,  1906,  that,  though  there  was  no  definite 
accord  between  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  yet  they  were 
more  and  more  inclined  to  discuss  amicably  all  the 
questions  at  issue  between  them.  In  March,  1907,  a 
Russian  Squadron  received  a  hearty  welcome  at  our 
naval  ports;  and  in  the  month  of  August  following  the 
two  Powers  came  to  an  agreement  respecting  Persia, 
Afghanistan,  and  Thibet^.  It  is  impossible  here  to  enter 
into  details,  save  that  Central  Asian  questions  have 
since  that  time  ceased  to  trouble  us  as  they  did  in  former 
periods.  For  a  time  tranquilHty  in  Central  Asia  seemed 
to  be  dearly  bought  at  the  cost  of  our  concurrence  in 
Russia's  Persian  policy;  but  that  is  now  seen  to  be  a 
side  issue  compared  with  the  graver  questions  at  stake 
in  Europe. 

»  The  Times,  October  23,  1905.  •  Tardieu,  282-6. 


80  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

In  1909  there  appeared  for  a  time  a  prospect  of  better 
relations  with  Germany;  and  the  improvement  was 
almost  certainly  due  to  the  personal  intervention  of 
H.M.  Edward  VII.  During  a  State  visit  to  Berlin  he 
discussed  important  matters,  thus  probably  helping  on 
the  Franco-German  agreement  on  the  Moroccan  Question 
which  was  signed  at  Berhn  on  Feb.  9,  1909^.  France 
thereby  recognised  the  integrity  of  Morocco;  while 
Germany  admitted  that  France  should  maintain  order 
in  the  interior.  The  agreement  obviously  was  vague; 
and  it  soon  fell  through  owing  to  the  outbreak  of  dis- 
turbances in  that  land. 

Accordingly,  in  the  early  summer  of  1911,  France 
sent  an  expedition  to  Fez,  whereupon  Spain  occupied 
points  on  the  West  coast,  allotted  to  her  by  the  secret 
Franco-Spanish  treaty  of  1904.  Germany,  seeing  her 
commercial  interests  threatened,  made  protests;  and 
when  nothing  came  of  them,  sent  the  corvette  Panther  to 
Agadir  (July  1911)  in  order  "to  help  and  protect  German 
"subjects  and  clients  in  those  regions."  Much  could  be 
said  in  favour  of  some  such  step,  for  as  matters  then  stood, 
German  interests  were  certain  to  suffer  unless  she  made 
a  stand  against  French  and  Spanish  expansion  in  Morocco. 
But  the  Pan-Germans  aggravated  the  crisis  by  demanding 
the  annexation  of  all  S.W.  Morocco ;  and  no  less  a  person 
than  the  Secretary  of  State,  Kiderlen-Wachter,  declared 
privately  that  the  German  flag  would  never  be  hauled 
down  at  Agadir,  and  that  he  would  not  hear  of  any 
exchange  of  it  for  French  Congo  districts^. 

*  Rachfahl,  p.  310;   Reventlow,  p.  309;   Pinon,  185. 

*  See  article  in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  xci  (new  series,  462)  founded, 
in  part,  on  revelations  made  on  oath  by  Herr  Class,  President  of  the 


MOROCCO:    THE    BAGDAD    RAILWAY       81 

British  Ministers  protested  against  the  action  of 
Germany;  and  it  was  made  clear  that  her  occupation  of 
Agadir  and  its  coast  was  an  mifriendly  act,  respecting 
which  Great  Britain  must  be  consulted.  The  silence  of 
Germany  respecting  this  declaration  led  to  a  shrill  remon- 
strance from  Mr  Lloyd  George;  and  the  whole  affair 
trended  dangerously  near  to  war.  The  secrets  of  that 
time  have  not  been  disclosed;  and  we  cannot  expect  to 
fathom  the  motives  of  the  Kaiser  with  any  approach  to 
certainty;  but  it  is  generally  believed  that  he  desired 
to  avert  war.  The  anonymous  author  of  that  curious 
book,  "The  Secrets  of  the  German  War  Office,"  asserts 
that  the  German  war  party  intended  by  the  despatch  of 
the  Panther  to  provoke  a  quarrel  with  Great  Britain  or 
France;  also  that  peace  was  maintained  only  by  the 
personal  interposition  of  the  Kaiser,  who  sent  him,  a 
secret  agent  of  the  Government,  with  the  utmost  haste 
and  secrecy  to  Agadir.  His  mission  was  to  warn  the 
captain  of  the  Panther  that  in  no  circumstances  was  he 
to  begin  hostilities  with  the  French  and  British  vessels 
in  that  port.  The  statement  is  made  without  proof  and 
is  on  several  grounds  suspicious.  Nevertheless,  if  not 
true  to  fact,  it  is  true  to  character.  The  Kaiser  appears 
to  have  desired  peace. 

It  is,  however,  doubtful  whether  his  pacific  leanings 
were  due  to  a  persistent  conviction,  or  whether  he  desired 
to  defer  a  rupture  until  a  more  favourable  juncture.     Was 


Pan-German  League.  Reventlow  (p.  354)  asserts  that  Kiderlen- 
Wachter  always  looked  to  an  exchange  between  S.W.  Morocco  and 
districts  on  the  French  Congo,  such  as  finally  was  arranged.  But  this 
seems  a  lame  excuse  for  the  final  compromise,  which  the  Pan-Germans 
detested. 

B.  L.  0 


82  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

he  waiting  for  a  time  when  the  Kiel  Canal  would  be 
widened  so  as  to  admit  the  German  Dreadnoughts  then  in 
course  of  construction?  And  was  he  dismayed  at  the 
prospect  of  the  huge  financial  crash  which  bankers  and 
merchants  confidently  prophesied  as  the  immediate 
result  of  war?  On  both  grounds  it  was  highly  desirable 
to  avert  hostilities.  Then,  too,  in  the  Bosnian  Crisis  of 
1908-9  (see  Lecture  VI)  he  had  inflicted  a  rebufi  on  the 
Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente;  and  after  strengthening 
his  control  over  the  Turkish  Empire,  he  might  hope 
before  long  to  find  in  the  re-organised  Turkish  army  an 
efiective  ally  against  Russia  in  Caucasia,  and  England  in 
Egypt. 

For  these  reasons — naval,  diplomatic,  and  financial — 
it  is  highly  probable  that  the  Kaiser's  resolve  not  to 
provoke  a  rupture  in  1911  was  based  on  prudential  con- 
siderations. As  events  have  actually  shown,  the  Triple 
Entente  was  stronger  in  1914  than  in  1911.  But  that 
could  not  have  been  foreseen.  According  to  all  appear- 
ances in  1911,  the  Kaiser  might  well  deem  that  the  Triple 
Alhance  would  be  stronger,  and  the  Triple  Entente 
weaker,  in  the  near  future;  and  this  result  would  have 
come  about  but  for  that  unexpected  event  in  the  autunm 
of  1911 — Italy's  attack  upon  Turkey,  which  will  be 
considered  in  due  course^. 

It  is  now  time  to  turn  to  the  Bagdad  Railway  Question, 
which  closely  concerns  the  future  of  Asia  Minor,  Meso- 
potamia, and  Egypt.  The  scheme  crystallized  in  1898  at 
the  time  of  the  Kaiser's  visit  to  the  Holy  Land.     Out- 

^  For  the  final  settlement  of  the  Moroccan  Question  see  E.  D.  Morel, 
op.  cit.  pp.  304r-323,  also  the  cessions  of  the  French  Congo  territory  to 
Germany. 


MOROCCO;    THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY       83 

wardly  he  appeared  as  a  crusader,  championing  the 
interests  of  Christian  pilgrims  to  Jerusalem,  for  whom 
he  gained  concessions  from  the  Sultan^.  But  he  also 
procured  from  the  Sultan  a  verbal  promise  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  Bagdad  Railway.  This  happened  in 
the  year  succeeding  the  Armenian  and  Macedonian 
massacres.  At  the  time  of  those  outbreaks  of  calculating 
fanaticism  strong  remonstrances  were  made  to  the 
SubUme  Porte  by  the  Western  Powers.  They  were 
fruitless.  For  many  years  past  Germany  had  supported 
Turkey,  in  pursuance  of  the  policy  of  Prussia  traditional 
since  the  days  of  Frederick  the  Great;  and  in  1897 
Kaiser  WilHam  emphasized  the  closeness  of  the  political 
tie  connecting  the  German  and  Ottoman  Empires^. 
Consequently  poets  and  idealists  in  Western  Europe 
raged  in  vain  against  the  atrocities  perpetrated  by  "  Abdul 
Hamid  the  Damned."  The  power  behind  his  throne 
was  the  Kaiser,  who  found  his  reward  for  the  great  betrayal 
of  1897  in  the  bargain  for  the  Bagdad  Railway.  In 
1902  the  Porte  issued  a  firman  authorising  that  enterprise. 
The  Kaiser,  during  his  visit  to  these  shores  in  November, 
1902,  probably  sought  to  interest  our  Government  in 
his  scheme.  True,  Mr  Balfour  denied  that  we  were 
asked  to  participate  in  it,  and  scolded  the  Spectator  for 
crediting  that  story.  But  early  in  1903  General  von 
der  Goltz  delivered  to  the  Konigsberg  Geographical 
Society  a  lecture  in  which  he  stated  that  the  German 
Bagdad  Syndicate  had  secured  a  concession  for  extending 

*  Elkind,  The  German  Emperor's  Speeches  (pp.  62-4,  318-322): 
"  Not  splendour,  not  power,  not  glory,  not  honour,  no  earthly  blessing 
is  it  that  we  seek  here :  we  pine,  we  pray,  we  strive  alone  after  the  sole, 
the  highest  blessing,  the  salvation  of  our  souls." 

■  Sir  H.  Rumbold,  Final  Recollections  of  a  Diplomatist,  p.  296. 

6—2 


84  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

its  line  to  Koweit  on  the  Persian  Gulf  "  after  diplomatic 
"  negotiations  with  Great  Britain^."  He  also  foretold 
that  British  mails  for  India  would  soon  go  via  Vienna, 
Constantinople,  Bagdad,  and  Koweit.  It  was  evident 
that  British  trade  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  especially  at 
Basra,  would  largely  be  diverted  to  this  railway,  especially 
if,  as  was  contemplated,  it  was  connected  with  European 
hues  by  a  tunnel  under  the  Bosphorus.  In  this  case, 
there  would  be  through  communication  from  Ostend  or 
Antwerp  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  with  serious  results  to  our 
shipping  interests. 

But  the  promoters  of  the  German  Bagdad  scheme 
showed  clearly  enough  that  pohtical  and  mihtary  issues 
of  great  moment  were  at  stake.  This  appeared  in  a  work, 
Die  BagdadbaJm,  published  in  1902  by  Dr  P.  Rohrbach, 
whose  travels  in  Mesopotamia,  originating  in  theological 
motives,  had  of  late  led  him  to  take  a  decidedly  miUtant 
tone.  He  stated  frankly  that  it  was  not  worth  while 
spending  a  pfennig  for  a  weak  Turkey;  but  for  a  strong 
Turkey  it  might  be  worth  while  to  spend  many  milUon 
marks.  He  pointed  out  how  the  Bagdad  Railway  would 
enable  the  SubUme  Porte  to  bring  up  its  Anatohan  troops 
quickly  to  the  Bosphorus,  whereas  in  the  Russo-Turkish 
War  of  1876-7  seven  months  were  wasted  by  the  troops 
from  Mesopotamia  before  arrival  at  the  front.  The  new 
lines  would  double  the  military  strength  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  Further,  the  prosperity  of  Mesopotamia  and 
Asia  Minor  would  revive,  stimulated  as  it  would  be  by 
the  immigration  of  numbers  of  Germans.  Thus,  both 
in  a  financial  and   mihtary  sense   Turkey  would  soon 

»  See  the  Spectator  for  November  8,  1902,  April  4,  1903;  also  June  5, 
1909,  and  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  June,  1909. 


MOROCCO;    THE    BAGDAD    RAILWAY       85 

be  able  to  resist  her  redoubtable  enemy,  Russia.  Rolir- 
bach  also  affirmed  that  agreements  had  been  almost 
secured  both  with  France  and  with  Great  Britain  (this, 
too,  in  1902). 

The  revival  of  irrigation  in  Mesopotamia  was  already 
planned  by  Sir  WilHam  Wilcocks;  but  the  arrival  of 
the  Bagdad  Railway  might  have  helped  the  development 
of  that  now  desolate  region.  Nevertheless,  in  view  of 
the  unfriendly  conduct  of  Germany  in  other  quarters, 
the  Bagdad  scheme  had  to  be  scrutinised  closely.  Her 
ambassador  at  Constantinople,  Baron  Marschall  von 
Bieberstein,  was  openly  hostile  to  Great  Britain;  and, 
if  we  had  helped  on  the  Bagdad  scheme,  we  should  at 
once  have  been  represented  as  the  enemies  of  Russia. 
On  the  other  hand  the  British  opposition  to  the  Bagdad 
scheme  was  finally  declared  by  a  German  writer  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  and  After  [June,  1909]  to  be  due 
to  Russian  instigation.  Clearly,  the  only  way  with  so 
intricate  and  compromising  a  scheme  was  to  let  it  alone, 
and  allow  the  Germans  to  make  the  line  if  they  could 
get  the  money  for  it.  They  failed  to  carry  through 
the  original  scheme  so  far  as  concerned  the  Persian 
Gulf.  To  this  extension  the  British  Government  could 
not  assent;  for  it  would  have  enabled  Turkey  and 
Germany  to  send  troops  quickly  to  the  confines  of  Persia, 
and  a  further  extension  of  the  Une  would  threaten  India. 
The  design  of  Germany  and  Austria  to  control  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  and  Asia  Minor  appeared  clearly  in  the  years 
1908-10.  In  1908  Austria  annexed  Bosnia;  and  though 
for  a  time  in  that  year  the  Young  Turk  Movement  over- 
threw German  influence  at  Constantinople,  yet  the 
intrigues  of  Baron  Marschall  brought  about  a  complete 


86  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

revival  of  Teutonic  ascendancy  in  April  1909.  Ever  since 
that  time  the  Young  Turks  have  been  the  creatures  of 
Berhn.  All  the  more  reason,  then,  had  we  for  opposing 
the  German  scheme  of  **  pacific  penetration  **  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  where  British  merchants  had  long  before 
built  up  an  extremely  valuable  trade^.  Moreover,  the 
terminus,  Koweit,  was  the  city  of  an  independent  Sheikh 
whom  we  had  more  than  once  supported  against  the 
coercion  of  Abdul-Hamid.  In  1911  Sir  Edward  Grey 
demanded  that,  if  a  railway  were  made  to  the  Gulf,  it 
must  be  a  purely  commercial  undertaking.  Herein  he 
followed  the  lines  laid  down  by  Lord  Lansdowne,  who 
stated  that  we  could  never  allow  another  Power  to  obtain 
there  a  strong  naval  position  "  which  might  be  used  on 
"  the  flank  of  our  communications  with  India.'* 

Such  an  assertion  was  aU  the  more  needed  because 
of  a  recent  compact  between  Russia  and  Germany. 
In  November,  1910,  the  Tsar  visited  the  Kaiser  at  Potsdam 
and  they  conferred  together  on  matters  of  State.  Their 
meeting  caused  no  little  surprise  in  view  of  the  rebuff 
which  the  Kaiser  had  dealt  to  the  Tsar  in  the  winter  of 
1908-9  over  the  Bosnian  Question.  It  now  seemed  that 
the  Tsar  had  ac<iepted  defeat  and  was  willing  to  follow 
the  lead  of  Germany.  The  meeting  of  the  two  Emperors 
therefore  caused  great  concern  at  London  and  Paris; 
for  it  might  betoken  the  break-up  of  the  Triple  Entente, 
lately  severely  strained  by  the  death  of  H.M.  Edward  VII. 
The  German  account  of  the  deliberations  of  the  two 
Emperors  is  as  follows:  Russia  agreed  not  to  oppose 
the  scheme,  and  even  to  link  up  that  railway  with  her 
Persian  hues;    also  to  recognize  Germany  as  an  equal 

^  D.  Fraser,  The  Short  Cut  to  India  (1909),  chs.  19-25. 


MOROCCO:     THE    BAGDAD    RAILWAY       87 

in  matters  commercial  in  that  country.  The  Court  of 
Berhn,  on  its  side,  recognized  that  Russia  had  special 
political  and  strategic  interests  in  Northern  Persia,  as 
well  as  lights  to  construct  railways,  roads,  and  telegraphs. 
Thus,  Germany  said  in  effect,  "Help  me  to  build  the 
*'  Bagdad  Railway  through  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  I 
"  will  hand  over  to  you  North  Persia  and  as  much  of 
"  that  land  as  you  want."  But  this  was  not  all.  The 
Russian  and  German  Governments  also  gave  mutual 
assurances  that  each  would  enter  into  no  engagement 
inimical  to  the  other*. 

The  Potsdam  Convention  was  a  triumph  for  the 
diplomacy  of  Germany.  She  had  set  back  Russia's 
interests  at  the  time  of  the  Bosnian  crisis ;  and  she  pushed 
on  the  Bagdad  Railway  until  it  promised  to  become 
a  menace  to  Russian  Caucasia.  Then  she  turned  round 
and  said,  "Now  that  I  have  beaten  you,  will  you  not 
"make  a  bargain?  Let  us  virtually  partition  Persia 
"  between  us,  shutting  out  the  British ;  and,  while  we 
"  are  about  it,  let  us  have  a  friendly  understanding  all 
"  round.  I  will  not  attack  you  in  any  quarter,  if  you 
"  will  not  attack  me."  The  method  is  rather  crude, 
as  German  diplomacy  has  been  since  Bismarck's  day. 
It  succeeded  in  1910.  But  it  seems  probable  that  the 
Potsdam  compact  marks  the  last  success  of  this  policy 
of  blows  and  bluff. 

For  the  time  there  were  searchings  of  heart  at  London 
and  Paris.  Was  the  Triple  Entente  of  any  avail  if  Russia 
could  thus  clasp  the  hand  of  our  declared  rival?  And 
were  there  any  secret  clauses?     Such  were  the  questions 

*  Raobfahl,  pp.  331-2;  Niaeieenth  Century  and  After,  June,  1914, 
pp.  1323-6. 


88  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

that  agitated  the  political  world^.  Obviously,  the  v^ar 
1911  was  one  of  great  anxiety  for  French  and  British 
statesmen;  and  the  facts  just  passed  in  review  explain 
why  the  war  party  at  Berlin  so  vehemently  clamoured 
for  hostilities  with  France  and  Great  Britain  at  the  time 
of  the  Agadir  affair. 

Their  confidence  found  expression  in  several  ways. 
Germany  had  recently  gained  from  the  Sultan  a  concession 
respecting  the  port  of  Alexandretta  which  made  it  for 
all  practical  purposes  a  German  port.  She  also  secured 
permission  to  build  an  important  branch  line  to  Damascus 
and  past  the  east  of  the  Dead  Sea  and  the  Sinaitic  Penin- 
sula to  Mecca.  It  comes  almost  within  striking  distance 
of  the  Suez  Canal.  Represented  as  a  semi-philanthropic 
enterprise,  designed  to  lessen  the  hardships  of  pilgrims 
proceeding  to  Mecca,  it  was  always  intended  to  menace 
Egypt.  This  was  stated  by  Dr  Rohrbach  in  a  later 
edition  of  his  book  (1911): 

England  can  be  attacked  and  mortally  wounded  by  land  from 
Europe  only  in  one  place — Egypt.  The  loss  of  Egypt  would  mean 
for  England  not  only  the  end  of  her  dominion  over  the  Suez  Canal, 
and  of  her  connections  with  India  and  the  Far  East,  but  would 
probably  entail  the  loss  of  her  possessions  in  Central  and  East 
Africa.  The  conquest  of  Egypt  by  a  Mohammedan  Power,  like 
Turkey,  would  also  imperil  England's  hold  over  her  60,000,000 
Mohammedan  subjects  in  India,  besides  prejudicing  her  relations 
with  Afghanistan  and  Persia.  Turkey,  however,  can  never  dream 
of  recovering  Egypt  until  she  is  mistress  of  a  developed  railway 
system  in  Asia  ]\linor  and  Syria,  and  until,  through  the  progress  of 
the  Anatohan  Railway  to  Bagdad,  she  is  in  a  position  to  withstand 
an  attack  by  England  upon  Mesopotamia.. .  .Egypt  is  a  prize  which 

*  See  an  article  in  La  Revue  des  Questions  diplomatiques  (Jan. -June, 
1911)  which  reproaches  Russia  with  her  Persian  policy,  which  "a 
^mascule  la  Triple  Entente." 


MOROCCO:    THE    BAGDAD    RAILWAY       89 

for  Turkey  would  be  weU  worth  the  risk  of  taking  sides  with 
Germany  in  a  war  with  England.  The  policy  of  protecting 
Turkey,  which  is  now  pursued  by  Germany,  has  no  object  but 
the  desire  to  effect  an  insurance  against  the  danger  of  a  war 
with  England. 

The  Bagdad-Mecca  scheme  aimed  at  the  revival  of 
the  Moslem  Power^;  and  that  Power,  when  strengthened 
by  German  money,  and  drilled  by  German  officers,  was 
to  play  a  great  part  in  an  eventual  conflict  with  Russia 
or  Great  Britain.  The  curious  tactics  of  the  Goeben 
and  the  Breslau,  and  the  coercion  recently  employed 
by  Germany  at  Constantinople,  explain  the  drift  of  events 
in  the  Near  East.  The  Kaiser  and  his  Ministers  supported 
successively  the  Sultan  and  the  Young  Turks  against 
the  impulse  for  reform  because  they  saw  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire  an  effective  ally  against  Russia  and  a  means 
of  deahng  a  deadly  blow  at  a  vital  part  of  the  British 
Empire. 

It  may  be  asked — How  could  the  Kaiser  make  the 
mistake  of  hoping  to  dominate  Egypt  without  previously 
having  gained  the  mastery  at  sea?  Does  not  Bonaparte's 
adventure  of  1798  stand  as  a  warning  against  such  an 
attempt?  Not  wholly,  I  think.  For  the  Corsican 
committed  two  blunders,  firstly,  of  not  securing  the 
definite  support  of  Turkey  before  he  sought  to  over- 
throw the  Mamelukes;  secondly,  of  disregarding  British 
maritime  power  at  a  time  when  sea-power  counted  for 

*  It  proved  very  profitable  to  the  promoters  and  burdensome  to 
Ottoman  finance:  see  D.  Fraser,  op.  cit.  chs.  n-v,  xvni;  L.  Fraser, 
articles  in  National  Review,  April,  May,  1911;  Mens.  A  Geraud,  in 
articles  in  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  May,  June,  1914,  shows  the 
weakness  of  the  Anglo-French  opposition  to  the  scheme.  On  the  Horns- 
Bagdad  railway  scheme,  favoured  by  England  and  France,  which  utterly 
failed,  see  The  Imperial  and  Asiatic  Quarterly  (July,  1912). 


90  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

far  more  than  it  does  in  the  present  case.  Bonaparte*fl 
exploit  was  therefore  doomed  to  failure,  if  we  and  the 
Turks  attacked  him.  Now,  however,  in  favourable 
circumstances,  the  Kaiser  and  the  Turks  might  attack 
Egypt  with  a  fair  chance  of  success.  For  he  and  they 
reckoned  on  having  almost  continuous  communications 
by  land  between  Berlin  and  the  Sinaitic  Peninsula.  If 
Balkan  affairs  had  gone  as  he  desired,  Austria  would 
have  controlled  the  hne  to  Constantinople,  and  have 
poured  troops  speedily  into  Syria,  thence  menacing  the 
Suez  Canal.  There  only  could  the  Sea-Power  have 
opposed  any  effective  resistance;  and  it  is  doubtful 
whether  warships  cooped  up  in  a  canal  can  long  oppose 
with  success  an  attack  of  a  large  army  provided  with 
pontoons.  We  shall  do  well  not  to  underrate  the  danger 
at  the  canal,  though  it  is  far  less  formidable  than  was 
designed  at  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Constantinople.  For, 
as  we  shall  see  in  Lecture  VI,  neither  Italy  nor  the  httle 
peoples  of  the  Balkans  maintained  the  passive  role  which 
the  Kaiser  desired.  They  successively  attacked  Turkey, 
thereby  enfeebhng  her  and  preventing  that  through 
railway  communication  with  Syria  which  was  needed  for 
the  full  reahzation  of  the  dreams  of  the  modern  Alexander 
the  Great. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE 

La  conquete  et  V annexion  par  la  force  de  V Alsace  et  de  la 
Lorraine  sent  le  principal  obstacle  a  la  paix  et  la  vraie  cause 
dea  armaments  gigantesques. 

(La  Ligue  internationale  de  la  Paix.     Geneva,  1884.) 

In  nearly  all  wars  there  are  motives  deeper  and 
more  fundamental  than  those  which  appear  on  the 
surface.  The  latter  may  be  the  occasion  of  the  rupture, 
but  they  need  not  be  the  fundamental  cause.  It  is  so 
in  the  present  instance.  The  murder  of  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand  was  merely  the  spark  that  ignited 
vast  stores  of  combustible  material  which  had  long  been 
accumulating.  They  may  be  classed  in  three  general 
groups.  The  first  was  due  to  the  clash  of  British  and 
German  national  interests,  especially  in  matters  colonial 
and  naval.  This  we  have  already  surveyed.  But  that 
friction  might  have  continued  indefinitely,  had  not 
flames  burst  forth  in  the  south-east  of  Europe.  The 
flames  spread  swiftly  to  France  (and  incidentally  to 
Belgium)  because  France  was  on  the  same  electrical 
circuit  as  Russia.  When  we  inquire  why  the  French 
RepubHo  is  connected  with  the  Tsardom,  we  find  the 
cause  in  the  deep-lying  hatred  and  fear  of  Germany 


92  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

which  has  prevailed  at  Paris  since  the  year  1870.  Those 
feelings  centre  in  the  Alsace-Lorraine  Question  which, 
as  by  an  electric  thrill,  set  the  West  in  a  blaze  so  soon 
as  fire  broke  forth  in  the  East. 

In  September,  1870,  during  the  Franco-German  War, 
when  the  first  feelers  with  regard  to  peace  were  put 
forth  by  the  young  French  Republic  to  the  victors, 
Bismarck  declared  that  Germany  must  have  Strassburg 
and  Metz.  To  German  diplomatists  he  wrote,  *'  So  long 
*'  as  France  possesses  Strassburg  and  Metz,  her  strategical 
*'  position  is  stronger  offensively  than  ours  is  defensively. 
"....In  Germany's  possession,  Strassburg  and  Metz 
*'  assume  a  defensive  aspect.  In  more  than  twenty 
"  wars  with  France  we  have  never  been  the  aggressors. 
"  We  have  nothing  to  demand  from  her  except  our 
"own  security ....  From  Germany  no  disturbance  of 
*'  the  peace  of  Europe  need  be  feared^.'*  These  words 
constituted  a  pledge  that  the  possession  of  Alsace  and 
part  of  Lorraine  would  be  a  guarantee  for  the  peace  of 
the  world.  From  the  historical  standpoint  Bismarck  was 
right.  W^ith  the  exception  of  Metz  and  its  district, 
Alsace-Lorraine  belonged  to  Germany  by  right  of  ancient 
possession.  It  was  partly  by  force,  partly  by  fraud, 
that  Louis  XIV  acquired  Strassburg  and  neighbouring 
towns.  Further,  the  German  plea  was  tenable  on  military 
grounds.  Under  the  two  Napoleons  France  had  recklessly 
disturbed  the  peace  of  Europe;  and  we  are  suffering 
now  from  the  final  results  of  the  Napoleonic  policy. 
The  recollections  of  the  times  of  the  two  Emperors  still 
haunt  the  brain  of  Germany  and  indispose  her  to  any 
weakening  of  her  Western  frontier. 
*  Lowe,  Prince  Bismarck,  i.  568;  Sir  R.  Morier,  Memoirs,  n.  220-9. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  93 

But  what  of  the  sentiments  of  the  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers  ?  Did  they  incUne  towards  France  or  Germany  ? 
Here  there  was  little  doubt.  Ever  since  the  great  Revolu- 
tion, Alsace-Lorraine  had  been  enthusiastically  French. 
That  great  event  sent  a  thrill  through  those  once  German 
provinces  and  united  them  with  la  patrie;  witness  the 
declaration  of  the  deputies  of  Lorraine  at  that  memorable 
sitting  of  the  National  Assembly  on  August  4,  1789. 
After  Dauphine,  Brittany,  and  other  provinces  had 
renounced  their  local  privileges,  the  men  of  Lorraine 
stood  up  and  declared  that  their  province,  though  the 
youngest  of  all,  desired  to  join  intimately  the  life  of 
"  this  glorious  family."  Alsace-Lorraine  sealed  those 
sentiments  with  their  blood  in  the  Revolutionary  and 
Napoleonic  Wars,  when  Kellermann,  Kleber,  Ney,  Rapp, 
and  many  others  added  lustre  to  the  French  arms. 
Thenceforth  those  provinces  were  French  to  the  core. 

Early  in  1871  Bismarck  had  an  uneasy  feeling  that 
the  annexation  of  the  French-speaking  districts  of  Lorraine 
about  Metz  might  be  undesirable.  His  secretary,  Busch, 
reports  him  as  saying,  "  If  they  (the  French)  gave  us 

*  a  milliard  more,  we  might  perhaps  let  them  have  Metz. 
*We   would   then   take   800,000,000   francs    and   build 

*  ourselves  a  fortress  a  few  miles  further  back ....  I  do 
'  not  like  so  many  Frenchmen  being  in  our  house  against 
'  their  will.  It  is  just  the  same  with  Belfort.  It  is  all 
'  French  there  too.  The  mihtary  men,  however,  will  not 
'  be  willing  to  let  Metz  slip,  and  perhaps  they  are  right^." 

It  is  well  known  that  Bismarck  and  Moltke  differed 
sharply  on  this  subject.     Moltke  kept  saying  that  the 

*  Busch,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War.  ii.  341;   Journals  of 
Count  von  Blumenthal,  pp.  316-8  (Eng.  edit.). 


94  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

acquisition  of  Metz  meant  a  difference  of  100,000  men 
in  a  campaign ;  and  this  estimate  convinced  the  Emperor 
William^.  Probably  the  Germans  had  from  the  outset 
resolved  to  have  Alsace-Lorraine;  for  they  imposed 
German  institutions  immediately  after  military  occupa- 
tion, a  step  which  they  did  not  take  in  districts  further 
West.  At  the  first  mention  of  the  terms  of  peace 
the  35  deputies  of  the  doomed  lands  made  a  strong 
protest  to  the  French  Chambers,  then  at  Bordeaux: 
"  Alsace  and  Lorraine  refuse  to  be  alienated.  With  one 
"  voice,  the  citizens  at  their  firesides,  the  soldiers  under 
"  arms,  the  former  by  voting,  the  latter  by  fighting, 
*'  proclaim  to  Germany  and  to  the  world  at  large,  the 
"  immutable  will  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  remain 
"  French.  France  can  neither  consent  to  nor  sign  the 
"  cession  of  Lorraine  and  Alsace  without  imperilling 
"  the  continuity  of  her  national  existence,  and,  with 
"  her  own  hands  dealing  a  death-blow  to  her  unity^.*' 

That  was  the  opinion  of  nearly  all  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers.  But  Germany  held  them  in  her  grip  except  the 
maiden  fortress  of  Belfort.  Further,  Bismarck  was  ordered 
by  his  sovereign  not  to  relax  his  terms.  M.  Thiers,  however, 
made  a  supreme  appeal  to  prevent  the  annexation  of 
Belfort.  Failing  even  at  that  point  to  break  the  will 
of  the  iron  Chancellor,  he  broke  forth  into  the  following 
protest:  "Well  then.  Let  it  be  as  you  will.  Count! 
"These  negotiations  are  nothing  but  a  sham.... Make 
"  war,  then.  Ravage  our  provinces,  burn  our  houses, 
"  slaughter  the  inoSensive  inhabitants :    complete  your 

*  Blowitz,  My  Memoirs,  p.  161. 

"  J.  Simon,  The  Government  of  M.  Thiers  (Eng.  trana.),  L  129,  130; 
H.  Welschinger,  La  Protestation  de  V Alsace-Lorraine  (Paris,  1914). 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  95 

"  work.  We  will  fight  you  until  our  last  breath.  We 
"  may  be  defeated,  but  at  least  we  shall  not  be  dis- 
"  honoured."  Even  Bismarck  was  moved.  He  retired 
to  consult,  first  Moltke  and  then  his  sovereign ;  and  the 
verdict  was  that  France  should  retain  Belfort,  provided 
that  the  Germans  should  enter  Paris  in  triumph.  The 
proud  city  underwent  that  humihation  with  quiet  disdain 
because  she  saved  Belfort. 

At  the  last  moment  it  seemed  that  Bismarck  would 
break  off  the  negotiations.  On  February  25  he  spoke 
with  extreme  harshness  to  the  French  plenipotentiaries 
and  accused  them  of  spinning  out  the  conferences.  The 
cause  of  his  anger  was  obvious.  The  British  Government 
was  about  to  make  representations  concerning  the 
enormous  indemnity  claimed  by  Germany  from  France. 
That  sum  had  been  fixed  at  six  milliards  (£240,000,000). 
But  on  February  23  the  Emperor  William  consented 
to  reduce  it  to  five  milliards  (£200,000,000)1.  Whether 
this  reduction  was  due  to  the  generosity  of  the  old 
Emperor  or  to  a  knowledge  that  Great  Britain  was 
about  to  take  diplomatic  action,  is  open  to  question. 
Certainly,  here  was  one  cause  of  the  extreme  anger  of 
Bismarck  and  the  German  Headquarters  against  us. 

But  there  were  other  causes.  Some  of  our  manu- 
facturers had  secretly  suppUed  munitions  of  war  to  the 
French,  a  fact  which  the  German  Staff  ascertained  and 
forthwith  proclaimed  to  the  four  winds.  Secondly,  a 
portion  of  the  British  Press  indulged  in  unseemly  diatribes 
against  the  Germans  for  their  harshness  in  the  conduct 
of  the   war  and  in  the   demand  for  Alsace-Lorraine*. 

•  J.  Simon,  The  Government  of  M.  Thiers  (Eng.  transl.),  L  137. 

•  Sir  R.  Morier,  Memoirs,  n.   165,  246. 


96  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

The  German  newspapers  savagely  retorted,  and  thus 
there  began  that  ceaseless  war  of  words  which  must 
be  pronounced  an  indirect  but  important  cause  of  this 
war.  When  journalists  of  all  lands  learn  the  urgent 
need  of  self-restraint  in  times  of  general  excitement, 
the  cause  of  peace  will  take  a  long  stride  forward. 

Bismarck  also  inveighed  against  the  British  Govern- 
ment for  asking  permission  to  send  a  gunboat  up  the 
River  Seine  in  order  to  remove  English  refugees.  He 
peremptorily  refused,  saying  that  we  desired  merely  to 
find  out  whether  the  Germans  had  laid  mines  in  the  river 
below  Rouen,  so  that  French  warships  might  follow 
the  gunboat.  Referring  to  our  real  motive  (surely,  by  no 
means  discreditable)  he  burst  out,  "  What  swine !  They 
are  full  of  vexation  and  envy  because  we  have  fought 
great  battles  here  and  won  them.  They  cannot  bear 
to  think  that  shabby  little  Prussia  should  prosper  so ... . 
They  have  always  done  their  utmost  to  injure  us. 
The  Crown  Princess  herself  is  an  incarnation  of  this 
way  of  thinking.  She  is  full  of  her  own  great  con- 
descension in  marrying  into  our  country^." 
The  terms  imposed  by  Germany  upon  France  seemed 
designed  to  crush  her  to  the  earth.  Great  therefore 
was  the  joy  at  London  and  the  annoyance  at  Berhn, 
when,  under  the  fostering  care  of  Thiers,  France  paid 
ofi  the  enormous  war  indemnity  by  the  spring  of  1873. 
Thus  the  Germans  had  violated  the  maxim  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  "  Never  maltreat  an  enemy  by  halves."  They 
had  deeply  wounded  France  by  tearing  from  her  two 
provinces  that  formed  an  integral  part  of  her  life.  Yet 
they  had  not  wholly  crushed  her;    and  since  1875  they 

*  Bismarck:    Some  Secret  PageSf  L  600. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  97 

have  had  no  chance  of  doing  so  except  by  an  unparalleled 
effort.  That  has  been  a  dominant  factor  of  the  European 
situation.  Just  as  the  Eastern  Question  brought  Russia 
and  Austria  into  sharp  rivalry,  so  Alsace-Lorraine  kept 
up  an  irreconcilable  feud  between  France  and  Germany; 
and  by  degrees  the  two  Germanic  Empires  ranged  them- 
selves together,  while  France  and  Russia  became  close 
allies. 

This  arrangement  lay  in  the  natural  order  of  things. 
So  far  back  as  1856  Bismarck  had  discerned  that  truth, 
which  became  clear  after  the  crisis  of  1875^.  But  the 
Franco-Russian  alliance  came  about  slowly  owing  to 
his  cautious  and  skilful  pohcy.  To  this  we  must  briefly 
advert;  for  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  his  deahngs 
with  the  Great  Powers  were  prompted  by  a  resolve  to 
escape,  if  possible,  from  the  consequences  of  the  annexa- 
tion of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Foreseeing  that  France  would 
seek  to  reconquer  those  provinces,  he  sought  to  keep 
her  isolated. 

His  first  effort  was  the  Three  Emperors'  League 
{Dreikaiserbund)  of  1872.  When  that  compact  virtually 
lapsed  in  the  crisis  of  1875,  he  looked  about  for  an 
alternative  scheme.  The  crisis  in  the  Eastern  Question 
in  1876-8  gave  him  his  chance.  He  supported  Austrian 
claims  against  those  of  Russia,  and  thus  in  1879  found  his 
reward  in  the  Austro-German  alliance.  But  he  did  not 
desire  to  offend  Russia.  Both  Wilham  I  and  he  desired 
merely  to  teach  Russia  a  sharp  lesson;  and,  when  she 
had  learnt  it,  in  isolation,  they  would  welcome  her  back. 
This  pohcy  of  alternate  cudgelling  and  cajoling  led  to 

1  Busch,  Our  Chancellor^  i.  320. 
B.  L.  7 


98  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

what  have  been  termed  the  Reinsurance  Treaties  with 
Russia — a  topic  too  complex  for  treatment  here^. 

Far  more  important  and  interesting  is  the  skilful 
lead  which  Bismarck  gave  to  France  into  the  colonial 
adventures  of  the  eighties.  He  sketched  their  first 
outlines  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin  Congress  of  1878.  His 
ingenuity  at  that  time  would  have  made  Machiavelli 
hail  him  as  a  master  in  this  craft.  While  opposing  the 
oncoming  tide  of  Slavonic  "  barbarism,"  he  found  means 
to  turn  the  energies  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy 
towards  Africa.  Oppert,  correspondent  of  the  Times  at 
Berlin,  states  that  Bismarck  gave  the  following  advice 
to  Beaconsfield: — Do  not  quarrel  with  Russia.  Let  her 
take  Constantinople,  while  you  take  Egypt — France  will 
not  prove  inexorable.  Besides,  one  might  give  her 
Syria  or  Tunis ^.  At  that  time,  then,  he  cared  not  a  jot 
for  Turkey.  He  was  even  desirous  of  starting  a  partition 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  provided  that  the  German 
Empire  thereby  gained  immunity  from  a  similar  proceeding 
— witness  his  graphic  declaration,  that  the  whole  Eastern 
Question  was  not  worth  the  bones  of  a  single  Pomeranian 
grenadier. 

His  foresight  was  justified.  France  in  1880  began 
to  cast  jealous  eyes  upon  Tunis,  which  Italy  had  marked 
out  for  herself;  and  when  the  statesmen  of  Rome  plied 
M.  de  Freycinet  at  Paris  with  anxious  questions,  they 
could  gain  from  him  no  more  assuring  reply  than  that 
"  for  the  present,  France  had  no  intention  of  occupying 
"  Tunis,  but  that  the  future  was  in  the  hands  of  God." 

*  See  J.  W.  Headlam,  Bismarck,  pp.  442,  443. 

•  Ibid.  n.   92;    Blowitz,   My   Memoirg,  p.    165;    Crispi,   Memoirs^ 
ToL  n.  pp.  08. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  99 

A  Kttle  later,  when  Rome  became  more  restive,  Freycinet 
gave  up  his  predestinarian  argument  and  said  plainly, 

"Why  will  you  persist  in  thinking  of  Tunis? Why 

"  not  turn  your  attention  to  Tripoli  ? "  Bismarck's 
procedure  is  worth  noting:  Great  Britain  is  directed 
towards  Egypt ;  France  towards  Tunis ;  and  she,  in  order 
to  "  square  "  Italy,  waves  her  on  to  Tripoli.  The  Chan- 
cellor contrived  the  scheme ;  but  the  statesmen  of  Paris, 
London,  and  finally  of  Rome  concurred  in  it^. 

By  this  gigantic  *'  deal "  in  North  Africa  Bismarck 
diverted  political  activity  away  from  Europe  to  the 
Dark  Continent.  What  was  more,  he  set  by  the  ears 
not  only  French  and  Britons  but  French  and  Italians. 
During  twenty-two  years  (1882-1904)  we  were  on  strained 
terms  with  France  respecting  Egypt.  Further,  the 
Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  never  forgave  us  for  our  intervention 
in  Egypt;  and  the  Pan-Islam  movement  which  that 
crafty  potentate  so  skilfully  nursed  was  largely  the 
outcome  of  our  presence  in  that  land.  True,  we  went 
to  Egypt  in  1882  as  the  mandatories  of  Europe  to  secure 
order;  but  we  went  with  the  ostensible  blessings  and 
secret  curses  of  the  Balaam  of  Berlin.  As  for  the  feud 
between  France  and  Italy  respecting  Tunis,  it  survived 
to  the  year  1911,  when  Italy  acquired  Tripoli.  Until 
then,  she  could  not  feel  cordially  towards  the  French, 
who  had  played  her  that  shabby  trick  over  Tunis  in  1881. 

During  many  years  the  energies  of  France  obeyed 
the  centrifugal  impulse  which  Bismarck  had  skilfully 
imparted.  Some  of  her  ministers,  notably  M.  Ferry, 
suffered  from  colony-fever.  France  seemed  for  the  time 
to  have  forgotten  Alsace-Lorraine  amidst  these  distant 
*  Crispi,  Mems.  n.  pp.  97-104. 

7—2 


100  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

quests.  But  at  the  end  of  the  year  1885  a  reaction 
set  in.  Tens  of  thousands  of  French  youths  had  perished 
of  malaria  amidst  the  swamps  of  Tonquin  or  the  forests 
of  Madagascar;  and  M.  Clemenceau  and  other  patriots 
asked  indignantly  what  had  France  to  show  for  this 
waste  of  life  and  treasure — Great  Britain  ofiended, 
China  hostile,  and  Germany  cynically  complacent.  He 
pointed  his  attacks  by  assertions,  culled  from  the  German 
Press,  that  the  French  were  the  inferiors  of  the  Germans, 
and  that  the  RepubUc  was  much  in  the  debt  of  the 
Teutonic  Empire  for  helping  on  her  colonial  enterprises. 
The  elections  of  1885  sent  up  a  large  number  of  royalist 
and  Bonapartist  deputies.  It  was  clear  that  the  Republic 
would  fall  if  it  persevered  in  plunging  into  tropical  swamps ; 
and  it  came  very  near  to  perishing  at  the  time  of  the 
Boulanger  crisis.  Le  brav^  general^  who  caracolled  about 
Paris  on  his  black  charger,  was  in  reality  a  poor  creature^. 
He  became  a  danger  to  the  Republic  chiefly  because 
he  championed  a  national  policy.  For  this  he  was 
abused  by  the  German  Press,  a  fact  which  gained  him 
the  heart  of  France.  He  rode  on  the  crest  of  public 
opinion  because  he  bade  Frenchmen  think  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  and  prepare  for  revenge.  The  first  definite 
sign  of  a  ra2)procJiement  between  France  and  Russia 
belongs  to  this  year,  the  year  when  Russia  first  renewed 
her  Reinsurance  Treaty  with  Germany.  At  the  request 
of  the  Court  of  Petrograd  the  French  Republic  under- 
took to  send  thither  500,000  Lebel  rifles,  on  the  express 
stipulation  that  they  should  never  be  used  against 
France^. 

1  Sir  T.   Barclay,  Anglo-French  Reminiscences  (1876-190C),  p.  96. 
*  Count  Reventlow,  DeuUchlanda  auswdrtige  Politik  (1888-1913),  p.  5. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  101 

The  thought  of  revenge  was  kept  alive  in  France 
by  events  in  the  conquered  provinces;  and  to  these  we 
must  now  turn.  The  North  Germans,  for  all  their  vigour 
and  manhness,  have  not  the  arts  that  conciHate  the 
vanquished.  That  was  seen  clearly  by  a  German  Liberal, 
named  Rasch,  who  in  1876  sought  to  discover  the  real 
state  of  afiairs  in  the  Reichsland  (Alsace-Lorraine). 
He  found  it  absolutely  different  from  what  the  German 
newspapers  represented.  Having  had  their  orders,  they 
described  the  revival  of  old  German  ways,  and  the  popular 
rejoicings  at  events  such  as  the  starting  of  a  steamboat 
service,  or  the  opening  of  the  new  University  buildings 
at  Strassburg.  This  latter  event  was  recounted  in  moving 
terms.  But  Rasch  found  that  less  than  one-fourth  of 
the  students  were  natives  of  the  province,  and  those 
chiefly  theological  students  who  had  to  study  there  in 
order  to  obtain  cures  in  that  Reichsland.  The  population 
had  dwindled,  no  fewer  than  100,000  having  emigrated 
to  France.  Metz  had  sunk  from  50,000  to  33,000  in- 
habitants. This  was  not  surprising ;  for  freedom  of  the 
Press  was  a  thing  of  the  past,  and  the  French  language 
was  proscribed.  In  fact,  the  Germans  were  hated  in  the 
Reichsland^. 

Bismarck  had  bidden  the  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers 
consider  themselves  an  independent  Republic.  In  reality 
the  Reichsland  resembled  a  satrapy  of  Xerxes  rather 
than  Athens.  Our  diplomatist.  Sir  Robert  Morier, 
during  a  visit  to  Strassburg  in  1872,  had  an  interview 
with  the  ex-mayor,  a  chemist  named  Klein,  who  had 
not  been  hostile  to  the  German  occupation.     Klein  went 

*  E.   Rasch,  Die  Preussen  in  Elsass-Lothringen  (1876),  cha.  n.-V. 
E.  Hinzelin,  UAlsace  sous  le  Joug  (1914),  ch.  11, 


102  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

with  a  deputation  to  Berlin  in  May,  1871,  to  beg  Bismarck 
to  defer  the  imposition  of  military  conscription;  but 
the  Chancellor  opposed  an  adamantine  opposition, 
because  "  Prussia  had  an  immense  experience  of  the 
"  results  produced  by  wearing  the  Prussian  uniform. 
**  Get  the  King's  coat  on  to  a  man's  back  and  let  him 
"  wear  it  for  three  years,  and  you  have  made  not  only 
**  a  good  soldier  but  a  good  citizen  of  him ....  *  Yes  '  (was 
"  Klein's  reply),  *  but  you  must  get  the  coat  on  first, 
"  and  that  is  what  you  will  not  succeed  in  doing.'  " 
Bismarck,  however,  was  inexorable;  and  the  results 
were  that  vast  numbers  of  Alsacians,  who  might  have 
become  reconciled  if  Germany  had  treated  them  with 
forbearance,  became  permanently  embittered.  Some 
12,000  of  them  fled  to  France  and  joined  the  French 
army  rather  than  don  the  Prussian  uniform. 

The  men  of  Berhn  were  deaf  to  all  appeals.  They 
adopted  a  drastic  system  and  then  forced  it  through 
at  all  costs.  This  spirit  has  been  the  curse  of  Berlin 
ever  since  the  days  of  Frederick  William  I;  but  never 
has  it  wrought  more  far-reaching  ill  than  when  applied 
by  the  Iron  Chancellor  to  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  improve- 
ments in  the  legal  system  and  in  the  railways  of  the 
Reichsland  counted  for  nothing  when  accompanied  by 
this  premature  rule  of  the  drill-sergeant^. 

The  Alsatians  were  virtually  an  unfree  community, 
held  down  by  the  sword.  They  retorted  by  tabooing 
the  Prussian  officials,  and  extended  this  ostracism  even 
to  the  new  station-masters,  so  that  one  of  them,  failing 
to  find  an  Alsatian  girl  who  would  marry  him,  had  to 
institute  a  search  for  a  wife  in  BerUn.     Fifty  wealthy 

*  Sir  R.  Morier,  Mems.  n.  264-6,  273-4. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  103 

manufacturers  left  Mlihlhausen  for  France.  There  and 
throughout  Alsace  the  people  were  German  in  type  and 
generally  spoke  German,  but  their  hearts  were  in  France. 
Rasch  deemed  it  essential  that  Germany  should  know 
the  truth,  which  was  this:  her  ways  were  odious  to 
her  new  subjects,  and  she  must  mend  those  ways  if 
a  reconciUation  was  to  be  effected.  Alas !  The  Prussian 
official  is  not  open  to  conviction;  and  though  a  few 
changes  were  made  at  a  later  time,  e.g.^  a  certain  measure 
of  constitutional  government,  yet  they  produced  httle  or 
no  effect,  because  there  was  no  change  in  the  spirit  of 
the  administration^.  The  Statthalter,  Prince  Hohenlohe, 
in  February,  1887,  made  an  almost  open  bribe  to  the 
people  that  they  should  have  full  constitutional  rights 
if  they  ceased  to  protest  against  the  German  connection 
and  entirely  accepted  it.  Then  and  then  only  would  the 
Empire  relax  its  policy^. 

If  we  look  deeper,  that  is,  into  the  thoughts  of  Bis- 
marck, what  do  we  find?  In  April  of  that  year  he 
confessed  to  Busch  that  he  wished  he  could  adopt  the 
methods  of  Charlemagne  and  transplant  all  the  Alsatians 
and  Lorrainers  to  Posen,  and  all  the  Poles  of  Posen 
into  Alsace^.  In  1912  a  German  author,  Frymann,  in 
a  book  termed  Wenn  ich  der  Kaiser  wdr\  stated  the  same 
thought  equally  crudely  :  "  We  acquired  Alsace-Lorraine 
"  because  the  land  is  necessary  to  us  in  a  mihtary  sense. 
**  The  inhabitants  were  thrown  in. . .  .The  constitution  of 
"  Alsace-Lorraine  should  be  abolished  and  its  administra- 
**  tion  be  placed  under  a  Minister  with  dictatorial  powers." 

*  M.  Leroy,  L* Alsace- Lorraine  (Paris,  1914),  chs.  i-m. 

*  Mems.  of  Prince  Hohenlohe,  n.  361. 

*  Bismarck :  Some  Secret  Pages,  m.  167. 


104  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

There  is  the  reason  why  Prussia  has  never  won  the 
Alsatians.  She  was  not  the  alma  7naier,  but  rather 
the  harsh  step-mother. 

The  friction  came  near  to  producing  war  in  1887, 
when  the  German  police  on  the  frontier  brutally  mal- 
treated a  French  agent,  named  Schnabele.  The  Tsar, 
Alexander  III,  sent  to  Berlin  a  remonstrance,  and  William  I 
arranged  matters  reasonably.  But  the  incident  proved 
that  the  endeavours  of  Bismarck  to  divert  the  thought 
and  energy  of  France  to  Africa  had  signally  failed. 
Accordingly  Germany  had  to  act  up  to  his  motto — 
Toujours  en  vedette. 

This  appeared  in  the  first  Proclamation  to  the  Army 
issued  by  William  II,  which  sent  a  shiver  of  apprehension 
through  Europe.  Its  efiect  was  not  lessened  by  a  later 
declaration  respecting  Alsace-Lorraine.  There  having 
been  suggestions  in  peace-circles  as  to  the  neutralising 
of  those  provinces,  the  late  Emperor  Frederick  was 
mentioned  as  favouring  such  a  scheme.  The  young 
Kaiser  emphatically  denied  it;  and  at  Frankfurt-on- 
the-Oder,  when  unveiling  a  statue  to  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  he  uttered  these  words :  "  We  would  rather 
"  sacrifice  our  eighteen  army  corps  and  our  42,000,000 
"  inhabitants  on  the  field  of  battle  than  surrender  a 
*'  single  stone  of  what  my  father  and  Prince  Frederick 
"  Charles  gained^."  That  was  the  official  version  of 
the  Kaiser's  words;  but  if  we  may  credit  Bismarck, 
they  were  far  stronger  and  more  melodramatic.  For 
Bismarck  criticized  him  for  saying  ''If  at  last  the  whole 
"  nation  lies  hushed  in  the  silence  of  death  2."     It  soon 

i  Elkind,  The  German  Emperor' a  Speeches,  p.  17. 
*  Bisynarck;   Some  Secret  Pages,  UL  202. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  105 

appeared  that  the  young  Kaiser  intended  to  put  in  force 
a  more  rigorous  regime  in  the  conquered  provinces. 
French  vrriters  agree  that  the  state  of  affairs  under  him 
was  worse  than  under  William  I,  and  that  the  increase 
of  rigour  has  produced  little  more  than  an  increase  of 
hatred  towards  Germany.  The  merchant  classes  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  may  outwardly  appear  resigned  to  the 
new  state  of  things;  but  at  heart  they  detest  it.  The 
1, 550^000  natives  long  to  be  free  from  the  Empire.  Only 
the  300,000  German  immigrants  are  loyal  to  it^. 

The  recrudescence  of  the  Alsace-Lorraine  Question 
under  "William  II  would,  perhaps,  not  have  led  to  war 
if  he  had  continued  the  Bismarckian  policy  of  com- 
plaisance towards  Russia.  But  in  1890  he  resolved  on 
drawing  closer  the  bonds  with  Vienna  and  loosening 
those  with  Petrograd.  His  reasons  for  this  important 
step  were  probably  as  follows.  He  knew,  from  a  secret 
report  of  a  German  pohtical  agent,  that  the  Russians 
were  deficient  both  in  regard  to  arms  and  the  railway 
facilities  needful  for  mobilization  of  their  huge  array. 
The  chances,  therefore,  were  that  Russia  would  in  no 
case  be  able  to  attack  Germany  before  the  year  1895^, 
and  by  that  time  the  Kiel  Canal  would  be  open,  and 
thereby  double  the  efficiency  of  the  German  fleet.  For 
these  reasons  William  II  recked  little  of  Russia.  He 
chose  to  adhere  closely  to  Austria,  gave  up  all  thoughts 
of  a  Russian  connection,  and  dismissed  Bismarck.  This 
is  one  explanation  of  the  breach  between  them.     The 

*  Hiazelin,  E.,  U Alsace  sous  le  Joug  (1914),  ch.  12;  J.  Claretie, 
Quarante  Ans  apres  (1911);  A.  Hallays,  En  fidiiant  (1911);  Betham 
Edwards,   Under  the  German  Ban  (1914). 

"  M.  Harden,  Monarchs  and  Men,  p.  143, 


106  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

other  explanations  are  that  the  Kaiser  insisted  en  the 
prosecution  of  colonial  and  naval  designs,  to  which 
Bismarck  demurred,  or  that  he  then  disliked  the  Chan- 
cellor's anti-Socialist  tendencies.  Perhaps  all  these  causes 
were  operative.  In  any  case,  Germany  and  Russia  drifted 
apart  in  1890;  and,  on  the  accession  of  the  present  Tsar 
in  1894,  there  was  an  end  of  the  personal  motives  which  had 
for  so  long  kept  Russia  aloof  from  the  French  Republic. 
The  Franco-Russian  alliance  soon  came  about,  and  it  was 
patent  to  all  the  world  in  June,  1895,  when  the  French 
and  Russian  fleets  steamed  together  into  Kiel  harbour 
to  grace  the  opening  of  the  Kiel  Canal.  It  was  their 
way  of  emphasizing  the  significance  of  that  pacific  under- 
taking. Thus,  the  completion  of  Kaiser  William's  first 
naval  programme  coincides  with  the  hardening  of  the 
national  resistance  to  his  designs  both  on  the  east  and 
west  of  the  German  Empire.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to 
say  that  the  cautious  policy  of  Bismarck  would  somehow 
have  prevented  a  Franco-Russian  alliance.  The  Kaiser's 
restless  and  ambitious  plans,  set  forth  in  flamboyant 
speeches,  helped  on  that  alliance.  The  isolation  of 
Germany,  which  her  publicists  ascribe  to  French,  Russian, 
or  British  jealousy,  was  in  all  probability  due  mainly 
to  the  reckless  policy  of  William  himself.  Napoleon  I 
always  declared  the  alliances  against  him  to  be  the 
outcome  of  British  gold.  It  is  ever  the  same  story. 
The  would-be  conquerors  of  the  world  will  not  understand, 
until  too  late,  that  the  world  must  insure  itself  against 
them  by  alliances. 

There  was  another  alternative,  that  the  Kaiser  should 
win  the  affections  of  the  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers.  He 
has  tried  to  do  so  by  methods  successful  in  North  Germany. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  107 

He  has  dazzled  them  by  parades.  He  has  re-bnilfc  in 
Lorraine  a  castle  which  recalls  the  splendours  of  old 
Germany.  But  he  has  not  won  the  hearts  of  that  people. 
Strive  as  he  might,  sometimes  by  menace,  sometimes  by 
cajolery,  he  could  not  escape  from  the  consequence  of  the 
blunder  of  187L  The  young  generation  of  Alsatians  proved 
to  be  more  Gallophile  than  that  which  lived  through  the 
war  of  1870.  Consequently,  German  policy  was  held  as 
in  a  vice.  The  more  the  Kaiser  fumed  and  threatened, 
the  closer  became  the  union  between  France  and  Russia. 
The  harder  he  pressed  upon  the  conquered  provinces, 
the  more  they  turned  towards  Paris.  There  were  but 
two  ways  of  escape  from  the  deadlock,  conciliation  or 
war.  There  was  much  to  be  said  for  the  former  alterna- 
tive, as  will  now  appear. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  all  Frenchmen  and 
Alsatians  longed  for  a  war  of  revenge.  Many  of  them 
realised  the  impossibility  of  such  a  scheme;  and  they 
also  saw  that,  even  if  it  succeeded,  the  holding  of  those 
provinces  against  a  hostile  Germany  would  impose 
crushing  burdens  upon  France  and  perpetual  unrest 
upon  Europe^.  Moreover,  the  teachings  both  of  ethnology 
and  history  warned  them  against  any  such  enterprise. 
The  term  Alsatia,  once  applied  to  a  no-man's  land  in 
London,  reminds  us  that  Alsatia  was  in  olden  times  a 
debateable  land  between  Gaul  and  Teuton.  In  point 
of  fact,  the  Alsatians  are  almost  entirely  German  by  race, 
and  the  ties  of  commerce  connected  her  with  the  Teutons 
rather  than  the  Gauls;  for  rivers  connect  peoples  while 
mountains  divide  them.     Consequently  many  influences 

>  See  "  La  Situation "  par  un  Alsacien-Lorrain  (Geneva,   1887) ; 
Sir  T.  Barclay,  pp.  312-4. 


108  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

told  against  a  complete  absorption  of  Alsace  into  France^. 
Therefore  they  pleaded  for  the  neutralisation  of  the 
annexed  provinces.  Arguments  in  favour  of  that  solution 
were  well  set  forth  at  the  International  Peace  Congress  held 
at  Geneva  in  1884.  Several  Frenchmen  protested  against 
that  solution  on  the  ground  that  the  provinces  wanted 
union  with  France.  Others,  however,  notably  M.  Demo- 
lins,  advocated  the  middle  course.  He  pointed  out 
that  during  1000  years  those  districts  had  formed  a 
debatable  land  between  the  French  and  German  peoples, 
neither  of  which  could  hold  them  permanently.  There- 
fore, was  it  not  better  to  pronounce  the  struggle  a  draw? 
A  recent  book  by  Hen  Maas  of  Leipzig,  Die  Vereinigten 
Staaten  Europas,  had  urged  the  neutralisation  of  the 
provinces,  all  the  fortresses  being  dismantled,  "  for  the 
"  strength  of  a  nation  consists  in  the  ascendancy  of 
*'  light,  science,  and  law.'*  Ardently  endorsing  these 
proposals,  Demolins  appealed  to  the  Germans  to  give 
up  their  militarism,  alike  cramping  to  themselves  and 
menacing  to  their  neighbours.  Frenchmen,  on  their 
side,  must  abandon  all  thought  of  a  war  of  revenge, 
and  be  satisfied  to  see  Alsace-Lorraine  independent  and 
neutral.  This  solution,  however,  by  no  means  satisfied 
an  Alsatian  delegate,  Waag  of  Colmar,  who  spoke 
passionately  for  union  with  France  as  the  cherished 
desire  of  all  Alsatians.  Their  civihzation  was  Roman, 
not  Germanic^.  The  final  vote  of  the  Conference  showed 
a  perplexing  balance  between  the  cosmopolitan  and  the 
national  solutions.  Twelve  of  the  delegates  voted  for 
neutralising  Alsace-Lorraine,  six  opposed  it,  six  abstained 

*  See,  too,  M.  Leroy,  ch.  i. 
■  So  E.  Hinzelin,  p.  163. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  109 

from  voting,  and  one  resigned.  Nothing  could  better 
indicate  the  difficulty  of  the  question.  The  only  topic 
on  which  there  was  an  approach  to  unanimity  was  in 
regard  to  the  preliminary  step,  that  Alsace-Lorraine 
must  be  allowed  to  express  freely  by  a  mass-vote  their 
desires  for  their  future. 

Any  such  proposal  was  vetoed  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment; and  the  outlook,  as  we  have  seen,  became  more 
gloomy  under  William  II.  Then  the  spirit  of  Treitschke 
began  to  prevail  in  Germany.  In  1871  the  professor 
had  raged  at  the  lenient  terms  accorded  to  France ;  and 
the  burden  of  his  professorial  message  was  that  Germany, 
now  strong  in  herself,  must  expand  by  force  of  arms: 
*'  War  is  the  mightiest  and  most  efficient  moulder  of 
"  nations.  Only  in  war  does  a  nation  become  a  nation, 
"  and  the  expansion  of  existing  States  proceeds  in  most 
*'  cases  by  way  of  conquest."  As  for  the  notion  of 
seeking  the  consent  of  the  annexed  people,  he  ridicules 
it :  "  States  do  not  arise  out  of  the  people's  sovereignty, 
"  but  they  are  created  against  the  will  of  the  people^." 
Doubtless,  he  deduced  this  principle  from  the  war  of 
1866,  which  created  the  North  German  Confederation 
despite  the  opposition  of  the  Prussian  Parliament.  But, 
with  the  perfervidum  ingenium  Prussorum,  he  expanded 
that  single  instance  into  a  universal  truth.  Monstrous! 
you  will  say.  True;  but  the  youth  of  Germany  believe 
it.  Hence  the  soul  of  Germany  became  hardened  against 
the  appeals  of  pity  that  came  from  the  Reichsland. 
And  when  the  Pan- German  idea  came  to  reinforce  pro- 
fessorial fallacies,  all  hope  of  a  compromise  respecting 
Alsace-Lorraine  vanished. 

1  Treitschke,  Die  Politik,  Bk.  L  §  4. 


no  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WiVR 

Yet,  if  the  Pan-Germans  had  been  logical,  they  would 
have  allowed  some  discussion  on  the  subject  of  Metz. 
That  city  was  thoroughly  French,  as  were  all  the  villages 
around  ;  so  too  was  Thionville.  For  this  reason,  Bismarck, 
as  we  have  seen,  secretly  disapproved  the  annexation 
of  Metz  and  its  environs.  Further,  on  historical  grounds 
Germany  had  no  right  to  Metz;  for  though  that  city 
had  been  connected  with  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  yet 
the  link  was  very  slight^.  Besides,  language  was  an 
insuperable  barrier.  There  is,  I  believe,  no  example  in 
history  of  a  French-speaking  people  giving  up  their 
mother-tongue  and  taking  to  German,  though  instances 
to  the  contrary  might  be  cited.  Consequently,  the 
Germanising  of  Metz  was  hopeless.  On  the  occasion  of 
State  visits  numbers  of  people  could  be  drafted  in  to 
cheer  the  Emperor^;  but  the  cheers  of  these  hired 
daqueurs  were  openly  ridiculed. 

Accordingly,  some  Germans  came  to  see  the  desirability 
of  exchanging  Metz  for  some  French  colony,  an  exchange 
which  might  have  eased  the  tension.  The  colonial 
party  in  Germany  would  have  scored  a  success,  and 
France  would  no  longer  have  fumed  at  seeing  French- 
speaking  people  at  her  very  doors  dragooned  by  Germans. 
Further,  she  would  have  been  free  from  that  military 
menace,  the  great  bastion  of  Metz  thrust  forth  into 
the  levels  of  Lorraine.  In  every  respect  the  crux  of  the 
Franco-German  problem  is  at  Metz.  The  Kaiser,  how- 
ever, and  the  leaders  of  German  opinion  scouted  all 
thought  of  an  exchange  which  would  restore  that  city 

*  Dom  Calmet,  Hist.  tccUsiastique  et  civile  de  la  Lorraine,  TL  p.  1296; 
H.  Maringer,  Force  au  Droit,  pp.  65-83. 

*  Mems.  oj  Prince  Hohenlohe,  n.  p.  360  (Engl.  edit.). 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  111 

to  France.  TMs  appears  even  in  a  little  book,  England 
and  Germany^  published  in  1912.  It  consists  of  a  number 
of  articles  urging  friendlier  relations  between  the  two 
countries.  Sir  Thomas  Barclay,  whose  labours  helped  on 
the  Anglo-French  Entente,  pointed  out  that  that  measure 
was  not  hostile  to  Germany;  but  that  our  friendship 
to  France  caused  us  to  take  a  lively  interest  in  the  Alsace- 
Lorraine  Question,  which  held  Germany  and  France 
apart;  and  he  suggested  that  the  statesmen  of  Berhn 
should  approach  those  of  Paris  with  a  view  to  finding 
some  modus  vivendi.  The  response  from  the  German 
contributors  was  disappointing.  Baron  von  Pechmann, 
a  Munich  banker,  reprobated  any  discussion  of  the 
Treaty  of  Frankfurt  of  1871,  which  assigned  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  the  Fatherland.  Ignoring  the  fact  that 
Metz  stood  in  a  very  different  relation  from  Strassburg 
to  the  German  Empire,  he  asserted  that  the  possession 
of  the  whole  of  the  annexed  districts  was  an  absolute 
necessity  to  Germany :  "  Anyone  who  questions  that  right 
"  is  guilty  of  a  wrong  to  Germany,  a  wrong  that  hufts 
**  us  in  a  very  sensitive  spot,  one  which  not  only  calls 
"  in  question  our  rights  but  the  most  sacred  memories 
"  in  our  history  and  everywhere  in  the  world  the  inalien- 
**  able  and  inviolable  quality  of  our  national  honour." 
These  are  the  words,  not  of  a  Prussian  bureaucrat,  but 
of  a  South  German  banker;  and  they  are  uttered  in 
rejection  of  a  friendly  suggestion,  that  Germany  should 
approach  France  with  a  view  to  some  compromise 
respecting  Alsace-Lorraine.  If  that  is  the  spirit  of  all 
Germans,  war  with  France,  was,  I  admit,  inevitable. 
I  do  not  believe,  however,  that  all  Germans  would  have 
excluded  from  discussion  the  French  part  of  Lothringen. 


112  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Many  of  them  desired  a  coraproinise.  But  so  long  a3 
Treitschke  swayed  the  convictions,  and  the  Kaiser 
excited  the  emotions,  of  the  German  nation,  a  friendly 
settlement,  even  as  regards  Metz,  was  out  of  the  question. 

For  the  spirit  in  which  a  nation  approaches  a  political 
problem  is  more  important  even  than  the  problem  itself. 
Who  would  have  said,  early  in  1901,  that  the  many  causes 
of  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  France  would  be 
amicably  settled  in  that  year?  During  two  centuries 
and  more  the  two  peoples  had  been  quarrelling  about 
the  fish  off  Newfoundland.  For  a  couple  of  decades 
they  had  been  snarling  about  Egypt,  Madagascar,  the 
Niger,  and  Siam.  And  then,  thanks  to  the  tact  of  King 
Edward  VII  and  Lord  Lansdowne,  they  speedily  discovered 
that  cod-fish  and  fellaheen,  Malagasy,  Haussas,  and 
Siamese,  were  not  worth  a  war.  But  that  discovery 
came  about  because  on  both  sides  of  the  Channel  there 
existed  a  latent  longing  for  peace,  which,  with  fostering 
care,  could  become  vocal  and  speedily  drown  or  resolve 
the  earlier  discords. 

But  how  did  Germany  regard  the  Anglo-French 
entente?  As  a  lesson  in  the  methods  by  which  disputes 
may  be  solved  peaceably?  She  might  have  viewed  it 
in  that  light;  and  there  are  good  grounds  for  believing 
that  we  should  have  gone  far  to  meet  her.  Lord  Rosebery 
in  his  speech  of  October  25,  1905,  stated  emphatically 
that  our  understanding  with  France  ought  not  to  be 
regarded  as  a  threat  to  Germany,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
that  we  desired  friendlier  relations  with  her.  Still 
more  important  is  Lord  Lansdowne's  letter  of  May  8, 
1904,  to  Sir  Thomas  Barclay.  He  expressed  his  desire 
*'  to  see  all  matters  which  might  give  rise  to  controversy 


ALSACE-LORRAINE  113 

"  between  ourselves  and  other  countries  happily  settled^." 
If  that  was  the  spirit  animating  our  Foreign  Minister, 
we  may  be  sure  that  he  endeavoured  to  include  Germany 
within  the  scope  of  the  recent  cordial  understanding 
with  France.  Further,  it  is  contrary  to  all  that  is  known 
of  the  convictions  of  his  successor,  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
to  suppose  that  he  too  would  not  have  welcomed  such 
an  arrangement. 

But  was  Germany  disposed  to  meet  us  half-way? 
The  Pan-German  writer,  Count  Reventlow,  supplies  the 
answer.  Discussing  the  proposals  that  passed  between 
London  and  Berlin  on  that  question,  he  declares  that 
they  were  not  feasible;  for  a  British  alliance  would  in 
the  future  have  tied  Germany's  hands.  The  ally  would 
inevitably  ask  Germany  to  consent  to  a  proportional 
diminution  of  the  British  and  German  naval  programmes 
as  a  sign  of  trust  and  goodwill.  Germany,  however, 
could  not  lessen  her  naval  preparations.  She  must  keep 
a  free  hand  to  build  warships  as  she  saw  fit,  otherwise 
she  would  be  in  a  worse  position  relatively  to  Great 
Britain.  Equally  must  she  be  free  to  pursue  her  World- 
PoHcy^.  These  admissions  are  illuminating.  They  show 
the  reason  why  the  proposal  of  an  Anglo- German- Japanese 
entente  in  1901  came  to  nought,  also  the  causes  of  the 
failure  of  King  Edward  and  his  statesmen  to  include 
Germany  in  the  entente  cordiale  with  France.  The 
latter  failure  is  easily  intelligible,  despite  the  efforts  of 
Frenchmen  (e.g.  M.  Jules  Lemaitre).  It  is  summed  up 
in  the  words,  Alsace-Lorraine^. 

*  Sir  T.  Barclay,  p.  312.  «  Reventlow,  pp.   178-9 

•  M.  Leroy,  chs.  iv,  v;   V.  M.  Laurent,  etc.  Le  Paix  armee  et  le 
ProhUme  d^AUace  (1914). 

R    L.  8 


1 14  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Even  80,  the  statesmen  of  Berlin  should  not  have 
interpreted  that  entente  as  a  threat  to  them,  but  rather  as 
a  sign  of  affability  to  France.  But  they  could  not,  or  would 
not,  see.  They  interpreted  every  act  of  Great  Britain 
in  the  most  unfavourable  sense^.  An  English  princess 
could  not  marry  a  Continental  prince  without  cries 
being  raised  all  over  the  Fatherland  that  we  were  hemming 
it  in  by  alliances;  though,  surely,  we  were  not  to  blame 
if  neither  the  supply  was  so  bounteous  nor  the  demand 
so  keen  in  regard  to  German  princesses.  These  acrid 
complaints  were  signs  of  a  mental  disease  which  it  is 
difficult  to  diagnose  apart  from  the  teachings  of  Treitschke 
and  Bernhardi.  Its  most  prominent  symptom  was  an 
unreasoning  Chauvinism,  which,  after  the  military 
collapse  of  Russia  in  Manchuria,  took  the  form  of  intoler- 
able arrogance  both  towards  France  in  Moroccan  affairs 
and  towards  Russia  in  those  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

*  e.g.,  Reventlow   passim. 


VI 

THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

When  the  Balkan  States  form  a  compact  body,  opposing  firm 
resistance  to  every  attempt  upon  their  union,  all  covetousness  will 
cease,  and  the  East  will  no  longer  he  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  Europe. 

Signer  Tittoni,  Speech  in  the  Chamber  at  Rome,  Deo.  3,  1908. 

The  Serbs  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  have  twice  set 
Europe  in  a  blaze — in  1875  when  their  revolt  against 
Turkish  misrule  reopened  the  Eastern  Question,  and 
again  in  June,  1914:,  when  two  of  their  fanatics  murdered 
the  Austrian  Archduke,  Francis  Ferdinand.  These  two 
events  remind  us  of  the  diverse  issues  that  confronted 
the  Cliristian  peoples  of  the  Balkans  in  the  past  genera- 
tion and  in  our  own  day.  In  1875  the  Turk  was  the  one 
and  only  enemy.  In  1914  the  enemy  is  Austria.  Thus, 
there  has  come  about  an  almost  bewildering  change  over 
the  problem  known  as  the  Eastern  Question.  But, 
before  we  seek  to  gauge  the  importance  of  that  change  and 
of  its  present  issues,  let  us  try  to  understand  the  essentials 
of  that  Question. 

It  is  a  profoundly  national  problem,  the  most  complex 
which  has  distracted  the  world  since  the  break  up  of  the 
Roman  Empire.  The  feuds  of  hostile  races  and  creeds 
in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  have  been  keener  than  in  any 

8—2 


116  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

other  part  of  Europe ;  and  this  is  due,  firstly,  to  geographi- 
cal causes.  Peninsulas  are  like  pockets  hanging  from  the 
mainland.  They  hold  up  the  flotsam  and  jetsam  of 
humanity.  Wales,  Brittany,  the  Iberian  Peninsula,  Italy, 
all  are  examples  of  the  working  of  this  ethnic  law.  But 
the  Balkan  Peninsula,  gaping  widely  towards  the  North, 
has  collected  far  more  peoples  than  any  other  peninsula 
except  India.  It  has  gathered  in  the  races  wandering 
from  East  to  West,  who  were  deflected  southwards  by  the 
great  barrier  of  the  Carpathians.  It  also  held  up  the 
reflux  from  the  North- West  and  wedged  it  against  the  far 
greater  drift  from  the  North-East. 

But  the  Balkan  Peninsula  is  not  only  a  great  wallet, 
it  is  also  (if  I  may  violently  change  the  metaphor)  a  bridge, 
the  easiest  way  from  Asia  into  Europe.  As  such  it  brought 
the  Turks  into  Europe.  Nearly  a  century  before  their 
capture  of  Constantinople  (1453)  they  harried  the  Balkan 
lands.  In  1389  they  utterly  crushed  the  Serbs  in  the 
Battle  of  Kossovo,  which  that  brave  little  people  yearly 
laments.  Their  grief  is  natural ;  for  that  disaster  ended 
their  days  of  splendour.  It  is  Kossovo,  not  the  capture 
of  Constantinople,  which  marks  the  beginning  of  the 
Eastern  Question.  Thereafter  the  Turks  overcame  the 
Bulgars,  a  warUke  race  of  Tartar  origin  who  became 
Slavised  and  Christianised  after  their  settlement  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula.  The  crescent  also  prevailed  over  the 
Greeks  and  Roumans.  Thus  there  began  that  long 
agony,  the  subjection  of  brave  and  civilized  Christian 
peoples  to  a  Tartar  horde  which  could  neither  under- 
stand, assimilate,  nor  even  govern  them.  During  ages 
the  Osmanli  Turks,  the  bravest  but  most  ignorant  and 
fanatical   of    the    Moslem    peoples,    studied  practically 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION  117 

nothing  but  the  Koran,  a  bewildering  jumble  of  precepts 
calculated  to  muddle  the  clearest  of  braina.  Napoleon 
greatly  admired  the  Koran  because  it  made  men  good 
fighters.  Yes;  but  if  its  votaries  were  wolves  in 
war,  they  were  sheep  in  time  of  peace,  especially  before 
the  head  shearer,  the  Sultan.  Valiant  in  fight,  but 
helpless  in  the  art  of  government,  they  slowly  yielded 
ground  before  their  Christian  subjects,  until  in  our  own 
day  the  strife  in  the  Balkans  became  balanced.  It  was 
reserved  for  the  little  peoples  of  the  Balkans  in  the 
epopee  of  1912  (surely  worthy  of  a  second  Tchaikovsky) 
to  defy  with  success  the  western  Moslems,  who  in  the 
middle  ages  had  beaten  back  the  forces  of  the  whole  of 
Christendom. 

In  those  long  struggles  for  liberation,  ranging  over 
nearly  250  years,  two  external  States  have  played  a  helpful 
part,  Russia  and  Austria.  But  here  we  must  distinguish 
between  the  motives  that  prompted  intervention  by  those 
Powers.  The  Russian  people  has  always  taken  keen 
interest  in  the  struggles  of  Serb  and  Bulgar  against  the 
Sublime  Porte.  Kinship  in  race  and  community  of  religion 
(that  of  the  Greek  Church)  impelled  them  to  intervene. 
The  generous  feelings  that  led  mankind  to  undertake 
the  Crusades  have  nerved  the  Musco\'ites  in  their  wars 
against  the  Turks.  True,  ambition  has  often  prompted 
the  policy  of  their  Government,  from  the  times  of  Peter 
the  Great  and  Catherine  II  onwards;  but  the  rank  and 
file  have  been  actuated  by  a  noble  impulse,  the  desire  to 
free  the  oppressed  and  to  plant  the  cross  once  more  on 
the  dome  of  St  Sophia  at  Constantinople.  This  is  the 
feeling  which  nerved  the  soldiers  of  Suvorof  and  Diebitsch 
to  their  deeds  of  heroism.     It  is  the  same  feehng,  largely, 


118  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

which  inspires  them  now  to  overthrow  the  last  but 
deadliest  enemy  of  the  Balkan  Slavs,  Austria. 

During  more  than  a  century  the  House  of  Hapsburg 
has  had  no  similar  motive  for  intervention  in  Balkan 
affairs.  But,  as  the  Ottoman  power  decayed,  the  States- 
men of  Vienna  discerned  in  the  south-east  the  line  of 
least  resistance  for  their  imperial  projects.  Italian 
patriots,  notably  Count  Balbo,  urged  the  Hapsburgs  to 
turn  towards  the  Balkans  the  energies  which  were  vainly 
employed  beyond  the  Alps  to  hold  down  Italians^.  His 
prophecy  in  1843  was  fulfilled  in  1866,  when  Austria  was 
expelled  both  from  Italy  and  from  the  Germanic  confeder- 
ation. After  the  formation  of  the  German  Empire  under 
the  headship  of  Prussia,  the  polyglot  Hapsburg  dominions 
could  expand  only  towards  the  Balkans.  Hence  the 
principle  of  growth  which  pushes  the  Germans  towards 
the  North  Sea  and  into  new  lands,  also  urges  Austria 
towards  the  iEgean.  We  must  recognise  that  in  both 
cases  an  impulse  natural  to  a  vigorous  people  is  driving 
on  these  movements.  In  the  interests  of  the  little 
peoples  who  are  threatened  on  the  lower  Rhine  and 
Meuse,  as  well  as  on  the  lower  Danube,  we  must  oppose 
such  forcible  expansion;  but  it  has  in  it  something  of 
the  elemental,  which,  in  the  wiser  future  that  is  surely 
ahead,  will  demand  satisfaction  by  methods  less  brutal 
than  war. 

In  this  brief  study  of  the  Eastern  Question  we  must 
limit  ourselves  mainly  to  the  ever  increasing  rivalry 
between  Austria  and  the  Balkan  Slavs  and  their  champion, 
Russia.  In  the  years  1875-7  that  rivalry  was  restrained 
by  the  counsels  of  prudence  which  then  prevailed  in 

»  C.  Balbo,  Le  Speranze  d'  Italia  (Turin,  1843). 


THE   EASTERN    QUESTION  119 

presence  of  the  rising  power  of  democracy.  The  three 
Empires,  still  loosely  connected  by  the  Three  Emperors' 
League,  sought  to  locahze  the  Herzegovinian  Rising  and 
to  induce  Turkey  to  grant  the  needed  reforms.  We  now 
see  that  pacific  coercion  of  the  Sublime  Porte  was  the 
sole  method  for  ending  the  troubles  in  the  North- West  of 
its  Empire;  and  it  is  generally  agreed  that  the  support 
offered  by  the  British  Government  to  the  Turks  was  a 
pohtical  blunder  of  the  first  magnitude.  At  once  they 
stiffened  their  necks ;  and  the  new  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  II, 
prepared  to  defy  Russia  if  she  took  up  the  cause  of  the 
now  despairing  Christians  of  the  Balkans. 

Mark  what  ensued.  Britain's  poHcy  having  broken 
up  the  Concert  of  the  Powers  which  had  sought  to  end 
the  crisis  peaceably,  the  former  rivals,  Russia  and  Austria, 
came  to  a  secret  agreement.  Regarding  war  between 
Russia  and  Turkey  as  inevitable,  they  agreed  to  the 
following  compromise.  Austria  would  remain  neutral, 
provided  that  Russia  respected  the  integrity  of  Roumania, 
and  did  not  annex  land  south  of  the  Danube.  It  was 
also  understood  that  she  should  confine  her  mihtary 
operations  to  the  eastern  half  of  the  Peninsula.  Austria, 
however,  exacted  a  high  price  for  her  neutrality,  viz.  the 
occupation  of  Bosnia  at  the  end  of  the  war.  But  this 
by  no  means  satisfied  the  statesmen  of  Vienna.  The 
severe  defeats  sustained  by  Russia  before  Plevna  whetted 
their  appetite  for  Balkan  lands;  and  in  the  spring  of 
1878,  before  the  Berlin  Congress  which  was  to  settle  the 
Eastern  Question,  they  demanded  that  Austria  should 
occupy  the  whole  of  Albania  and  Macedonia,  including 
Salonica.  Bosnia  was  also  to  become  a  principality 
dependent  on  the  Hapsburgs ;   and  Austria  was  to  acquire 


120  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

the  right  to  make  special  treaties  with  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro, on  terms  wliich  would  have  made  them  virtually 
dependent  on  her^. 

She  did  not  gain  these  concessions.  But  she  procured 
the  insertion  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  of  Articles  25  and  29, 
which  empowered  her  provisionally  to  occupy  the  Sanjak 
of  Novi  Bazar,  and  also  to  extend  her  influence  bcyoiul 
Mitrovitza,  its  southernmost  limit.  This  was  equivalent 
to  handing  her  the  key  to  Macedonia  and  bidding  her 
advance  to  Salonica  when  she  saw  fit;  and  on  several 
occasions  she  seemed  about  to  begin  the  march  to  Salonica, 
to  which  the  chauvinists  of  Vienna  constantly  impelled 
her^. 

The  Balkan  peoples  lived  in  perpetual  dread  of  such 
an  event.  Mr  Minchin  found  during  his  sojourn  in 
Bosnia  and  Serbia  that  the  Montenegrins  dreaded  Austria 
far  more  than  their  ancient  foes,  the  Turks.  So  did  the 
Greeks.  The  Turk  was  in  his  dotage,  but  his  place 
would  at  once  be  taken  by  the  active  and  intriguing 
Austrian,  and  then  farewell  to  all  hopes  of  a  Greek 
Salonica^.  Most  of  all,  the  Serbs  dreaded  Hapsburg 
aggression.  True,  Austria  coquetted  with  King  Milan, 
but  only  on  condition  that  he  worked  in  her  interests. 
In  1885  she  also  saved  the  Serbs  from  the  advance  of 
the  victorious  Bulgars ;  but  she  could  do  no  less ;  for  she 
had  incited  them  to  attack  the  Bulgars;  and  when  her 
proteges  were  badly  beaten  she  of  course  intervened ;  but 
thereafter  she  was  described  as  the  shadow  hanging  over 

^  Debidour,  Hist,  diplomatique  de  V Europe,  ii.  516. 

*  Tittoni,  Italy's  Foreign  and  Colonial  Policy  (Eng.  edit.),  pp.  ISO- 
US. 

•  J.  Minchin,  Growth  of  Freedom  in  the  Balkan  Pensinula,  pp.  19, 
32,  221 ;  Cassavetti,  Hellas  and  the  Balkan  Wars,  p.  226. 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION  121 

the  whole  of  Serbia.  Indeed,  it  would  seem  that  nothing 
but  the  dread  of  increasing  the  Slav  population  of  the 
Dual-Monarchy  prevented  its  statesmen  from  annexing 
Serbia  outright.  There  were  credible  reports  that  both 
King  Milan  and  afterwards  King  Alexander  were  about 
to  place  Serbia  under  vassalage  to  Austria. 

The  Albanians  were  equally  apprehensive.  Both 
Austria  and  Italy  coveted  their  land,  especially  its  coast 
line,  which  commands  the  entrance  to  the  Adriatic. 
Those  nominal  Allies  could  scarcely  forbear  laying  violent 
hands  on  that  important  coast,  a  question  which  in  the 
winter  of  1912-3  nearly  brought  about  a  European  War. 

We  must  now  trace  the  growing  rivalry  between  Austria 
and  Russia  in  Balkan  affairs.  Early  in  the  present 
century  Austria  began  to  gain  ground  far  more  quickly 
than  Russia  in  Balkan  Questions.  This  may  be  explained 
by  her  advantages  of  position,  her  skill  in  the  management 
of  half-civihzed  races,  and  the  firm  backing  of  Germany. 
The  support  of  Berlin  is  intelligible  in  the  light  of  events 
described  in  Lecture  IV.  So  as  soon  the  Bagdad  Railway 
scheme  took  definite  form,  in  the  year  1902,  Germany 
had  every  reason  for  desiring  Austria  to  control  the 
Balkan  lands,  and  therefore  the  through  railway  lines 
from  Central  Europe  to  Constantinople.  These  schemes, 
linked  as  they  were  with  the  Bagdad  and  Hedjaz  Railways 
were  so  vast  that  the  Sultan  ought  to  have  perceived 
their  menacing  character.  But  Germany  convinced  him 
of  her  goodwill — England  had  stolen  Egypt  and  Cyprus; 
France  had  annexed  Tunis;  Italy  coveted  Tripoli; 
Russia  threatened  Armenia.  The  Austrians  might  be 
dangerous  in  Macedonia;  but  Germany  would  see  that 
they  did  the  Turk  no  harm;   and  by  her  railways  she 


122  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

sought  to  do  Turkey  nothingfbut  good.  The  Germans, 
in  fact,  were  the  only  sincere  friends  that  Turkey  had  in 
the  world^.  Moreover,  the  Kaiser  encouraged  the  Sultan 
to  persevere  in  the  Pan-Islam  movement.  In  fact,  Pan- 
Germanism  and  Pan-Islamism  acting  together  would 
stalemate  Pan-Slavism.  The  crafty  Sultan  was  completely 
cajoled;  and  during  many  years  Berlin  virtually  swayed 
the  counsels  of  the  Sublime  Porte,  giving  it  carte  blanche 
in  regard  to  the  Christians  of  Macedonia  and  Armenia. 
The  more  the  British  Government  and  Press  protested 
against  his  policy  of  terrorism  and  massacre,  the  more  he 
leant  on  the  Kaiser;  and  a  large  share  of  the  responsi- 
bility for  those  horrors  must  fall  to  the  imperial  moralist 
and  preacher  of  Potsdam.  For  the  time  his  pro-Turkish 
policy  succeeded.  The  influence  of  Berhn  superseded 
that  of  Great  Britain  and  France;  and  it  promised  to 
support  Turkey  even  against  the  dreaded  Muscovite. 

Thus,  the  Teutonic  programme  was  as  follows:  Ger- 
many would  partly  support,  partly  control  Turkey 
(meanwhile  exploiting  Asia  IMinor)  while  Austria  was  to 
become  supreme  in  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  finally  in 
Macedonia.  That  accomphshed,  the  Germanic  Empires 
might  hope  for  the  Empire  of  the  Orient. 

How  came  Russia  to  permit  these  schemes?  We 
must  here  remember  that  Russia  in  1900  successfully 
opposed  the  northern  route  of  the  Bagdad  Railway; 
and,  having  diverted  the  hne  far  from  her  Caucasian 
borders,  she  now  viewed  the  scheme  with  less  reluctance, 
especially  as  it  promised  to  link  up  her  Persian  hues 
with  the  Bagdad  system.  Russia,  moreover,  at  that  time 
waa  chiefly  intent  on  her  Trans-Siberian  railway  schemes 

'  ReventloWy  p.  313. 


THE    EASTERN    QUESTION  123 

and  the  construction  of  great  naval  and  commercial 
bases  on  the  Pacific  at  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny.  The 
Far  East  diverted  her  from  the  Near  East.  The  statesmen 
of  Petrograd  and  of  Tokio  are  said  to  be  convinced  that 
Germany  lured  Russia  on  to  the  dangerous  schemes  in 
Korea  which  embroiled  her  with  Japan,  an  explanation 
which  seems  reasonable  in  view  of  the  reconcihation 
between  the  two  Powers,  which  came  about  speedily  after 
the  end  of  the  war. 

Certain  it  is  that,  some  ten  to  fifteen  years  ago,  Russia 
took  far  less  interest  in  Balkan  affairs  than  formerly.  In 
1903,  when  on  the  brink  of  the  Japanese  War,  she  came 
to  terms  with  Austria  in  what  was  known  as  the  Miirzsteg 
programme  of  reforms.  Ostensibly  it  aimed  at  the  im- 
provement of  the  lot  of  the  oppressed  peoples  of  Macedonia 
under  the  joint  supervision  of  Austria  and  Russia.  That 
the  two  rivals  should  join  hands  in  promoting  philan- 
thropic schemes  caused  cynics  to  sneer;  and  unfortu- 
nately the  cynics  were  right.  The  scheme  was  supposed 
virtually  to  supplant  the  obligations  laid  upon  all  the 
Great  Powers  by  the  Treaty  of  Berhn.  England,  enfeebled 
by  the  Boer  War,  was  glad  to  hand  over  her  responsibiHties 
as  regards  the  Christians  of  Turkey.  France  and  Italy 
took  much  the  same  view ;  while  Germany  was  hand  and 
glove  with  the  Sultan,  the  sworn  foe  of  all  reforms.  When 
Russia  was  defeated  in  the  Far  East,  Austria  virtually 
let  the  Miirzsteg  programme  lapse^.  But  in  the  meantime 
she  had  secured  the  first  place  in  Balkan  affairs. 

Signs  of  her  activity  have  been  portrayed  in  the 
sprightly  pages  of  Miss  Edith  Durham.  She  describes 
the  splendour  of  the  Austrian  consulates  then  being  built 

*-  Beveutlow,  p.  316. 


124  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

in  Albania  and  Macedonia.  She  says,  "The  consul  lives 
"  in  a  palace,  and  has  a  whole  staff  of  lively  youths, 
*'  whose  principal  business  in  life  appears  to  be  taking 
"  holidays  for  shooting  expeditions,  and  whose  knowledge 
"  of  the  land  is  minute  and  exhaustive.  They  will  even 
"  take  you  out  for  a  walk  and  tell  you  the  improvements 
"  which  their  Government  means  to  introduce  in  a  few 
"  years'  time."  She  once  asked  one  of  them  whether 
a  new  consulate  was  not  large  enough  for  a  Governor's 
palace.  He  at  once  repUed :  "  Then  it  will  be  very  useful 
"  to  us  in  a  few  years'  time^." 

The  first  great  coup  came  in  1908.  Austria  then 
annexed  Bosnia-Herzegovina  outright.  The  Powers  pro- 
tested vigorously,  all  the  more  so  because  the  Young 
Turks  had  just  gained  power  at  Constantinople  amidst 
the  plaudits  of  an  astonished  world.  But  while  visions 
of  a  political  millennium  seemed  to  be  taking  shape  on 
the  Bosphorus,  there  fell  this  heavy  blow  from  Austria. 
Was  it  her  way  of  discrediting  the  new  system,  detested 
by  Germany,  acclaimed  by  Great  Britain?  Or  was  it 
merely  a  coincidence  that  the  annexation  came  at  the 
time  of  the  Diamond  Jubilee  of  Francis  Joseph,  providing 
him  with  a  present  of  imperial  splendour?  Or,  again, 
was  it  that  Russia  was  still  weak  and  could  not  resent 
Austria's  expansion  in  the  Balkans? 

It  is  certain  that  the  Austrian  statesman  who  carried 
through  this  stroke,  had  adopted  a  very  different  pohcy 
from  that  usually  associated  with  Vienna.  During  many 
years  Viennese  policy  had  been  conservative  and  cautious, 
so  that  Austria  had  been  called  the  House  of  Lords  of 
Europe.  Up  to  the  autumn  of  1906  she  was  so  passive 
^  £.  Durham,  Burden  of  the  Balkans^  ch.  3. 


THE   EASTERN    QUESTION  125 

in  foreign  affairs  that  Kaiser  William  took  occasion  to 
describe  her  Foreign  Minister,  Count  Goluchowski,  as  "a 
'*  brilliant  second"  during  the  Algeciras  Conference  of  the 
spring  of  that  year.  Damned  with  faint  praise,  that 
Minister  retired  from  ofl&ce.  His  successor.  Baron  von 
Aehrenthal,  soon  proved  to  be  a  man  after  Kaiser  William's 
own  heart.  He  was  enterprising,  and  thoroughly  German. 
Above  all  he  beUeved  that  the  best  means  of  stopping 
the  eternal  feuds  in  the  Parhaments  of  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy was  to  embark  on  a  spirited  foreign  poHcy^: 

Be  it  thy  course  to  busy  giddy  minds 

With  foreign  quarrels;  that  action,  hence  borne  out. 

May  waste  the  memory  of  the  former  days. 

Those  words,  which  Shakespeare  puts  in  the  mouth  of 
Henry  IV,  as  parting  advice  to  his  son,  may  stand  as  the 
motto  of  Austria's  policy  since  1906.  Aehrenthal  was 
only  too  ready  to  obey  the  impulses  emanating  from 
Berlin.  He  checked  the  pro-Slav  tendencies  in  the 
Dual  Monarchy  and  prepared  to  subject  the  Slavs  on 
its  southern  borders.  Russia,  weakened  by  her  disasters 
in  Manchuria,  was  not  likely  to  oppose  him.  As  for 
Great  Britain  he  openly  flouted  her;  and  he  declined  to 
take  us  seriously  even  after  the  conclusion  of  our  entente 
with  Russia  in  1907.  In  fact  in  the  autumn  of  that  year 
he  pushed  on  a  railway  scheme  into  Macedonia  by  way  of 
Novi  Bazar,  and  in  order  to  procure  the  consent  of  the 
Porte  he  offered  that  Austria  should  renounce  her  partici- 
pation in  the  Miirzsteg  scheme  of  Macedonian  reforms. 
His  bargain  with  Turkey  may  be  thus  described:  "You 
"  Turks  may  do  what  you  Uke  in  Macedonia  if  you  will  let 
**  us  build  our  railway."    At  home  Aehrenthal  defended  his 

^  W.  Steed,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  pp.  224-230. 


126  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

scheme  on  the  ground  that  it  would  be  an  important  link 
between  Europe,  Egypt,  and  India^.  The  mention  of 
Egypt  and  India  was,  of  course,  meant  as  a  threat  to  us. 

These  were  the  events  preceding  the  annexation ;  and 
they  explain  the  indignation  which  that  event  occasioned 
at  Petrograd,  Paris,  and  London.  Austria,  backed  up 
by  Germany,  was  clearly  working  to  precipitate  the  ruin 
of  the  Turks  by  abandoning  the  reform  programme 
which  alone  could  save  Macedonia  from  anarchy;  but 
she  was  also  pushing  on  a  railway  that  would  enable  her 
to  profit  to  the  full  by  that  anarchy.  So  soon  as  Turkey 
went  to  pieces,  the  white  coats  of  Austria  could  be  at  the 
gates  of  Salonica,  That  was  the  way  in  which  Vienna 
then  regarded  the  Eastern  Question;  and  it  must  be 
remembered  that  Germany,  for  all  her  bolstering  up  ot 
the  old  Sultan's  tyranny,  was  ready  with  railway  schemes 
in  Asia  Minor  so  as  to  profit  by  the  breakdown  in 
Turkey  which  clear-sighted  observers  confidently  pre- 
dicted. She  was  prepared  for  either  alternative,  the 
continuance  of  Turkish  tyranny,  or  the  fall  of  the  Sultan. 

Why,  then  did  she  not  push  on  her  schemes  when  the 
Sultan's  authority  collapsed  at  the  time  of  the  Young 
Turks'  triumph  at  Constantinople?  Doubtless,  because 
that  event  overthrew  German  influence  at  the  Sublime 
Porte.  It  has  even  been  asserted  by  German  writers 
that  the  Young  Turks  dealt  their  stroke  because  just 
previously  King  Edward  VII  and  the  Tsar  had  met  at 
Reval  on  the  Gulf  of  Finland.  Post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc. 
Evidently  (so  argue  these  logicians)  those  potentates  met 
for  something.     The  Young  Turk  Revolution  was  some- 

1  W.  Steed,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  p.  235 ;  Sir  C.  Eliot,  Turkey 
in  Europe,  ad  fin.  (new  edit.  1908);   Reventlow,  p.  316. 


THE   EASTERN    QUESTION  127 

thing.  Therefore  the  royal  meeting  met  for  the  Young 
Turk  Revolution.  In  the  eyes  of  these  writers  King 
Edward  was  the  Mephistopheles  of  the  age,  ever  plotting 
the  isolation  of  Germany. — His  summer  visits  to  Carlsbad 
or  Ischl,  where  he  often  met  Kaiser  Franz  Joseph,  were 
intended  to  withdraw  him  from  the  German  alliance, 
or  tempt  him  to  persuade  Kaiser  Wilhelm  not  to  build 
ships  so  fast.  And  now  at  Reval  King  Edward  and  the 
Tsar  launched  the  Young  Turks  against  Abdul  Hamid^. 
— It  seems  to  us  incredibly  superficial.  But  very  many 
Germans,  judging  other  sovereigns  by  the  phenomenal 
activity  of  their  own,  could  not  believe  that  anything 
great  could  happen  unless  some  monarch  or  statesman 
contrived  it. 

Alas !  The  prospects  of  the  reformers  at  Constantinople 
were  speedily  blighted  by  their  follies  and  factions;  and 
in  April,  1909,  there  came  to  power  a  party  favourable 
to  Germany, — a  result  due  largely  to  the  skill  of  the 
German  ambassador.  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein. 
Since  then  she  has  resumed  her  former  sway  at  Con- 
stantinople^. 

Meanwhile  the  two  Germanic  Empires  had  also  won 
a  diplomatic  triumph.  They  made  good  their  contention 
that  Austria  should  annex  Bosnia.  The  Triple  Entente 
opposed  them  in  vain.  Russia  was  still  weak;  France 
knew  that  she  would  get  no  help  from  Petrograd,  and 
took  little  interest  in  Balkan  affairs.  Great  Britain  took 
more  interest;    but,  alone,  she  was  helpless  against  the 

*  Reventlow,  p.  322 :  the  King  and  Tsar  probably  did  not  discuss 
politics  (see  W.  Steed,  p.  237). 

•  Sir  W.  Ramsay,  The  Bevolution  in  Constantinople  and  Turkey 
(1909),  pp.  16-17. 


128  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Triple  Alliance.  For  at  that  time  Italy  held  by  her 
Allies.  True,  she  di^l  so  somewhat  doubtfully;  and  her 
Government  was  sharply  criticized  in  the  Chambers  at 
Rome  for  its  pro-Austrian  policy.  But,  by  coming  to  an 
understanding  with  Russia  on  Balkan  afiairs,  the  Cabinet 
of  Rome  scored  one  success.  At  the  Congress  of  the 
Great  Powers  which  dehberated  on  the  Bosnian  Question, 
Austria  had  to  consent  to  withdraw  from  the  Sanjak  of 
Novi  Bazar.  She  did  so  very  reluctantly,  and  mainly,  it 
is  said,  owing  to  the  insistence  of  Italy  and  Russia^. 

But  mark  the  result  of  this  withdrawal.  It  left  only 
one  Hne  of  advance  southwards  to  a  Power  which  was 
resolved  to  extend  not  only  its  railways  but  its  poHtical 
power  in  the  Balkans.  This  line  was  through  Serbia, 
which  provided  both  the  shortest  and  the  easiest  route 
to  Salonica.  Indeed,  a  railway  already  ran  right  through 
to  the  coveted  port.  Therefore  the  Austrian  mihtary 
men  and  engineers  consoled  themselves  with  the  thought 
that  thenceforth  the  route  through  Serbia  must  be  the 
object  of  Austria's  efiorts. 

Serbia  was  exasperated  by  these  events^.  The  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia,  and  the  handing  back  of  the  Sanjak  to 
the  Porte  shut  her  out  from  all  hopes  of  reaching  the 
sea,  which  she  had  so  long  cherished.  Through  the  600 
dark  years  which  have  rolled  over  her  since  the  downfall 
of  her  glorious  kingdom,  she  had  dreamed  of  once  more 
reaching  the  Adriatic.  Now  that  dream  was  dispelled. 
On  all  sides  she  felt  herself  threatened;    for  that  most 

*  Tittoni,  p.  142.  For  the  Austro -Turkish  bargain  of  February, 
1909,  which  ended  "the  annexation  crisis"  (see  W.  Steed,  p.  265). 
Billow,  Imperial  Germany,  pp.  60-61. 

•  Reventlow,  p.  328. 


THE    EASTERN    QUESTION  129 

crafty  of  European  rulers,  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria, 
had  recently  taken  a  threatening  step.  Just  before 
Austria's  annexation  of  Bosnia,  he  had  visited  Vienna ; 
and  on  his  return  proclaimed  himself  Tsar  of  the  Bul- 
garians, a  claim  which  implied  sway  over  the  milUon  or 
more  of  Bulgars  in  Central  and  West  Macedonia.  This 
again  seemed  to  blight  Serbia's  hopes  of  expanding 
southwards.  Nay!  She  was  threatened  at  her  very 
heart  by  a  war  of  tariffs  with  Austria.  Her  chief  product 
was  pigs;  and  now  the  Dual  Monarchy  refused  to  take 
them.  The  Turks  refuse  all  pigs.  Therefore  the  sole 
exit  for  Serb  pigs  was  Bulgaria ;  but  as  the  Bulgars  had 
enough  of  their  own,  the  future  for  the  Serb  animals 
became  gloomy  in  the  extreme.  For  a  time  King  Peter 
and  some  of  his  counsellors  are  said  to  have  thought  of 
entering  into  some  form  of  dependence  on  Austria  at 
which  that  Empire  had  been  aiming. 

But,  fortunately  for  the  cause  of  the  little  States, 
they  decided  to  fight,  not  each  other,  but  rather  the 
common  enemy,  either  Turkey  or  Austria.  One  of  their 
delegates  to  London  in  1912,  when  questioned  as  to  the 
date  of  their  preparations  for  war,  said  that  they  were 
begun  immediately  after  Austria's  annexation  of  Bosnia; 
for  all  those  peoples  then  felt  their  doom  approaching^. 

The  assertion  may  be  commended  to  the  German 
writers  who  have  seen  in  the  Balkan  League  merely  the 
outcome  of  Russian  intrigues.  All  who  are  acquainted 
with  Balkan  affairs  know  that  it  originated  in  a  sense 
of  despair  of  any  reforms  from  the  Young  Turks  or  of 
effective  help  from  the  Great  Powers.     Germany  and 

*  Letter  of  Mr  Frederick  St  John  in  Times,  August  14,  1914. 
B.L.  9 


130  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Austria  blocked  the  way  to  intervention  by  the  Great 
Powers;  and  by  the  years  1911-12  the  incredible  folly 
of  the  Young  Turks  led  to  hardships  worse  even  than  in 
the  days  of  Abdul  Ilamid.  Only  occasionally  did  he 
order  massacres.  But  the  Young  Turks  persistently 
pressed  hard  upon  all  the  Christians  of  the  Empire. 
Trained  at  Paris  or  Berlin,  they  had  imbibed  the  doctrine 
that  public  affairs  would  go  well  if  organized  by  a  scientific 
administration.  To  them  nationality  and  religion  were 
absurd  survivals,  to  be  swept  aside  as  soon  as  possible. 
Turkey  would  prosper  when  her  government  resembled 
that  of  Paris  or  Berlin.  A  sort  of  Pan-Turk  propaganda 
was  set  on  foot  to  assimilate  all  the  diverse  peoples  of  the 
empire.  A  Young  Turk  said  to  Miss  Durham:  "All  is 
"  now  simplified.  The  Greek,  the  Bulgar,  the  Serb,  the 
"  Albanian  Questions  no  longer  exist.  We  have  passed  a 
"  law,  and  now  all  are  Osmanli."  To  which  Miss  Durham 
repUed:  "You  can  pass  a  law,  if  you  Uke,  that  all  cats 
*'  are  dogs;   but  they  will  remain  cats." 

In  1912  the  opportunity  for  the  Httle  peoples  had  come. 
In  the  previous  autumn  Turkey  was  attacked  by  Italy, 
an  event  which  disordered  all  the  calculations  of  Berlin 
and  Vienna.  It  had  long  been  known  vaguely  that 
Italy  desired  TripoU.  So  far  back  as  1878  Bismarck 
had  pointed  her  to  that  land,  if  France  took  Tunis. 
But  very  few  persons  expected  the  blow  to  fall  in 
1911.  Her  part  in  the  Triple  AlHance  was  to  act  as  a 
passive  third,  behind  Austria  as  a  "brilhant  second."  On 
one  occasion  Kaiser  William  said  as  much  to  an  Italian 
diplomat  who  complained  of  the  lenten  fare  provided  for 
Italy  by  the  Triple  AlUance.  He  said  to  him:  "Wait 
**  patiently.     Let  the  occasion  but  present  itself,  and  you 


THE    EASTEKN    QUESTION  131 

**  shall  have  whatever  you  wish^."  But  Italy  waited  in 
vain.  Her  impatience  became  extreme  in  1911;  for  by 
then  France  had  cut  a  great  sHce  out  of  Morocco,  and 
Germany  out  of  the  French  Congo.  The  Cabinet  of  Rome 
therefore  resolved  to  strike  at  TripoH;  and  those  who 
watch  the  inner  ironies  of  history  will  note  with  satis- 
faction that  the  Kaiser  was  hoist  by  Bismarck's  petard, 
and  that,  too,  at  a  time  extremely  inconvenient  for  the 
oriental  designs  of  Germany.  The  railways  were  progress- 
ing favourably.  The  Turkish  army  and  navy  were  said  to 
be  gathering  strength.  Even  Turkish  finances  were  said 
not  to  be  hopeless.     But  now  Italy  spoilt  the  game. 

As  if  this  were  not  enough,  the  Turks  chose  this  time 
of  crisis  for  dragooning  the  Albanians  and  massacring 
Bulgars  at  Kochani  in  Macedonia.  The  Christian  States 
therefore  came  to  terms,  framed  their  league,  struck  home ; 
and  within  a  month  the  Turkish  Colossus  lay  prone. 

But  then  came  a  terrible  event.  The  victors  fell  out 
among  themselves  as  to  the  share  of  Macedonia.  The 
cause  of  these  disputes  is  still  obscure;  but  I  have  been 
informed  by  a  diplomat  of  a  Balkan  State  that  it  resulted 
largely  from  the  vagueness  of  the  original  compact,  which 
at  first  did  not  include  Greece.  Serbia  and  Bulgaria 
had  arranged  a  general  scheme  for  dividing  Macedonia; 
but  this  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  Serbia  would 
acquire  Albania.  She  did  acquire  it  by  the  prodigious 
exertions  of  her  troops  in  the  rush  through  snow  and 
slush  to  Vallona.  But  it  soon  appeared  that  Austria  and 
Italy  would  forcibly  oppose  her  at  that  coast.  Those 
two  States  very  rarely  pull  together ;  but  on  this  occasion 
they  did,  because  each  hoped  to  get  Albania.   Thus  it  came 

*  Crispi,  Mems.  m.  326  (Eng.  edit.). 

9—2 


132  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

about  that  in  the  Congress  of  the  Powers  held  in  London 
in  1912-13,  Serbia  had  finally  to  give  up  North  Albania. 
It  was  a  bitter  blow  to  her  people ;  but  now  they  demanded 
a  larger  share  of  Macedonia.  To  this  the  Bulgars  demur- 
red; and  it  is  almost  certain  that  their  opposition  in  its 
final  stages  was  instigated  by  Austria.  It  is  an  open 
secret  that  she  encouraged  her  protege,  King  Ferdinand, 
to  expect  Austrian  help  if  he  rejected  the  demands  of 
Serbia.  Several  of  the  hotheads  of  Sofia  hearkened  to 
this  insidious  advice.  The  Daneff  Ministry  at  Sofia  was 
less  to  blame  than  has  been  generally  believed.  It  was 
pushed  on  to  the  brink  of  the  precipice  by  the  chauvinists. 
Indeed,  the  final  order  to  the  Bulgarian  troops  to  attack 
the  Serbs  never  had  the  signature  of  the  responsible 
Ministers.  Insidious  influences  were  certainly  at  work  to 
set  the  Christians  of  the  Balkans  by  the  ears;  and  those 
influences  emanated  from  Austria.  She  had  resolved  to 
smash  the  Balkan  League,  whose  victory  over  the  Turks 
had  been  a  most  unwelcome  surprise.  Both  at  Vienna 
and  Berhn  it  was  beheved  that  the  Turks,  drilled  by 
Germans,  provided  with  Krupp's  artillery,  and  rendered 
doubly  mobile  by  the  new  German  railways  in  Asia  Minor, 
must  prevail  over  allies  who  until  lately  had  hated  each 
other  more  bitterly  than  the  Turks.  What  wonder  that 
the  Germanic  Empires  loathed  the  thought  of  a  Turkey  in 
Europe  controlled  by  four  Christian  States  whose  pro- 
gressive culture  marked  out  the  future  as  theirs.  The 
German  plans  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  Turkey 
would  survive,  at  least  long  enough  for  the  Teuton  to 
step  in  as  residuary  legatee.  And  now  the  Christian 
States  were  about  to  share  the  best  part  of  the  inheritance. 
Their  triumph  would  imply  the  throwing  in  of  four  sohd 


THE    EASTERN    QUESTION  133 

blocks  into  the  path  which  the  Germanic  Empires  were 
resolved  to  control,  the  path  leading  from  Berlin  and 
Vienna  to  Constantinople  and  thence  to  the  Persian 
Gulf. 

In  these  considerations  we  may  find  the  explanation 
of  the  miserable  events  of  the  summer  of  1913,  which 
exhausted  the  Balkan  States  and  led  to  the  conclusion 
of  the  unsatisfactory  Peace  of  Bukharest,  mainly  at  the 
dictation  of  the  Germanic  Powers.  Here  again  they 
prevailed.  They  threw  back  the  Slav  cause  in  a  way 
which  caused  keen  satisfaction  at  Berhn  and  Vienna,  but 
still  keener  resentment  at  Sofia,  Belgrade,  and  Athens — 
above  all  at  Petrograd.  The  Slavs  had  not  sought  this 
conflict,  though  this  is  constantly  asserted  at  Berhn.  It 
was  forced  on  them  by  the  aggressive  designs  of  the  two 
Germanic  Empires,  and,  later,  by  the  insane  misgovern- 
ment  of  the  Young  Turks.  Twice  the  Slav  cause  was  set 
back  by  the  action  of  Austria  and  Germany,  viz.  in  the 
winters  of  1908-9  and  of  1912-13,  on  both  of  which 
occasions  Europe  narrowly  escaped  a  general  war.  But 
the  experience  of  those  crises  led  to  a  firm  resolve  not  to 
accept  further  humihations  from  the  Houses  of  Hapsburg 
and  Hohenzollern. 


vn 

THE  CRISIS  OF    1914 

By  whatever  means  we  must  he  strong^  so  that  by  a  powerful  effort 
we  may  destroy  our  enemies  in  the  east  and  in  the  west. 

(German  Secret  Report,  March  19,  1913.) 

The  events  in  the  Balkans  during  the  year  1913 
ushered  in  a  time  of  severe  tension.  It  was  evident  to  all 
observers  that  the  two  Central  Powers  were  bent  on 
breaking  up  the  Balkan  League  and  securing  their 
supremacy  in  that  peninsula.  The  participation  of 
beaten  Turkey  in  that  second  war  could  scarcely  have 
occurred  without  encouragement  given  from  Berlin  and 
Vienna.  The  intention  evidently  was  to  re-estabhsh  the 
Ottoman  power  as  far  as  possible  and  deal  a  blow  to  the 
Slav  cause  both  by  lessening  its  gains  of  the  year  1912 
and  by  sowing  discords  among  its  champions.  The  plan 
met  with  startHng  success,  and  Austria  might  well  hope 
finally  to  secure  her  supremacy  in  Turkey  in  Europe. 

The  secrets  of  those  months  are  half  revealed  by  some 
significant  signs.  Evidently  the  Sublime  Porte  must 
have  considered  itself  very  closely  bound  to  the  Central 
Powers;  otherwise  it  would  not  now  have  intervened  in 
this  war.  The  Turkish  troops  are  fighting  with  extreme 
reluctance;    and  it  is  well  known  that  the  Moslems  oL 


THE   CRISIS   OF   1914  135 

India  and  Egypt  regard  Turkey's  action  as  likely  to  lead 
to  utter  ruin.  How  close,  then,  must  have  been  the  grip 
which  the  German  Powers  fastened  on  Turkey  in  1913! 
As  to  the  Balkan  States,  though  they  nurse  bitter  hatred 
against  each  other,  yet  it  is  repressed  by  their  over- 
mastering dread  of  Austria.  Early  in  the  present  war 
it  was  expected  that  Bulgaria  would  attack  Serbia  in 
order  to  regain  Central  Macedonia.  Why  did  she  not 
do  so?  Because  to  do  so  would  be  to  play  the  game  for 
Austria;  and  her  experience  of  the  insidious  poHcy  of 
Vienna  in  1913  has  now  kept  her  quiet. 

Turn  to  Roumania.  That  State  used  to  be  on 
friendly  terms  with  the  Triple  Alliance  owing  to  re- 
sentment at  the  shabby  conduct  of  Russia  in  1878 
in  annexing  Western  Bessarabia.  But  her  anger  has 
abated.  She  no  longer  fears  Russia;  but  she  does 
fear  Austria.  On  November  20,  1914,  a  leading 
Roumanian  statesman,  M.  Jonescu,  telegraphed  to  a 
Russian  paper  the  following : — "  All  Roumania's  interests 
"and  her  future  are  inseparably  bound  up  with  the 
"victory  of  the  Triple  Entente,  to  which  Roumania  must 
"contribute  by  participating  in  the  war.  Roumania 
"should  strive  to  promote  a  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement 
"and  do  everything  possible  to  come  to  terms  with 
"Bulgaria,  thus  enabling  all  the  Balkan  States  to  side 
"with  the  nations  of  the  Entente.  A  German  victory 
"would  mean  the  burial  of  all  the  hopes  of  the  Balkan 
"  States  and  of  the  independence  of  the  neutral  countries^." 
Roumania  has  her  own  special  reasons  for  wishing  the 
overthrow  of  Austria,  from  whom  she  hopes  to  recover 
the  Roumans  living  north  of  the  Carpathians.  But  she 
*  Times,  Nov.  23,  19U. 


136  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

also  knows  that  Austrian  supremacy  in  the  Balkans 
would  sound  the  death-knell  of  every  free  State  in  the 
Peninsula.  Thus,  the  Aehrenthal  policy  has  had  the 
efiect  of  uniting  practically  all  the  Balkan  peoples  against 
the  menace  from  the  north. 

Hungary  has  behaved  worse  to  the  Slavs  than  Austria 
has  done.  In  the  AVestern  half  of  the  Monarchy  a  feeling 
not  long  ago  prevailed  in  favour  of  encouraging  the  Slavs 
as  a  make-weight  against  the  Magyars.  In  its  extreme 
form  this  policy  was  known  as  Trialismus,  i.e.  a  triple 
division  of  the  Empire,  the  Slav  provinces  becoming  a 
third  division  with  Agram  as  capital.  To  the  Magyars 
this  notion  spelt  ruin,  and  they  opposed  it  furiously. 
Thus,  severe  friction  resulted,  especially  on  the  Serb 
border.  There  the  Magyars  sought  to  crush  their  Serb 
subjects,  while  these  retaliated  by  a  nationalist  propa- 
ganda which  sometimes  led  to  fights  and  outrages.  In 
the  main,  however,  the  Magyars  carried  things  with  a 
high  hand,  as  was  seen  in  that  disgraceful  episode,  the 
Fried]  ung  trial.  For  details  I  must  refer  you  to  the 
works  of  Messrs  Seton-Watson  and  Wickham-Steed. 
Nowhere  in  Europe,  except  in  Ireland,  was  there  friction 
so  acute  as  in  the  Slav  provinces  of  Hungary;  and  it 
was  there  that  friction  first  produced  flame. 

On  June  28,  1914,  two  Bosnian  Serbs  murdered  the 
heir  to  the  throne  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  Archduke 
Franz  Ferdinand.  This  dastardly  crime  aroused  intense 
indignation  against  the  Serbs.  Their  cowardly  assassi- 
nation of  King  Alexander  and  Queen  Draga  in  1903  was 
remembered;  and  all  through  Europe  there  rang  denun- 
ciations of  that  "nation  of  assassins."  There  were 
suspicious  features  about  the  crime.     The  Archduke  had 


THE   CRISIS   OF    1914  137 

favoured  Trialismus;  and  the  Archduchess  was  of  Slav 
race.  Therefore  the  murdered  pair  were  more  Slavonic 
in  their  sympathies  than  nine-tenths  of  those  who  now 
denounced  the  Serbs.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to 
the  intense  indignation  which  the  crime  at  Serajevo 
aroused  throughout  the  Austrian  dominions;  and  it 
excited,  what  has  been  so  rare  in  the  recent  history  of 
that  Empire,  a  passionate  and  general  longing  for  war. 
A  hackneyed  saying  of  Napoleon  assigns  to  moral  power 
three-fourths  of  the  might  of  an  army.  That  moral 
power  was  now  on  the  side  of  the  "  white-coats  "  about  to 
wield  the  sword  of  justice  against  cowardly  murderers. 
The  Slav  cause  being  disgraced,  that  of  the  Teuton  bade 
fair  to  prevail.  German  and  Magyar  in  the  Dual  Monarchy 
clasped  hands  enthusiastically;  and  even  their  Slav 
subjects  seemed  likely  to  fight  for  good  old  Kaiser  Franz 
against  a  nation  that  had  put  itself  under  the  ban  of 
Europe.  The  opportunity  was  all  the  more  favourable 
because  Austria  generally  viewed  with  suspicion  and 
alarm  the  forward  moves  of  Germany.  As  von  Bernhardi 
said  in  the  Preface  to  his  book,  How  Germany  makes 
War,  neither  Austria  nor  Italy  took  any  interest  in 
Germany's  World-Policy.  They  were  therefore  certain  to 
desert  her  if  she  began  hostilities  on  her  own  account. 
But  in  July,  1914,  Austria,  the  backward  partner,  was 
eager  for  war.  What  a  chance!  It  might  never  again 
recur.  Finally,  there  was  this  consideration,  that  the 
Tsar  would  probably  be  reluctant  to  draw  the  sword  on 
behalf  of  "a  nation  of  assassins."  In  the  next  lecture 
we  shall  see  the  use  to  which  the  Kaiser  put  this  murder- 
motive. 

Meanwhile  notice  that  the  war-party  at  Vienna  began 


138  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

forthwith  to  exploit  the  crime  for  their  own  ends,  and  to 
plan  forcible  intervention  in  Serbia.  The  French  am- 
bassador in  Vienna  on  July  2  reported  as  follows:  "The 
"inquiry  into  the  origin  of  the  outrage,  which  is  to  be 
"demanded  on  conditions  intolerable  to  the  dignity  of  the 
"  Belgrade  Government,  would,  in  case  of  refusal,  provide 
"the  excuse  for  proceeding  to  miUtary  execution."  The 
scheme  was  seen  through  at  Petrograd.  There  the 
Austrian  ambassador  stated  that  Austria  might  be  forced 
to  search  in  Serbia  for  the  accomplices  of  the  crime. 
Thereupon  SazonofE,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  uttered 
these  warning  words:  "No  country  has  suffered  more 
"than  Russia  from  outrages  planned  upon  foreign 
"territory.  Have  we  ever  claimed  to  adopt  against  any 
"country  whatever  the  measures  with  which  your  news- 
"  papers  threaten  Serbia  ?  Do  not  enter  upon  that  path^." 
Up  to  July  23  Austria  delayed  action.  But  the  Mili- 
tdriscJie  Rundschau  clamoured  for  war. — "The  moment  is 
"still  favourable  for  us.  If  we  do  not  decide  upon  war, 
"the  war  we  shall  have  to  wage  in  two  or  three  years  at 
"the  latest  will  be  begun  in  circumstances  much  less 
"propitious.  Now  the  initiative  belongs  to  us.  Russia 
"is  not  ready;  the  moral  factors  are  for  us,  might  as  well 
"as  right.  Since  some  day  we  shall  have  to  accept  the 
"struggle,  let  us  provoke  it  at  once."  The  Neue  Freie 
Presse  demanded  the  extermination  of  the  accursed 
Serbian  race^. 

Let  us  now  take  a  brief  survey  of  the  general  situation 
in  Europe  in  the  first  seven  months  of  1914.  In  Russia 
there  was  a  very  serious  strike,  which  promised  to  paralyse 

*  French  Yellow  Book  (1914),  pp.  20,  21. 

•  Ibid.  p.  22 


THE    CRISIS    OF    19U  139 

not  only  the  tram  service  but  also  the  transport  service 
of  the  Empire.  Consequently  that  vast  organism  seemed 
likely  to  move  with  far  more  than  the  traditional  amount 
of  circumspection.  Difficulties  of  mobihzation  have 
always  been  great  in  Russia  owing  to  the  sparseness  of 
the  population  and  the  primitive  nature  of  the  means 
of  communication.  Her  railways  are  not  all  of  the  same 
gauge;  and  the  locomotives  on  different  Hues  are  con- 
structed, some  to  burn  wood,  others  coal  or  oil.  But 
strategic  railways  to  her  western  frontier  were  either 
planned  or  were  in  course  of  construction,  an  additional 
motive  why  the  Germans  should  act  soon.  Further, 
in  her  three  last  wars,  the  Crimean,  the  Turkish,  and  the 
Japanese,  her  organization  had  proved  to  be  very  defective. 
Consequently,  it  was  a  proverb  in  historical  circles  that 
Russia,  however  strong  for  defence  (as  against  Charles  XII 
and  Napoleon)  was  weak  for  offence ;  and  in  June,  1914, 
her  offensive  power  seemed  at  the  lowest  point.  Russian 
finances  were  also  judged  to  be  weak.  In  1912  Dr  Rohr- 
bach  sfated  that  they  would  not  bear  the  strain  of  a  single 
bad  harvest.  As  for  her  army  organization,  it  had  been 
improved  somewhat  since  the  Japanese  War;  but  up  to 
1912  no  real  improvement  had  taken  place.  In  an  earlier 
work  he  pronounced  Russia's  power  to  be  overrated, 
and  he  now  repeated  his  verdict.  Such,  too,  was  the 
report  of  the  French  diplomatic  and  consular  agents  in 
Germany:  *'In  political  and  military  circles  it  is  not 
"believed  that  her  assistance  wiU  be  sufficiently  rapid 
"and  energetic  to  be  effective^." 

Let  us  turn  to  France.     In  the  spring  and  summer 
of  1914  the  French  Republic  was  not  in  good  odour. 

i  French  Yellow  Book  (1914),  p.  18. 


140  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

The  miserable  Caillaux  affair,  with  the  resulting  recrimi- 
nations between  Ministers  of  State,  awakened  a  general 
sense  of  distrust  and  alarm.  Parliamentary  Government 
had  long  been  on  its  trial,  and  now  it  seemed  condemned. 
Groups  of  men,  struggling  for  power,  displaced  others  so 
soon  as  they  were  hopelessly  discredited.  Above  them 
there  stood  a  manly  figure,  M.  Poincare,  who  typified 
France;  but  he  seemed  powerless  before  the  strife  of  the 
factions.  Worst  of  all,  some  Ministers  stood  accused 
of  seUing  State  secrets  to  Germany.  Then  again,  the 
army  was  far  from  strong.  True,  the  Chambers  had  in 
the  summer  of  1913  passed  a  law  reinforcing  three  years' 
mihtary  service,  a  measure  which  promised  to  restore 
the  military  efficiency  latterly  open  to  question.  But 
early  in  1914  the  supporters  of  the  new  Ministry  threatened 
to  get  that  decree  repealed.  Everything  therefore 
became  uncertain.  Later  on,  on  July  13,  there  took 
place  in  the  Chambers  a  debate,  in  which  the  army  was 
alleged  to  be  ill  equipped  for  war,  boots  and  other 
necessaries  being  deficient  both  in  quality  and  quantity. 
The  disclosures  sent  thrills  of  alarm  through  France,  of 
exultation  through  Germany. 

At  that  time,  too,  no  small  part  of  the  French  effectives 
was  still  locked  up  in  Morocco;  and  some  weeks  must 
ensue  before  those  war-hardened  troops  could  form  front 
in  Lorraine.  Accordingly,  Morocco  was  a  drain  on  the 
French  army  almost  as  serious  as  Mexico  was  to  Napoleon 
III  in  the  crisis  of  1866.  German  generals  are  known  to 
have  rejoiced  at  the  ending  of  the  Agadir  afiair,  which 
gave  France  carte  blanche  in  Morocco,  because  "it  put 
an  elephant  on  the  back  of  France."  There  was  another 
reason  why  they  should  act  soon  against  France.     When 


THE   CRISIS   OF    1914  141 

she  had  thoroughly  conquered  Morocco,  she  could  marshal 
an  army  corps  of  Moors,  some  of  the  bravest  fighters  in 
the  world.  For  the  present,  Morocco  held  some  80,000 
of  her  best  troops.  As  for  the  French  navy,  once  the 
second  in  the  world,  it  had  now  sunk  to  fifth  place. 

The  most  serious  feature  in  the  life  of  France  remains 
to  be  noted,  the  declining  birth-rate.  If  that  decline 
continued,  France  would  obviously  become  a  Power  of 
the  second  rank.  A  German  official  puts  it  thus :  "  The 
"French  may  arm  as  much  as  they  like.  They  cannot 
*'from  one  day  to  another  increase  their  population^." 
Count  Reventlow  urges  that  fact  as  a  reason  why 
King  Edward  chose  to  ally  himself  with  France.  She 
was  a  decadent  nation,  and  therefore  it  was  better 
policy  to  act  along  with  her  rather  than  with  ever 
increasing  Germany^.  The  argument  is  true  if  we 
assume  that  Great  Britain  desires  to  maintain  the  Balance 
of  Power.  But  the  argument  is  fatal  to  the  Count's 
favourite  thesis,  the  ceaseless  greed  of  the  islanders.  If 
they  were  ever  eager  to  clutch  at  a  World-Empire,  why 
did  they  not  unite  with  powerful  Germany  to  partition 
rich  but  decadent  France  and  her  extensive  colonial 
empire?  That  we  clasped  the  hand  of  the  weaker  State 
is  a  convincing  refutation  of  the  charges  of  selfish  cunning 
so  often  flung  at  us. 

What  of  the  British  Empire?  In  the  year  1914  how 
did  it  stand  in  the  eyes  of  the  militant  party  of  Berlin? 
Certainly  there  was  much  to  excite  their  hopes.  The 
Pan-Germans  had  long  filled  their  books  and  journals 
with  disquisitions  on  the  inherent  weakness  of  the  British 


»  French  Yellow  Book  (1914),  p.  9l 
•  Reventlow,  p.  233. 


142  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

dominions.  The  arguments  were  curiously  like  those 
used  by  the  French  Republicans  in  1793,  adopted  by 
Bonaparte,  and  then  pressed  home  in  his  Continental 
System.  An  essay  might  be  written  on  the  theme  Delenda 
est  Carthago,  as  appHed  to  England.  The  idea  has  capti- 
vated many  a  thinker,  from  the  time  of  Quesnay  and  the 
French  ^conomistes  down  to  the  German  Agrarians  of 
to-day.  The  fundamental  notion  is  the  same.  Land  is 
the  basis  of  a  State,  and  agriculture  is  the  true  source  of 
wealth.  Manufactures  and  commerce  are  later  and 
artificial  developments.  The  British,  while  relying  on 
them,  have  neglected  the  source  of  real  wealth,  agri- 
culture. Therefore  England  resembles  a  ship,  light  in 
ballast  and  with  a  fine  show  of  top-hamper,  destined  to 
founder  in  the  first  tempest.  The  France  of  Napoleon  I 
and  the  Germany  of  William  II  are  well  trimmed  craft 
and  will  ride  out  the  storm.  Such  is  the  theory.  It  is 
highly  attractive,  especially  to  the  German  Agrarians, 
as  it  enables  them  to  tax  foreign  corn  and  thereby  steady 
the  ship  of  State  and  fill  their  own  pockets. 

One  must  admit  that  in  the  light  of  the  teachings  of 
history — Tvre,  Carthage,  Venice,  Portugal,  Holland — 
the  persistent  survival  of  Great  Britain  is  the  most 
exasperating  of  facts  to  theory-ridden  professors;  and 
this  it  is  which,  in  part  at  least,  accounts  for  out  extreme 
unpopularity  in  German  academic  circles.  That  all  the 
learning  and  ingenuity  of  the  Fatherland  should  hitherto 
have  stumbled  over  our  rock  of  ofi'ence  is  an  unpardonable 
crime.  Treitschke,  Rohrbach,  Reventlow,  Frobenius  and 
others  have  proved  to  demonstration  the  fragility  of  the 
British  Empire.  It  was  won  by  guile.  "We  set  all  the 
Continental  States  fighting  and  then  stole  the  best  lands 


THE   CRISIS   OF    1914  143 

across  the  seas.  The  moral  was  obvious.  Let  all  the 
aggrieved  States  combine  and  compel  the  footpad  to 
disgorge.  If  the  Pan-Germans  had  been  wise,  they 
would  have  limited  themselves  to  that  programme,  at 
once  moral  and  lucrative.  For  the  British  nation  (they 
said)  was  weak  and  degenerate,  utterly  given  over  to 
sport,  neglecting  the  first  duty  of  citizenship  by  hiring 
"mercenaries"  to  fight,  detested  by  the  Irish,  and  loathed 
both  by  the  Boers  and  the  peoples  of  India.  The  landing 
of  a  European  force  in  South  Africa  (so  said  Rohrbach 
in  1912)  would  lead  to  a  rising  of  the  Dutch  population, 
and  that  wealthy  land  would  soon  be  lost  to  the  Union 
Jack.  In  that  year  Germany  made  formidable  military 
preparations  in  South- West  Africa.  As  will  be  seen  in 
the  Appendix,  ammunition  and  stores  sufficient  to  equip 
a  force  of  10,000  men  for  six  years  were  in  that  colony 
in  the  autumn  of  1912 ;  and  about  that  number  of  men 
were  ready  to  take  the  field.  German  officials,  when 
questioned,  said  that  these  preparations  were  against  the 
Ovambos  in  the  north ;  but  that  native  tribe  was  absolutely 
quiet;  and  the  chief  preparations  were  in  the  south,  not 
far  from  the  border  of  Cape  Colony.  Finally  it  became 
known  through  an  intercepted  letter  to  the  German 
cruiser  EheVy  at  Cape  Town,  that  orders  were  issued  at 
Berlin,  on  June  14,  1914,  whereby  that  ship  and  others 
would  be  supplied  with  coal  by  means  therein  described, 
if  war  ensued^. 

Reverting  to  Rohrbach,  we  note  his  estimate  of  the 
defensive  power  of  Australia.  He  declared  that  she 
could  not  resist  if  her  four  chief  towns,  all  of  them  near 
the  coast,  were  occupied  by  an  invader.    As  for  Canada, 

1  Times,  Oct.  6,  1914. 


144  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

she  was  sparsely  peopled  and  had  no  military  force  worthy 
of  mention.  India  was  discontented;  the  handful  of 
white  administrators  did  not  understand  the  people, 
who  were  always  on  the  brink  of  revolt.  The  appearance 
of  a  single  Russian  army-corps  on  the  Indus  would  lead 
to  the  collapse  of  British  rule.  Egypt,  the  keystone  of 
the  imperial  arch,  could  easily  be  dislodged  by  the  Moslems 
in  a  Holy  War.  Above  all  the  heart  of  the  Empire  was 
weak;  for  the  British  people  were  too  enervated  by 
luxury  and  selfishness  to  cope  with  the  difficulties  presented 
by  their  overgrown  Empire^.  The  hopes  which  Germany 
placed  in  a  general  rising  of  Moslems  against  Great 
Britain,  Russia  and  France,  are  strikingly  shown  in  a 
German  secret  report,  dated  Berlin,  March  19,  1913, 
which  advocated  extensive  preparations  for  war.  It 
proceeded  thus:  "Disturbances  must  be  stirred  up  in 
"Northern  Africa  and  in  Russia.  This  is  a  means  of 
"absorbing  the  forces  of  the  adversary.  It  is,  therefore, 
"vitally  necessary  that  through  well-chosen  agents  we 
"should  get  into  contact  with  influential  people  in  Egypt, 
"Tunis,  Algiers  and  Morocco,  in  order  to  prepare  the 
"necessary  measures  in  case  of  a  European  war.  These 
"secret  allies  would,  of  course,  be  recognized  openly  in 
"  time  of  war. . . .  They  should  have  a  guiding  head,  who 
"might  be  found  among  influential  religious  or  political 
"chiefs.  The  Egyptian  school  is  specially  suited  for 
"  this.  More  and  more  it  gathers  together  the  intellectuals 
"of  the  Moslem  world^." 

Even  those  who  did  not  depreciate  Great  Britain  to 

1  Rohrbach,  Deutschland  unter  den  Welt-Volkern  (1908),  pp.  67-164; 
Der  deutsche  Gedanke  in  der  Welt  (1912),  pp.  168-176. 
»  French  Yellow  Book  (1914),  pp.  9,  10. 


THE    CRISIS    OF    19U  145 

this  extent,  proclaimed  the  need  of  beating  her  down. 
General  von  Bernhardi  in  his  second  book,  Unsere  Zulcunft 
(Berlin,  1912),  declared  that  a  naval  war  with  her  might 
be  successful;  she  found  great  difficulty  in  manning  her 
fleet  by  the  voluntary  system ;  and  (said  he),  "  she  seems 
"  to  be  approaching  the  limits  of  her  naval  capacity.  In 
"the  second  place  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal  will 
"soon  be  finished,  and  its  completion  will  yield  consider- 
"able  military  advantages  to  Germany.  Lastly,  the 
"German  navy  grows  from  year  to  year,  so  that  the 
"conclusion  lies  near,  that  the  comparative  strength  of 
"the  two  navies  will  gradually  be  altered  to  England's 
"disadvantage.  In  the  Mediterranean  the  Austrian  and 
"Italian  navies  are  about  to  be  strengthened."  He  then 
says  it  is  clearly  to  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  to  provoke 
a  war  with  Germany  as  soon  as  possible.  This  advice 
to  us  (we  may  notice)  was  a  counterpart  to  that  which 
in  1911  he  had  given  to  Germany  in  his  work,  now 
translated, — Germany  and  the  next  War.  At  the  end  of 
that  book  he  spoke  thus :  "  Even  English  attempts  at  a 
"  rapprochement  [to  Germany]  must  not  blind  us  to  the 
"  real  situation.  We  may  at  most  use  them  to  delay  the 
"  necessary  and  inevitable  war  until  we  may  fairly  imagine 
**  we  have  some  prospect  of  success." 

Those  prospects  of  success  mounted  high  in  the 
summer  of  1914.  Firstly,  because  Germany  at  Midsummer 
opened  the  enlarged  Kiel  Canal.  In  consequence  of  the 
general  adoption  of  the  Dreadnought  type  of  battleship 
she  had  been  forced  in  1905  to  set  about  the  widening  and 
deepening  of  that  canal,  so  as  to  admit  the  passage  of 
her  new  warships,  the  first  of  which  was  launched  in 
1908  and  completed  (I  believe)  by  1911.     Other  ships  of 

B.  L.  10 


146  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

the  Dreadnought  type  soon  followed.  But  none  of  then 
could  pass  quickly  from  the  Baltic  to  the  North  Sea  or 
vice  versa  until  that  canal  was  widened  and  deepened,  as 
it  was  at  an  estimated  cost  of  £12,000,000.  The  com- 
pletion was  fixed  for  1915,  a  time  when  Germany  expected 
to  have  18  Dreadnoughts  or  Super- Dreadnoughts  ready,  or 
nearly  ready,  for  sea.  By  great  exertions  and  additional 
expense  she  completed  the  canal  at  Midsummer,  1914. 
She  had  every  reason  for  haste.  In  1910  she  transferred 
her  large  battleships  from  Kiel  to  Wilhelmshaf en :  and, 
until  the  canal  was  completed,  they  would  be  unable 
quickly  to  reach  the  Baltic  and  confront  the  Russian 
fleet.  After  1914  Germany  could  expect  to  overpower  in 
succession  both  the  Russian  and  French  navies  if  they 
came  out  of  port.  She  held  the  interior  position  between 
them,  an  immense  advantage  at  all  times;  and  that 
advantage  was  now  enhanced  by  the  means  of  swift 
entry  either  into  the  Baltic  or  North  Sea. 

These  considerations  are  all  important  for  a  due  under- 
standing of  the  course  of  German  policy.  It  is  a  policy 
based  on  military  and  naval  considerations.  In  1866 
she  forced  on  a  war  with  the  Hapsburg  Power  because 
she  had  the  needle-gun,  while  other  circumstances  also 
promised  success  to  her  arms.  The  same  holds  good  of 
the  war  of  1870.  Indeed,  writers  who  neglect  the  military 
and  naval  situation  leave  out  of  count  the  determining 
factor  of  the  policy  of  Berlin.  Germany  has  enjoyed  an 
astonishing  series  of  triumphs  because  she  does  not  go  to 
war  for  an  idea  or  a  principle,  but  because  she  awaits  a 
time  favourable  for  dealing  a  sudden  blow.  That  is  the 
essence  of  Realpolitik.  Even  when  she  does  not  deal  the 
blow,   her  diplomacy  is  coloured  by  the  military  and 


THE    CRISIS    OF    1914  147 

naval  situation.  Note  the  following  facts.  Her  tone 
became  far  more  aggressive  in  the  year  1895,  the  year  in 
which  the  Kiel  Canal  was  first  opened.  She  then  adopted 
a  high  tone  towards  us  in  the  Congo  and  South  African 
Questions,  the  latter  of  which  nearly  led  to  war.  The 
spurt  thereby  given  to  British  naval  construction  served 
to  impose  respect  upon  her  during  the  Boer  War;  but 
she  then  began  to  build  very  fast.  The  Ententes  with 
France  and  Russia  and  increased  naval  construction  were 
our  methods  of  retort.  She,  too,  pushed  on  her  navy  as 
fast  as  possible;  but  the  adoption  of  the  Dreadnought 
placed  her  for  a  time  at  a  great  disadvantage,  because, 
after  the  completion  of  her  first  Dreadnoughts  in  1911-12, 
she  could  not  send  them  through  her  ship-canal ;  and  in 
view  of  the  persistence  of  the  Anglo-Russo-French  entente, 
which  she  found  to  be  solid  at  the  time  of  the  Bosnian 
crisis  of  1908-9,  she  had  to  prepare  to  face  a  naval  war 
with  all  three  Powers.  She  then  made  greater  efforts 
than  ever,  and  so  did  her  Allies,  Austria  and  Italy.  By 
the  Naval  Act  of  1912  she  provided  that  about  four-fifths 
of  her  marine  should  always  be  kept  on  a  war  footing; 
and  so  threatening  was  the  situation  which  thus  came 
about  that  the  British  Admiralty  for  a  time  decided  to 
leave  the  Mediterranean,  a  resolve  which  emphasized 
our  reliance  on  France  in  that  quarter.  It  was  clear, 
then,  that  Germany  was  beginning  to  run  us  close.  Still, 
she  could  not  well  face  a  war  until  the  great  strategic 
advantages  of  the  Kiel  Canal  were  again  at  her  disposal. 
Therefore,  on  naval  grounds  it  was  desirable  for  her  to 
postpone  a  war  until  after  the  completion  of  that  great 
work.  This  fact  was  well  understood  in  naval  circles. 
In  1913  Commandant  Davin  of  the  French  navy  wrote 

10—2 


148  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

an  article  reviewing  the  naval  resources  of  Germany  and 
pointing  out  that  the  Canal  changed  a  weak  naval  base 
into  a  very  strong  one.  He  therefore  concluded  that 
she  would  await  the  completion  of  that  work  before 
declaring   war'. 

But  why  did  she  hurry  on  the  Canal  so  as  to  be  ready 
by  Midsummer,  1914?  Here  the  state  of  the  French 
and  Belgian  armies  must  be  considered.  The  efficiency 
of  the  French  army  was  certain  soon  to  increase  owing 
to  the  operation  of  the  law  of  1913,  reinforcing  three  years* 
military  service.  The  Belgian  army  also  was  becoming 
stronger  every  year.  In  1910  that  Government  carried 
a  law  imposing  compulsory  service  for  one  son  at  least 
in  every  family.  But  in  1912,  owing  to  alarming  advice 
respecting  German  plans,  the  Chambers  at  Brussels 
extended  the  principle  of  compulsory  service  with  few 
exceptions  to  males  physically  fit,  above  the  age  of 
nineteen.  This  would  bring  to  the  colours  as  many  as 
56,000  men  in  1914-15,  instead  of  35,000,  the  contingent 
for  1912-13.  Inclusive  of  the  militia  reserve,  the  grand 
total  would  amount  to  200,000  men  at  the  end  of  1913. 
Finally  it  would  rise  to  340,000.  It  is  certain  that  Ger- 
many took  into  consideration  this  increase. 

The  new  Army  and  Taxation  Bills  introduced  into 
the  Reichstag  on  April  7,  1913,  led  to  an  interesting 
discussion,  the  Imperial  Chancellor  stating  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  Government  to  train  60,000  men  more  every 
year,  in  order  to  meet  the  proposed  increases  of  the 
French  and  Russian  armies.  He  also  pointed  out  the 
difficulty  of  acceding  to   Mr  Churchill's  proposal  of  a 

'  La  Remit  des  Questions  diplomatique^  (1913),  pp.  417,  418. 


THE   CRISIS   OF    1914  149 

Naval  Holiday.  The  Minister  for  War  then  stated  that 
the  object  of  the  Bills  was  to  render  possible  an  oifei^sive 
strategy  if  war  came;  for  "the  best  parry  ia  the  lunge: 
"the  best  covering  force  is  the  offensive.'*  The  new 
taxation  comprised  a  drastically  graduated  Property 
Tax,  as  well  as  Death  Duties  and  Increment  Duties, 
against  which  the  Conservatives  protested.  The  Imperial 
Budget  subsequently  empowered  a  special  vote  for 
expenditure  of  £21,000,000;  but  that  sum  has  been 
largely  exceeded.  It  is  known  that  the  purchase  of 
petrol  in  1914  was  double,  and  of  corn  nearly  double, 
of  that  in  average  years.  The  opinion  became  prevalent 
that  this  drastic  taxation  could  not  last ;  and  a  feeling  of 
restlessness  increased.  German  newspapers  stated  that 
£40,000,000  would  be  spent  on  war  material  by  July  1. 

A  rupture  of  the  peace  of  Europe  appeared  so  imminent 
on  the  Albanian-Montenegrin  disputes  as  to  justify  the 
Powers  in  taking  financial  precautions.  Those  of  Germany 
were  especially  thorough,  probably  because  her  credit 
suffered  severely  at  the  time  of  the  Agadir  crisis  in  1911. 
The  wholesale  collapse  which  was  then  barely  averted 
led  her  to  take  measures  to  avert  a  crash  in  the  event  of 
war.  The  full  details  of  her  action  with  the  Banks  are 
not  known.  But  the  German  Secret  Report  of  March  19, 
1913,  laid  down  these  guiding  principles — There  must 
be  a  great  increase  in  armaments  and  consequently  in 
taxation,  so  that  "an  outbreak  [of  war]  shall  be  considered 
"as  a  deliverance,  because  after  it  would  come  decades 
"of  peace  and  prosperity,  such  as  those  which  followed 
"1870.  The  war  must  be  prepared  for  from  a  financial 
"  point  of  view.  There  is  much  to  be  done  in  this  direction. 
"The  distrust  of  our  financiers  must  not  be  aroused, 


150  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

"but,  nevertheless,  there  are  many  things  which  it  will 
*'be  impossible  to  hide^." 

Accordingly,  on  July  3,  1913,  amidst  a  time  of  great 
prosperity,  a  law  w^as  passed  authorising  the  addition  of 
gold  and  silver  equal  in  value  to  £12,000,000^.  This  sum 
was  to  be  added  to  the  imperial  reserve  of  £6,000,000 
deposited  in  1871  in  the  fortress  of  Spandau.  In  addition, 
there  was  in  the  Banks  of  Issue  bullion  of  the  value  of 
£86,900,000.  Thus,  the  total  value  of  gold  and  silver 
reserve  was  £104,960,000.  But  the  Government  was 
also  ready  with  measures  calculated  to  meet  a  sudden 
demand  for  money.  On  August  1,  1914,  it  suspended  cash 
payments  at  the  Banks  and  issued  a  large  amount  of  paper 
notes  and  silver  coins.  The  imperial  reserve  was  also  made 
available,  and  the  Government  immediately  estabhshed 
banks  for  the  issue  of  loans  even  for  very  small  amounts 
on  the  security  of  goods  and  securities  of  all  kinds,  thereby 
becoming  a  paternal  pawnbroker.  There  was  therefore 
no  need  of  a  moratorium,  and  Germany  prided  herself  on 
the  ease  with  which  she  adapted  herself  to  a  state  of  war. 

All  had  been  thought  out  beforehand ;  and  there  was 
Httle  confusion,  certainly  far  less  than  was  the  case  here. 
The  British  Government  had  no  plans  ready  for  meeting 
the  financial  strain;  and  at  the  close  of  July  we  were 
face  to  face  with  a  very  serious  situation.  The  Joint 
Stock  Banks  have  been  blamed  for  increasing  the  general 
distrust  by  alarmist  measures;  but  it  is  only  fair  to 
remember  that  the  situation  was  so  alarming  because 
the  Government  had  no  plans  ready  for  meeting  it.     If 

*  French  Yellow  Book  (1914),  p.  9. 

■  An  authority  has  informed  me  that  by  July  31,  1914,  only 
£4,250,000  had  been  acquired  in  gold. 


THE   CRISIS    OF    19U  151 

Bank  Holiday  had  not  ensued,  and  been  extended  by 
three  more  days,  an  unparalleled  panic  might  have  been 
the  result.  Fortunately,  the  advice  of  financial  experts 
led  to  the  adoption  of  remedial  measures  such  as  the 
moratorium.  The  mere  fact  that  so  desperate  a  measure 
had  to  be  adopted  showed  that  the  Government  had 
prepared  no  plan  for  reassuring  the  Joint  Stock  Banks 
in  case  of  a  crisis.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the  reserve 
of  gold  in  the  Bank  of  England  had  not  been  increased, 
as  would  certainly  have  been  the  case  if  a  crisis  had  been 
expected.  No  scheme  for  paper  notes  was  ready,  and 
some  little  time  elapsed  before  the  issue  of  Treasury 
Notes  which  an  amateur  forger  could  not  easily  counterfeit. 
At  Berlin  everything  had  been  thought  out  and  provided. 
At  London  the  City  was  caught  in  a  state  of  trustful 
innocence. 

Far  worse,  however,  was  the  general  political  situation 
of  the  United  Kingdom.  The  Germans  seem  to  have  been 
singularly  impressed  with  the  inabihty  of  our  Government 
to  deal  with  "the  wild  women."  Much  space  was  given 
in  their  papers  to  the  outrages  of  the  militants;  and 
many  were  the  comments  on  the  softness  and  hesitancy 
of  British  procedure.  The  Germans,  who  never  have 
any  difficulty  with  their  women,  seem  to  have  concluded 
that  a  Government  which  allowed  itself  to  be  hen-pecked, 
must  be  in  its  dotage.  That  was  the  general  view  in 
Germany ;  and  it  must  be  reckoned  among  the  influences 
which  produced  a  feeling  of  pride  in  the  Fatherland  and 
contempt  for  the  decadent  islanders. 

The  Irish  Question  produced  an  even  deeper  impression. 
That  the  British  Government  should  be  unable  to  prevent 
two  sets  of  Irish  Volunteers  procuring  arms  and  drilHng 


152  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

was  incompreliensible  to  the  German  mind.  If  it  were 
possible  I  should  hke  to  have  heard  a  lecture  by  Treitschke 
on  that  subject.  Imagine  the  scorn  he  would  pour  forth 
on  a  State  that  could  not  control  its  citizens  in  the  most 
elementary  of  political  duties,  and  allowed  them  to  per- 
vert national  defence  into  a  national  danger.  A  heavy 
responsibihty  lies  somewhere  about  that  whole  business. 
That  responsibility  will  be  allotted  someday  and  will 
prove  to  be  an  indirect  cause  of  this  war.  One  cannot 
but  sympathize  with  the  German  private  who  was  taken 
prisoner  by  an  Irishman.  At  this  he  was  most  indignant. 
"What  business  have  you  fighting  here  (he  said).  You 
"ought  to  be  fighting  in  your  own  civil  war."  I  have 
received  interesting  proof  that  General  Bernhardi  himself 
had  expected  a  civil  war  in  Ireland.  My  informant 
allows  me  to  quote  the  part  of  her  letter  bearing  on  this 

topic : — 

Letchworth. 

Sept.  17,  1914.  • 

It  may  possibly  interest  you  to  know  that  last  April — May 
I  spent  at  a  Pension  at  Frascati,  where  I  was  next  to  Greneral 
von  Bernhardi  and  his  wife  at  table.  He  asked  me  repeatedly 
about  the  Irish  Question,  showing  great  sympathy  with  the 
Nationalists ;  he  also  asked  about  the  causes  of  the  failure  of  the 
Government  to  deal  successfully  with  the  Suffragettes.  All  German 
men  I  met  in  Italy  this  winter  seemed  to  take  a  special  interest  in 
these  two  points .... 

This  further  point  deserves  notice.  The  Austrian  Note 
to  Serbia  was  sent  on  July  23,  the  day  on  which  it  became 
known  that  the  Buckingham  Palace  Conference  on  the 
Irish  Question  was  certain  to  fail. 

It  is  now,  I  think,  clear  to  anyone  whose  eyes  are  not 
blinded  by  preconceived  notions,  that  the  two  Germanic 


THE   CRISIS   OF    1914  153 

Empires  chose  the  time  with  extreme  skill  for  launching 
their  bolt.  Their  method  of  clinching  its  effects  will 
concern  us  in  the  next  lecture.  Here  I  wish  to  point 
out  that  the  leaders  of  Germany,  both  in  the  spheres  of 
thought  and  action,  have  always  advocated  an  energetic 
initiative  whenever  a  fit  opportunity  occurred.  Treitschke 
represents  the  union  of  historical  learning  with  the 
victorious  militarism  of  1870.  He  uses  history  as  a  text 
for  glorifying  Prussian  procedure  and  stimulating  its 
progress  towards  wider  triumphs.  He  rejoices  over  the 
treatment  of  Saxony  by  Frederick  the  Great  in  1756. 
"Should  Frederick  (he  asks)  have  had  respect  for  the 
"official  regulations  of  Saxony?"  Treaties?  What  are 
treaties  ?  The  State  is  superior  to  all  treaties.  Treitschke 
says :  "  The  State  cannot  recognize  an  arbiter  above 
"itself,  and  consequently  legal  obligations  must  in  the 
"last  resort  be  subject  to  its  own  judgment^."  Which 
means  that  Prussia  cannot  be  bound  by  international 
law  if  it  thwarts  her  interests ;  also,  that  the  rules  of  the 
Hague  Conference  are  null  and  void  so  soon  as  the  Prussian 
State  feels  the  pinch  of  circumstances.  That  has  been, 
not  merely  the  dictum  of  a  deaf  professor ;  it  is  the  maxim 
which  has  guided  Prussia  at  most  of  the  great  crises  since 
her  first  successful  crime,  the  seizure  of  Silesia.  Under 
good  men  like  Frederick  William  III  and  IV  and  WilKam 
I,  she  swerved  nervously  towards  the  Ten  Commandments ; 
but  she  afterwards  recurred  to  the  more  gainful  creed  of 
Frederick  the  Great. 

Let  us  look  more  closely  at  his  procedure  and  that 
of  Bismarck ;  for  they  are  the  chief  exponents  of  Prussian 
State  policy.     Frederick  made  no  attempt  to  justify  his 

*  Treitschke,  Die  Politik,  Bk  i.  §  3. 


154  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

seizure  of  Silesia  from  the  young  Empress-Queen,  Maria 
Theresa,  whom  his  father  had  lately  sworn  to  uphold. 
The  young  king  struck  quickly  in  1740,  and  he  left  it  to 
his  later  apologists,  including  Carlyle,  to  discover  justi- 
fications. Frederick  in  his  Histoire  de  mon  Temps  uses 
no  whitewash.  He  merely  says  that  Maria  Theresa  was 
weak;  her  army  had  of  late  been  badly  beaten  by  the 
Turks;  Russia  for  the  time  favoured  him;  and,  as 
France  and  England  were  always  at  feud,  he  would  be  sure 
of  the  help  of  one  of  them.  Therefore  he  struck  at  Silesia^ 
His  action  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Years'  War 
is  equally  noteworthy.  Here  he  had  more  reason  for 
striking.  His  enemies  were  preparing  to  move  against 
him,  and  he  anticipated  them.  But  he  did  so  by  over- 
whelming an  unoffending  neutral  that  lay  in  his  way, 
Saxony.  True,  by  that  elaborate  piece  of  mystification, 
his  Memoire  raisonne,  he  tried  to  show,  later  on,  that 
Saxony  was  conspiring  against  him:  but  the  excuse 
rings  hollow,  as  hollow  as  those  which  William  II  sought 
to  foist  on  the  world  respecting  Belgium.  Frederick  in 
his  Histoire  supplies  the  real  reason  for  the  blow  dealt 
at  Saxony:  "Saxony  not  having  finished  her  [military] 
"arrangements,  these  conjunctures  seemed  favourable  to 
"gain  advantages  over  the  enemies,  by  forestalling  them 
"from  the  beginning  of  the  campaign^."  The  British 
Government,  which  did  not  want  war  in  Europe,  sought 
to  dissuade  him  from  this  precipitate  action  against 
a  neutral,  but  Frederick  persisted.  "  Let  us  conquer  "  (he 
said) :  "the  politiQians  will  then  find  plenty  of  justification 
"  for  us.'*  That  phrase  summed  up  his  motives ;  and  they 
have  largely  governed  Prussian  policy  ever  since.     It  has 

^  Frederic,  Hist,  de  mon  Tempj.  u.  54-6.  '  Ibid.  m.  37. 


THE    CRISIS    OF    19U  155 

become  a  maxim  at  Berlin  to  make  rapid  use  of  the 
advantage  which  a  central  position  gives  to  well-armed 
forces.  In  a  strictly  political  sense  the  central  position 
of  Germany  causes  her  anxiety.  But  every  student  of 
war  knows  that  it  confers  great  advantages  if  it  be  used 
with  rapidity  and  decision.  Therefore  her  policy  at  a 
crisis  tends  to  be  governed  by  military  rather  than  diplo- 
matic considerations.  Prussian  statesmen  always  remem- 
ber those  significant  words  in  the  will  of  Frederick  the 
Great:  "May  this  State  always  be  governed  with  justice, 
wisdom  and  force^." 

Much  the  same  view  was  presented  by  the  Prussian 
military  writer,  Clausewitz.  For  him  the  life  of  States 
was  a  constant  struggle.  When  war  broke  out,  it  was 
only  a  change  of  method ;  the  struggle  for  self-preservation 
then  went  on  openly  and  by  force.  His  notion  of  strategy 
is  this:  "The  best  strategy  is  always  to  be  very  strong, 
"jQjstly  in  general,  and  secondly,  at  the  critical  point." 
Thus,  Prussia  is  always  struggling.  When  she  goes  to 
war  she  merely  intensifies  and  specializes  her  efforts  with 
a  view  to  the  exhaustion  of  her  enemy  by  the  exercise  of 
the  utmost  possible  rigour.  He  thoroughly  approved  of 
Frederick's  merciless  use  of  Saxony  in  1756-1762.  All 
this  was  written  in  1836-7,  a  time  of  profound  peace^. 

The  next  great  exponent  of  Prussian  policy,  Bismarck, 
modelled  his  policy  on  that  of  Frederick.  It  was  strictly 
objective.  He  hated  idealists.  Of  one  of  them  he 
wrote  thus  in  1881 :  "  Professor  Gladstone  perpetrates 
"one  piece  of  stupidity  after  another.     He  has  alienated 

^  Fr6d6ric,  Hist,  de  mon  Temps,  yl.  219. 

'  Clausewitz,  Vom  Kriege  und  Kriegfiihrung,  Bks  I.  Chs.  1,  2 ;  vni. 
Chs.  6,  7. 


156  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

"the  Turks:  he  commits  follies  in  Afghanistan  and  at 
"tlie  Cape  [the  Majuba  ad'air] ;  and  he  does  not  know  how 
"to  manage  Ireland.  There  is  nothing  to  be  done  with 
"him^."  The  part  of  Bismarck's  career  in  which  he 
himself  took  most  pride  was  the  Schleswig-Holstein 
Question,  in  which  he  got  the  better  of  many  opponents, 
brushed  aside  in  succession  all  solutions  but  his  own,  and 
had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  his  handiwork  completed 
by  an  opportune  attack  upon  Austria.  His  conduct  of 
Franco-Prussian  negotiations  in  July  1870  was  almost 
equally  skilful,  for  it  led  up  to  a  rupture  at  a  time  ex- 
ceedingly favourable  to  Prussia.  Napoleon  III  was 
known  to  be  contemplating  a  league  with  Austria  and 
Italy  with  a  view  to  an  attack  upon  North  Germany  in 
1871.  Bismarck  anticipated  that  attack;  and,  on  the 
plane  of  expediency,  on  which  statesmen  must  act  in  such 
a  crisis,  he  was  justified.  Germany  waged  the  war  in  a 
straightforward  way,  and  she  deserved  her  triumph. 

The  wars  of  1866-1870  are  good  examples  of  Prussian 
policy.  They  were  undertaken  after  a  careful  cal- 
culation of  chances  and  by  a  swift  offensive.  Whenever 
Prussia  wavered  and  acted  weakly,  as  under  Frederick 
William  II  and  III  (at  least  in  1805-12),  she  came  near 
to  ruin.  The  fate  of  Frederick  William  IV  was  even  more 
pitiable;  for  his  plans  were  as  diffuse  as  his  decisions 
were  halting.  Concentration  of  purpose  on  one  prac- 
ticable aim,  and  swiftness  of  action  at  the  favourable 
time,  these  have  been  the  guiding  principles  of  Prussia 
at  her  most  successful  times.  It  is  necessary  to  recall 
these  facts;  for  many  persons  who  do  not  know  them, 
have  formed   curiously   wrong  judgments   on   Prussian 

^  Biat/iarck  ;  Some  Secret  Pages,  n.  456. 


THE   CRISIS   OF    1914  157 

policy,  and  have  framed  for  it  apologies  at  which  the  men 
of  Berlin  in  their  franker  moods  would  be  the  first  to 
gibe.  Treitschke  and  Bernhardi  are  excused  as  freaks, 
alien  to  the  German  genius.  True,  they  are  to  the 
German  genius  in  its  best  form,  as  typified  by  Goethe, 
Kant,  Schiller.  But  Imperial  Germany  is  not  now  the 
land  of  Goethe,  Kant,  Schiller.  She  is  the  creation  of 
William  I  and  II,'  of  Roon,  Moltke,  Bismarck  and  Krupp ; 
and  she  takes  after  her  creators.  A  central  State  must, 
of  course,  be  cautious.  Its  policy  cannot  be  swayed  by 
sentimental  considerations.  But  since  1870  the  German 
frontier  has  been  strong.  It  is  extremely  strong  on  the 
side  of  France  and  equally  so  on  that  of  Austria.  There- 
fore in  the  new  order  of  things  there  is  less  excuse  for  a 
Machiavellian  pohcy  than  there  was  in  the  days  of 
Frederick  the  Great.  Fortified,  too,  by  the  Triple 
Alliance  with  which  Bismarck  had  buttressed  her,  she 
might  readily  have  relaxed  her  military  rigour.  But 
the  restless  activity  of  William  II  has  impelled  her  on 
dangerous  quests,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  involved  acute 
friction  with  Russia,  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  while 
alarming  the  United  States  and  Portugal.  At  the  same 
time,  too,  he  did  nothing  to  relax  the  tension  between 
Germany  and  France.  On  the  contrary,  his  rigorous 
policy  in  Alsace-Lorraine  made  the  friction  worse. 

That  was  seen  at  the  time  of  the  Zabern  outrage,  when, 
after  trifling  provocation,  a  neurotic  young  lieutenant  drew 
his  sword  on  a  lame  shoemaker.  The  Chancellor  and 
Minister  of  War  refused  to  censure  him;  and  the  protest 
of  the  Reichstag,  which  at  first  passed  a  vote  of  censure, 
was  entirely  ignored.  The  Military  Court  at  Strassburg 
quashed  all  legal  proceedings;  and  it  was  seen  that  civil 


158  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

law  and  a  formal  protest  of  the  Reichstag  counted  as 
nothing.  The  army  ruled  the  State.  That  was  clear  in 
the  early  days  of  1914. 

The  excuse  for  all  these  proceedings  was  that  Germany 
must  be  armed  to  the  teeth  in  order  to  confront  Russia 
and  France;  and  that  her  policy  may  be  explained  as 
prompted  by  fear.  Let  us  examine  this  theory,  not  from 
the  utterances  of  private  individuals  (for  they  count  as 
nothing  in  Germany),  but  from  the  conduct  of  the  Govern- 
ment, which  alone  is  important  in  this  connection. 

There  are  two  infallible  tests  by  which  you  can  tell  a 
fearful  policy.  It  seeks  to  propitiate  the  most  dan- 
gerous of  its  enemies ;  and  it  seeks  to  gain  every  possible 
ally.  Now,  has  Germany  of  late  sought  to  propitiate 
Russia?  No  sign  can  be  found  of  any  such  intention, 
since  the  Potsdam  interview  of  November  1910.  Then  it 
seemed  for  a  time  that  Tsar  and  Kaiser  had  come  to  a 
temporary  accord.  But,  so  soon  as  the  Eastern  Question 
again  became  acute,  Germany  acted  in  direct  opposition 
to  Russia's  declared  interests.  She  successfully  opposed 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  in  the  Albanian  dispute,  and 
finally  she  helped  Austria  in  those  insidious  efiorts  which 
wrecked  the  Balkan  League,  patched  up  an  unsatisfactory 
peace,  and  set  the  Turk  on  his  feet  once  more.  In  all 
this  there  was  a  direct  defiance  of  Russia;  and,  what  is 
more,  the  two  Germanic  Empires  succeeded.  The  years 
1908, 1911  and  1913  are  marked  by  three  German  successes, 
Bosnia,  the  Morocco-Congo  exchange,  and  the  Treaty  of 
Bukharest^.     Central  Europe  then  gave  the  law  to  the 

^  Pan-Germans  pronounced  the  acquisition  of  the  large  and  fertile 
district  from  the  French  Congo  a  defeat;  but  this  only  shows  the  extent 
of  their  Moroccan  designs. 


THE    CRISIS    OF    1914  159 

Triple  Entente,  wliich  bowed  before  the  dictates  of 
Berlin.  In  all  this  there  is  no  sign  of  fear,  rather  of  bound- 
less confidence.  This  was  seen  by  M.  Jules  Cambon, 
French  ambassador  at  Berlin,  who  reported  to  his  Govern- 
ment on  May  6,  1913:  "These  people  do  not  fear  war: 
"they  fully  accept  its  possibihty,  and  they  have  taken 
"their  steps  in  consequence^." 

Equally  significant  was  the  treatment  of  Italy  by  the 
Germanic  Empires.  It  was  notorious  both  in  1908  and  in 
1912-13  that  Italy  disliked  their  Balkan  policy.  Yet, 
save  in  the  matter  of  the  Sanjak  of  Novi-Bazar  (1908), 
Italy  had  scant  consideration  at  their  hands.  In  truth, 
their  policy  seems  to  lay  more  stress  on  the  friendship  of 
the  Sublime  Porte  than  of  the  Cabinet  of  Rome.  Certain 
it  is  that  neither  Berlin  nor  Vienna  swerved  from  their 
designs  in  order  to  retain  the  alliance  of  Italy.  That 
alliance  was  of  a  defensive  nature,  and  was  therefore 
forfeited  if  war  resulted  from  their  aggressive  designs; 
yet  they  persisted  in  those  designs,  with  the  result  that 
they  must  have  foreseen,  the  loss  of  Italy's  help.  All 
this,  I  repeat,  savours  not  of  fear,  but  of  blind  confidence 
in  their  ability  to  carry  out  at  all  costs  a  preconceived 
policy,  the  hour  for  the  execution  of  which  had  now 
sounded  forth. 

Finally,  take  the  supreme  test  for  Prussian  policy, 
the  disposition  of  her  troops  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
Did  that  imply  dread  of  Russia  ?  On  the  contrary, 
Bernhardi,  Frobenius  and  other  officers  have  for  some 
time  past  been  declaring  that  Germany  is  perfectly  well 
able  to  wage  war  on  both  fronts  at  once.  They  had 
built  strategic  railways,  often  four  lines  abreast,  which 
»  French  YeUow  Book  (1914),  p.  12. 


160  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  ^YAR 

would  enable  large  masses  of  men  to  be  thrown  quickly 
on  the  eastern  or  the  western  frontier ;  and  on  the  eastern 
lines  especially  they  have  adopted  a  mechanical  device 
whereby  their  rolling-stock  could  quickly  be  adjusted  to 
the  different  gauge  of  some  of  the  Russian  lines.  Of 
course,  they  would  not  repeat  Napoleon's  blunder  of 
advancing  far  into  Russia ;  but,  if  Austria  offered  vigorous 
help,  as  she  was  certain  to  do  after  the  murder  of  her 
Archduke,  the  German  Powers  might  hope  to  converge  on 
Warsaw  and  capture  it  before  the  unwieldy  Eastern 
Colossus  had  fully  bestirred  himself.  The  special  cir- 
cumstances of  1914,  viz.  the  strike  in  Russia,  afforded 
special  ground  for  hope  that  the  Germans  and  Austrians 
might  not  only  capture  Warsaw,  but  push  on  finally  to 
what  is  a  good  military  position — the  Une  of  the  Rivers 
Niemen  and  Bug.  There  they  might  pause  for  the  winter, 
having  weakened  Russia  by  the  occupation  of  Poland 
and  perhaps  part  of  her  Baltic  provinces.  But,  far  from 
throwing  their  chief  weight  on  the  side  of  Russia,  as  they 
would  have  done  if  they  feared  her,  they  sent  their  great 
masses  westwards  to  Belgium  and  France. 

The  supreme  proof  that  they  did  not  fear  Russia  is  to 
be  found  in  this  fact.  Austria,  which  has  more  reason 
than  Germany  to  be  apprehensive  of  Russia,  sent  a 
considerable  force,  along  with  heavy  siege  guns  into 
Belgium  and  Northern  France.  True,  the  Central  Powers 
found  out,  when  too  late,  that  they  had  made  a  blunder 
— that  Belgium  was  not  to  be  walked  over  in  a  week, 
and  Paris  entered  within  three  weeks.  The  resistance 
in  the  west  was  more  obstinate,  the  advance  of  the 
Russians  quicker,  than  the  German  Staff  had  expected. 
But  their  miscalculation  is  a  tribute  to  their  excess  of 


THE    CRISIS    OF    1914  161 

confidence;   and  it  suffices  to  explode  the  theory  of  fear 

which  has  been  so  confidently  set  forth.     The  German 

Stafi  summarized  its  programme  thus :    "  We  shall  smash 

France  in  three  weeks,  then  wheel  about  and  deliver  a 

knock-down  blow  to  Russia  before  she  has  had  time  to 

complete  her  mobilization.     Belgium  will  offer  only  the 

resistance  of  sullenness.     England  will  not  come  in  at 

all."     That  was  the  prospect  held  forth  to  encourage 

the  leaders  of  German  industry;    and  it  only  slightly 

exaggerates  what  we  can  now  see  to  have  been  the  plan 

of  campaign.     That  plan  was  based,  not  on  fear,  not  even 

on  principles  of  ordinary  prudence,  but  rather  on  the 

feehng  of  supreme  confidence  expressed  in  the  favourite 

national  song: 

Deutschland,  Deutschland,  iiber  alles,  liber  alles  in  der  Welt. 


B.  fi.  V 


VIII 


THE   RUPTURE 

"Tire  ^e  Koi  veorrjs  rroWfj  fiev  ovcra  iv  rfj  IliKoTrovvrjcra,  iroWrj  d 
fv    Tois  'A6T]vaLS,   ovK    aKOvcricos    vtto    drreipias    rJTTTeTO   tov    rroXefMOv. 

(And  then  the  young  men  being  numerous  in  the  Peloponnese,  and 

also  at  Athens,  were,  through  inexperience,  not  unwilling  to  start 

the  war.) 

Thug  YD  IDES,  Bk  n.  ch.  8. 

As  we  have  seen,  Austria  despatched  to  Serbia  a 
series  of  exacting  demands  on  the  very  day  on  which  it 
became  known  that  the  Buckingham  Palace  Conference 
on  Irish  Afiairs  was  certain  to  fail.  So  soon  as  that  news 
reached  Berlin,  the  chances  became  in  the  highest  degree 
favourable  to  the  Central  Powers.  The  finances  of  France 
showed  a  deficit  of  £32,000,000,  and  the  Chambers  had 
reluctantly  assented  to  the  loan  of  £52,000,000,  deemed 
necessary  for  carrying  through  the  Three  Years'  Service. 
The  Russian  railways  were  hkely  to  be  paralysed  by  a 
wide-spread  strike ;  and  the  United  Kingdom  was  on  the 
verge  of  a  civil  war.  Thus,  by  July  23  a  state  of  things 
had  come  to  pass  far  more  favourable  even  than  that 
which  Bernhardi  had  thus  described: 

When  a  State  is  confronted  by  the  material  impossibility  of 
supporting  any  longer  the  warlike  preparations  which  the  power 
of  its  enemies  has  forced  upon  it;  when  it  is  clear  that  the  rival 


THE    RUPTURE  163 

States  must  gradually  acquire,  from  natural  reasons,  a  lead  that 
cannot  be  won  back;  when  there  are  indications  of  an  offensive 
alliance  of  stronger  enemies  who  only  await  the  favourable  moment 
to  strike — then  the  moral  duty  of  the  State  towards  its  citizens 
is  to  begin  the  struggle  while  the  prospects  of  success  and  the 
political  circumstances  are  tolerably  favourable^. 

Further,  Germany  could  not  wait  much  longer.  The 
Junker  party  was  resolved  to  get  rid  of  the  drastic  suc- 
cession duties  recently  outlined  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment. They  were  inevitable  if  the  armed  peace  lasted; 
and  the  German  governing  class  judged  war  to  be  pre- 
ferable to  such  a  peace.  The  Junkers  were  furious  at 
the  heavy  financial  burdens,  with  no  territorial  acquisitions 
to  show  for  them.  The  French  Minister  at  Munich  in 
July,  1913,  declared  that  pubhc  opinion  would  welcome 
war — "  as  the  solution  of  pohtical  and  economic  difficulties 
"which  will  only  become  worse^." 

Moreover,  Austria  was  eager  to  attack  the  Serbs. 
Her  Note  of  July  23  contained  two  demands  which  no 
independent  State  could  accord;  viz.  to  admit  Austrian 
officials  to  take  part  in  the  trial  of  the  Serbs  accused 
of  compUcity  in  the  murder  at  Serajevo;  while  other 
officials  were  to  collaborate  in  the  suppression  of  the 
an ti- Austrian  propaganda.  The  former  of  these  demands 
Serbia  rejected;  the  latter  she  promised  to  comply  with 
so  far  as  it  agreed  with  the  principles  of  international 
law,  criminal  procedure  and  neighbourly  relations.  To 
all  the  other  demands  she  assented.  To  the  two  just 
named  she  could  not  assent  without  becoming  a  vassal 
State.     In  view  of  the  exceptionally  short  interval  of 

*  Bemhardi,  The  Next  War,  p.  62. 

*  Trench  Yellow  Book  (1914),  p.  13. 

11—2 


164  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

48  hours  allowed  for  a  reply  to  far-reaching  and  complex 
demands,  Austria  must  have  sought  to  provoke  a  war. 
Such  was  the  opinion  of  our  ambassador  at  Vienna, 
Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  who  stated  that:  "this  country 
"has  gone  wild  with  joy  at  the  prospect  of  war  with 
"Serbia,  and  its  postponement  or  prevention  would 
"undoubtedly  be  a  great  disappointment^."  Whether 
Austria  would  have  welcomed  a  general  war  is  a  wider 
question ;  but  Russia  had  repeatedly  warned  the  Court  of 
Vienna  that  any  attack  on  Serbia  must  involve  war  with 
Russia^.  Therefore,  that  Government  precipitated  the 
crisis  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  terrible  consequences 
that  must  ensue ;  and  the  question  now  arises — Would  it 
have  acted  thus  if  it  had  not  received  promises  of  powerful 
support  ? 

What  was  the  influence  of  Germany  in  the  develop- 
ments of  Hapsburg  policy?  Her  Government  has  dis- 
claimed all  knowledge  of  the  Austrian  demands  on  Serbia. 
But  the  following  facts  seem  to  imply  adequate  if  not 
exact  knowledge  on  the  part  of  some  at  least  of  her  re- 
sponsible Ministers.  (1)  A  German  official  Note  approving 
Austria's  demands  was  handed  in  at  London  by  the 
German  Ambassador  on  July  24,  a  fact  scarcely  possible 
unless  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  had  previously  known  their 
tenour.  (2)  The  Italian  Government,  always  on  cool  terms 
with  Austria,  had  cognizance  of  them  on  July  23.  If  so, 
why  had  not  the  Government  of  BerHn,  always  closely 
associated  with  that  of  Vienna?  (3)  On  July  23,  the 
Bavarian  Prime  Minister  stated  that  he  knew  the  terms 


»  British  White  Paper,  Nos.  5,  39,  41. 

«  Ibid.,  No.  139;  Russian  Orange  Book,  Nob.  4,  6,  10,  13-16,  23. 


THE    RUPTURE  165 

of  that  Note^.  (4)  Von  Tschirsky,  German  Ambassador 
at  Vienna,  stated  on  July  2G  that  Germany  "knew 
"very  well  what  she  was  about  in  backing  up  Austria- 
"  Hungary  in  this  matter."  (5)  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen 
had  good  reason  for  believing  that  Tschirsky  knew 
the  terms  of  the  Austrian  Note  and  telegraphed  them 
to  Kaiser  William^.  These  facts,  taken  together,  con- 
stitute a  proof  as  complete  as  historical  evidence  generally 
admits.  There  is  also  the  curious  fact,  just  revealed  in 
the  French  Official  Correspondence  (Yellow  Book),  that 
von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  for  Foreign  Afiairs,  did 
not  think  it  worth  while  to  read  the  Serbian  reply  to 
Austria's  demands,  though  on  that  reply  depended  peace 
or  war  in  the  South-East^.  Equally  significant  is  it 
that,  on  the  Kaiser's  hurried  return  from  his  Baltic  cruise 
to  BerUn,  Germany  and  Austria  acted  in  unison.  On  the 
28th  Germany  rejected  the  British  proposal  for  a  Confer- 
ence, and  on  that  day  Austria  declared  war  on  Serbia. 

As  to  the  Powers  forming  the  Triple  Entente,  they 
were  undoubtedly  surprised  by  Austria's  sudden  action. 
On  July  23  the  French  President  and  the  chief  Ministers 
of  the  Republic  were  at  Cronstadt  and  entertained  the 
Tsar  and  his  suite  on  board  their  warship  La  France. 
President  Poincare  and  the  Tsar  both  made  friendly 
speeches  containing  not  a  phrase  that  differed  from  the 
ordinary.  The  Tsar  referred  to  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance  as  a  guarantee  for  peace  which  both  nations 
desired  to  perpetuate.  At  Paris  a  European  war  was  far 
from  the  thoughts  of  the  public.  The  Caillaux  Trial  still 
reigned  supreme,  witness  the  fact  that  the  issue  of  the 

1  French  Yellow  Book  (1914),  p.  28. 

•  British  White  Paper,  Nos.  9, 32, 38, 96.        ■  French  Yellow  Book,  p.  69. 


106  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Figaro  of  July  24  allotted  two  columns  to  the  Cronstadt 
fete,  thirty-six  columns  to  the  Caillaux  Trial,  and  two 
only  to  the  Austrian  Note  to  Serbia.  The  editorial 
comment  ended  with  the  declaration  that  the  Great 
Powers  would  abstain  from  conflict;  and  it  seemed  that 
Russia  was  intimidated  by  Austria's  energy. 

Across  the  English  Channel  public  attention  was 
concentrated  almost  entirely  on  the  preparations  for 
civil  war  in  Ireland.  But  on  July  20  Sir  Edward  Grey 
asked  the  German  ambassador.  Prince  Lichnowsky,  what 
step  Austria  was  about  to  take  regarding  Serbia,  and 
advised  Germany  to  urge  moderation  on  the  Court  of 
Vienna.  The  prince  gave  a  dubious  reply.  On  July  22 
von  Jagow,  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Afiairs  at 
BerUn,  admitted  to  our  ambassador,  Sir  Edward  Goschen, 
that  Austria  was  about  to  take  action,  and  he  claimed 
that  it  concerned  no  other  Power  whatever;  and  this, 
too,  in  spite  of  the  repeated  warnings  of  Russia  to  the 
Hapsburg  Court  that  its  attack  on  Serbia  must  involve 
war  with  Russia.  In  the  face  of  these  repeated  warnings 
Germany  held  to  her  original  contention,  that  the  quarrel 
concerned  Austria  and  Serbia  alone.  By  this  course  of 
action  the  BerUn  Government  practically  gave  Austria 
carte  blanche. 

From  this  rigid  attitude  little  hope  of  success  could  be 
augured  for  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposals  (July  24-26)  of 
a  Conference,  in  which  Great  Britain  and  France,  after 
dehberating  with  Germany  and  Italy,  should  endeavour 
to  moderate  the  zeal  of  their  respective  Allies — Russia 
and  Austria.  Seeing  that  the  war-fever  at  Vienna  was 
arousing  angry  feelings  at  Petrograd,  such  a  solution  of 
the   difficulty    was    perhaps   the   only   one   practicable. 


THE    RUPTURE  167 

Fiance  and  Italy  accepted  it ;  while  Russia  expressed  her 
approval.  Germany  declined,  for  reasons  which  must  be 
pronounced  frivolous,  in  view  of  the  extreme  gravity  of 
the  situation.  The  coincidence  of  her  refusal  with  the 
aggravation  of  the  crisis  by  a  declaration  of  war  against 
Serbia  has  already  been  noticed^ 

An  alternative  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  of  a 
Conference  was  suggested  concurrently  at  Petrograd  on 
July  24,  that  is,  three  days  before  Austria  declared  war. 
It  was  as  follows.  Sazonofi,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  the  French  ambassador  at  Petrograd,  sug- 
gested that  Great  Britain  ought  at  once  to  join  France 
and  Russia,  the  three  Powers  taking  up  *'a  firm  and 
"united  attitude,"  as  the  only  means  of  averting  war^. 
The  question  has  by  this  time  often  been  discussed  whether 
that  was  the  only  means  of  averting  war.  That  expla- 
nation is  plausible.  But  such  a  course  of  action  was  open 
to  grave  objections.  Firstly,  our  ambassador,  Sir  George 
Buchanan,  to  whom  this  difficult  question  was  put,  had 
no  authorization  to  assent  to  it.  The  Triple  Entente  did 
not  bind  us  to  joint  action — so  much  is  clear;  for  other- 
wise the  question  would  not  have  been  put.  But,  apart 
from  that.  Great  Britain  could  not  consistently  adopt  a 
threatening  tone  towards  the  Central  Powers  when  on 

*  British  White  Paper,  Nos.  10,  11,  36,  42,  43,  49,  71. 

*  Ibid.  No.  6;  Russian  Orange  Book,  No.  17.  No.  23  shows  that 
Russia  sought  to  persuade  Italy  to  mediate  at  Vienna  in  favour  of 
peace.  All  documents  yet  published  show  Russia's  desire  for  peace. 
No.  77  sets  forth  her  case  against  Germany. 

With  the  facts  stated  above,  compare  the  assertion  of  the  German 
Chancellor,  on  Deceml>er  2,  1914,  that  our  Government  could  have 
averted  war  "if  it  had  without  ambiguity  declared  at  Petrograd  that 
"Great  Britain  would  not  allow  a  ooutinentai  war  to  develop  from  the 
"  Austro-Serb  confliot "  1 


168  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

that  very  day  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  suggested  a  Conference 
with  a  view  to  a  friendly  solution  of  the  difficulty.  You 
may  either  conciliate  or  threaten ;  you  cannot  do  both  at 
once;  and  Sir  Edward  Grey,  when  the  question  was 
referred  to  him  from  Petrograd,  commended  our  am- 
bassador's caution  and  continued  to  advocate  the  Con- 
ference. He  knew,  far  better  than  his  critics  can  know, 
that  both  Austria  and  Germany  were  in  so  irritable  a 
mood  as  to  be  likely  to  take  extreme  measures  if  anything 
resembhng  a  menace  were  used.  He  therefore  adhered  to 
the  conciliatory  proposal,  which  Germany  was  to  reject 
on  the  28th.  By  so  doing  she  put  herself  in  the  wrong ; 
while  unprejudiced  observers  noted  that  British  policy  was 
not  only  pacific,  but  also  calculated  to  allay  the  rising 
storm  of  passion. 

Most  important  of  all  considerations  was  the  influence 
which  a  menacing  attitude  would  exert  upon  the  Cabinet 
of  Rome.  There  was  to  be  found  the  key  of  the  diplomatic 
situation.  Relatively  to  the  Central  Powers,  Italy  held  a 
position  not  unlike  that  of  Great  Britain  with  regard  to 
the  Triple  Entente.  True,  she  was  more  closely  attached, 
but  her  obligations  were  of  a  defensive  nature.  If, 
however,  we  joined  Russia  and  France  and  issued  a 
threatening  declaration  to  the  Central  Powers,  the  im- 
mediate result  must  have  been  to  tighten  the  bonds  of 
the  Triple  Alliance.  Therefore  conciliation  was  not  merely 
the  only  consistent  and  morally  justifiable  course;  it  was 
also  the  prudent  course.  In  truth  those  who  now  say 
that  a  sterner  attitude  should  have  been  taken  towards 
the  Germanic  Powers  advocate  what  was,  in  the  cir- 
cumstances, a  weaker  course  of  action.  They  confuse 
diplomacy  with  war,  where  the  offensive  is  generally  the 


THE   RUPTURE  169 

stroQger  alternative,  whereas  in  diplomacy  it  is  generally 
the  weaker  alternative.  It  was  so  in  this  case.  Italy, 
noting  that  her  Allies  persistently  adopted  an  aggressive 
tone,  was  perfectly  justified  in  parting  company  with 
them.  On  August  3  the  Italian  Government  stated  that, 
the  action  of  the  Central  Powers  having  been  aggressive, 
the  Triple  Alliance  lapsed,  and  Italy  would  remain 
neutral^.  That  decision,  I  repeat,  could  not  have  been 
formed  if  we  had  joined  France  and  Russia  in  a  declaration 
to  the  Central  Powers  which  could  have  been  represented 
as  a  menace.  The  nation  therefore  owes  a  deep  debt  of 
gratitude  to  Sir  George  Buchanan  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 
for  their  self-restraint  in  declining  a  course  of  action 
which  on  the  surface  seemed  attractive.  If  they  had 
followed  it,  war  would  not  have  been  averted,  and  we 
should  now  be  fighting  Italy.  A  study  of  this  question 
must  yield  cause  for  thankfulness  that  our  foreign  policy 
has  not  been  directed  by  brilliant  and  self-confident 
amateurs,  who  claim  to  possess  an  exceptional  fund  of 
common  sense. 

Meanwhile,  as  we  have  seen,  Kaiser  William  had 
returned  in  haste  from  his  Baltic  cruise,  greatly  to  the 
regret  of  the  German  Foreign  Office,  which  afiected 
soHcitude  for  the  excitement  likely  to  be  produced  by 
that  step^.  The  fact  of  its  regret  may  be  noted,  the 
excuse  may  be  disregarded.  Late  on  July  28  (the  day  of 
Austria's  declaration  of  war)  Kaiser  WilHam  telegraphed 
to  the  Tsar.     After  referring  to  the  murders  of  ELing 

»  British  White  Paper,  Nos.  49,  64,  92,  162. 

*  The  arguments  urged  in  Germany  as  to  the  Kaiser  knowing  nothing 
of  diplomatic  developments  during  his  cruise  are  clearly  inapplicable  to 
the  age  of  wireless  telegi'aphy 


170  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Alexander  and  his  Queen  in  1903,  and  to  that  of  the 

Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  he  continued:  "Un- 
**  doubtedly  you  will  agree  with  me,  that  we  two,  you  and 
"I  as  well  as  all  sovereigns,  have  a  common  interest  in 
"insisting  that  all  those  morally  responsible  for  this 
"terrible  murder  shall  suffer  deserved  punishment." 
He  therefore  expressed  the  hope  that  the  Tsar  would  not 
be  overborne  by  the  excitement  on  behalf  of  Serbia  which 
was  increasing  in  Russia.  The  Tsar  repUed  on  the 
following  day:  "...In  this  serious  moment  I  ask  you 
"urgently  to  help  me.  A  disgraceful  war  has  been  de- 
"clared  on  a  weak  nation.  The  indignation  at  this, 
"which  I  fully  share,  is  immense  in  Russia.  I  foresee 
"that  soon  I  can  no  longer  withstand  the  pressure  that  is 
"being  brought  to  bear  upon  me,  and  that  I  shall  be 
"forced  to  adopt  measures  which  will  lead  to  war.  In 
"order  to  prevent  such  a  calamity  as  a  European  War,  I 
"ask  you  in  the  name  of  our  old  friendship,  to  do  all 
"that  is  possible  for  you  to  prevent  your  ally  from  going 
"too  far."  The  Kaiser  returned  to  the  charge  with  two 
telegrams.  In  the  former  he  repeated  his  former  argument 
and  added:  "it  is  quite  possible  for  Russia  to  remain  in 
"  her  role  of  a  spectator  towards  the  Austro-Serbian  War, 
"without  dragging  Europe  into  the  most  terrible  war 
"that  it  has  ever  seen^."  The  ground  on  which  the 
Kaiser  based  this  charge  was  that  on  July  29  Russia  had 
mobilized  part  of  her  army  (viz.  in  the  military  districts 
of  Odessa,  Kieff,  Moscow,  and  Kazan)  as  a  sharp  warning 
to   Austria.     The    Kaiser    deprecated    this    mobilization 

*  German  White  Book,  Annexes  20-23  a.  For  Serbia's  appeal  to 
Russia  for  help  Rce  Russian  Orange  Book,  No.  6.  No.  56  shows  that 
the  Tsar  on  July  28  telegraphed  a  reply  in  the  affirmative. 


THE    RUPTURE  171 

(albeit  only  partial)  obviously  because  it  would  interfere 
with  the  pre-arranged  plan  of  an  Austrian  incursion  into 
Serbia,  with  which  no  outsider  had  any  concern.  To  this 
scheme  he  adhered  with  the  rigidity  which  forms  a  pro- 
minent feature  of  his  character.  As  his  study  of  Napoleon 
has  finally  endowed  him  with  a  full  measure  of  Napoleonic 
pertinacity,  we  may  pause  to  notice  its  manifestation  in 
a  physical  sense.  On  the  occasion  of  a  religious  service 
before  the  troops  on  parade,  it  was  noticed  that,  while 
everyone  else  occasionally  shifted  the  weight  of  the  body 
from  one  leg  to  the  other,  the  Kaiser  remained  absolutely 
inflexible  during  the  whole  of  the  hour.  It  was  his  manner 
of  doing  honour  to  the  Hohenzollern  Deity.  Now,  the 
will-power  which  so  prolonged  a  strain  implies  has  been 
exerted  increasingly  on  foreign  policy,  all  the  more  so 
because  the  present  Chancellor  is  inexperienced  in  diplo- 
matic aflfairs^. 

In  its  psychological  aspect,  then,  the  crisis  may  be 
stated  thus:  the  fate  of  Europe  depended  on  the  ability 
of  the  Kaiser  to  realize  the  extreme  peril  of  the  course 
which  he  was  following,  that  is,  if  he  was,  as  he  claimed, 
the  friend  of  peace.  If  so,  he  completely  misjudged  the 
situation,  mainly  (it  would  seem)  because  he  staked  all 
on  being  able  to  convince  the  Tsar  that  all  sovereigns 
had  a  common  interest  in  assuring  the  chastisement  of  a 
nation  of  assassins.  But  here  again  he  displayed  another 
defect,  excess  of  energy.  He  urged  this  plea  with  so  much 
insistence  that  the  Tsar  must  have  discerned  in  it  an 
appeal  to  his  fears.  Certainly,  he  rejected  it  most 
decisively,  and  he  took  his  stand  on  what  may  be  termed 
the  national  ground.     As  the  father  of  his  people  he 

1  Lamprecht,  pp.  82,  110. 


172  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

could  not  see  a  small  Slav  State  dragooned  by  Austria. 
Knowing  the  history  of  her  efforts,  from  1878  onwards, 
to  secure  hold  of  Serbia,  he  saw  in  the  present  appeals 
merely  a  repetition  in  acuter  form,  of  the  Germanic 
pohcy  which  had  inflicted  defeats  on  the  Slav  cause  in 
1908  and  1912-13.  Twice  he  had  bowed  before  the 
Kaiser's  "shining  armour."  He  was  resolved  not  to 
endure  humihation  a  third  time  and  see  Austria  overrun 
the  Balkans.  That  she  was  aiming  at  the  longed-for 
goal,  Salonica,  was  reported  both  at  Rome  and  Con- 
stantinople. At  the  latter  place  the  Austrian  ambassador 
bemoaned  "the  deplorable  situation  of  Salonica  under 
"Greek  administration,"  and  then  spoke  of  the  "assistance 
"  on  which  an  Austrian  army  could  count  from  Mussulman 
"population  discontented  with  Serbian  rule^."  While 
the  Tsar  was  being  amused  by  professional  disquisitions 
on  the  duties  of  crowned  heads,  the  Austrian  eagle  was 
about  to  wing  its  flight  to  Salonica. 

If  there  was  any  danger  of  the  Tsar  succumbing  to 
the  appeals  from  Potsdam,  it  vanished  on  receipt  of  the 
news  as  to  secret  and  swift  preparations  for  war  in 
Germany,  which  were  proceeding  on  both  fronts.  This 
was  the  more  threatening,  as  the  French  President  and 
Ministers  did  not  reach  France,  after  their  voyage  from 
Cronstadt,  until  July  27-28,  up  to  which  time  no  Minister 
was  able  to  give  definite  orders.  The  absence  of  the 
Government  and  the  general  confusion  in  the  adminis- 
tration, presented  an  opportunity  such  as  had  never  occur- 
red since  the  year  1875.  Then,  as  we  saw  in  Lecture  I, 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  declared  that  France  must 
not  be  taken  at  a  disadvantage;   and,  now  again,  as  the 

1  British  VVliite  Paper,  Noa.  19,  82. 


THE    RUPTURE  173 

situation  developed,  Russia  saw  the  danger  to  her  ally. 
On  July  31  she  ordered  a  general  mobilization.  This 
led  to  instant  ultimatums  from  Berlin  to  Petrograd  and 
Paris,  requesting  demobilization  under  pain  of  the  com- 
mencement of  hostilities. 

The  circumstances  amidst  which  these  imperious 
demands  were  sent  deserve  notice.  On  July  31  Russia 
signified  both  to  the  Austrian  and  British  Governments 
her  desire  to  frame  an  amicable  arrangement  with  the 
Court  of  Vienna,  in  accordance  with  the  plan  suggested 
by  Sir  Edward  Grey.  That  Court  forthwith  assented; 
and  consequently  there  appeared  a  prospect  of  a  peaceable 
settlement.  The  attitude  of  Russia  had  throughout 
been  conciliatory,  and  Austria  now  seemed  about  to 
respond  in  the  same  spirit.  Then  it  was  that  Germany 
intervened,  allowing  Russia  only  twelve  hours  in  which 
to  agree  to  a  complete  demobilization.  In  the  words 
of  Jules  Cambon,  French  ambassador  at  Berlin, — "The 
"ultimatum  of  Germany,  intervening  just  at  the  exact 
"time  at  which  agreement  appeared  on  the  point  of 
"being  estabhshed  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd,  is 
"  significant  of  her  belhcose  policy."  Further,  the  incident, 
distinctly  aggressive  on  her  part,  could  be  represented 
by  her  as  implpng  general  disarmament  (though  her  own 
preparations  were  far  advanced) — a  plea  which  would 
for  the  time  cajole  her  Social  Democrats^.  Germany, 
however,  claims  that  Russia  was  arming  fast  before 
July  31,  and  without  the  Tsar's  knowledge.  On  this 
question  it  is  impossible  at  present  to  acquire  exact 
information. 

1  French  VeUow  Book,  pp.  6,  13  15-17,  41,  66-9,  109.  110;  Russian 
Orange  Book,  pp.  48-67. 


174  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Russia  refused  to  accede  to  the  German  demand: 
France  temporized,  in  the  hope  of  gaining  a  day  or 
two  of  respite.  But  the  rupture  came  about  on 
August  3;    with  Russia  on  August  P. 

The  storm-centre  now  moved  suddenly  to  Belgium. 
Already,  on  July  29,  the  German  Chancellor  had  made  to 
Sir  Edward  Goschen  his  "infamous  proposals,"  to  the 
effect  that,  in  the  event  of  war,  and  provided  that  Great 
Britain  maintained  neutrality,  Germany  would  take  no 
mainland  territory  from  France  but  limit  her  demands 
to  French  colonies.  He  further  promised  to  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Holland.  As  regards  Belgium  he  said:  "It 
"depended  upon  the  action  of  France  what  operations 
"Germany  might  be  forced  to  enter  upon  in  Belgium,  but, 
"when  the  war  was  over,  Belgian  integrity  would  be 
"  respected  if  she  had  not  sided  against  Germany^."  The 
last  clause  is  to  be  noted,  because  by  the  custom  of 
nations,  Belgium  is  bound  to  uphold  her  neutrahty  if  it 
is  impugned. 

This  stipulation  is,  indeed,  an  essential  condition  of 
neutrahty ;  for  otherwise  a  neutral  State  becomes  a  means 
whereby  one  State  may  attack  another  at  a  comparatively 
unguarded  part  of  its  frontier.  The  neglect  to  maintain 
neutrality  had  been  the  ruin  of  Poland.  Moreover,  at  the 
end  of  August,  1870,  when  threatened  by  the  powerful 
armies  of  Germany  and  France,  Belgium  had  maintained 
her  neutrahty;  and  Marshal  McMahon's  forces,  because 
they  respected  that  neutrality,  became  wedged  into  a 
false  position  at  Sedan.     Further,  in  1842  and  1875  (as 

»  British  White  Paper,  Nos.  99,  105,  134.     See  M.  P.  Price,  Diplo- 
matic History  of  the  War  (1914),  pp.  90 — 114  for  military  moves,  eto. 
«  British  White  Paper,  No.  85. 


THE    RUPTURE  175 

we  have  seen),  statesmen,  who  discussed  the  question  of 
Belgium's  neutrality,  agreed  that  she  would  fulfil  the 
duties  which  it  imposed.  Early  in  1852,  Queen  Victoria 
wrote  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  assuring  him  against 
the  alleged  designs  of  Napoleon  III,  and  stating — "  Any 
"  attempt  on  Belgium  would  be  casus  belli  for  us^."  In 
1875  Bismarck  admitted  that  Great  Britain,  as  one  of 
the  signatory  Powers  of  the  treaty  of  1839  (constituting 
Belgium  a  neutral  State  under  international  guarantees) 
must  defend  Belgium  if  she  were  attacked.  That  was 
consonant  with  the  declaration  of  Mr  Gladstone  in  1870, 
though  he  phrased  it  with  less  clearness  than  could  be 
desired. 

It  is  also  well  known  that  the  German  Staff  discussed 
questions  arising  from  the  possible  forcing  of  the  Scheldt 
estuary  (in  Dutch  waters)  by  a  British  expedition,  which 
might  seek  to  succour  the  Belgian  army  if  driven  into  its 
great  camp  of  refuge  at  Antwerp.  Those  discussions  pre- 
supposed that  Great  Britain  would  make  the  attempt. 
Further,  the  Dutch  Government  had  mounted  heavy  guns 
at  Flushing  to  command  that  estuary,  as  if  it  feared  some 
such  action  by  the  British.  Its  action  was  deemed  im- 
friendly  both  to  Great  Britain  and  to  Belgium,  especially 
as  it  neglected  to  fortify  the  Dutch-German  frontier. 

Consequently  the  military  and  naval  situation,  no  less 
than  the  diplomatic  engagements,  proclaimed  the  fact 
that  Great  Britain  was  bound  in  honour  to  protect 
Belgium  if  she  were  attacked,  and  that  both  at  Berlin  and 
The  Hague  it  was  expected  that  she  would  in  that  case 
defend  her  by  force  of  arms.  The  Belgian  Government 
also,  on  July  24,  expressed  the  confident  belief  that  Great 

*  Letters  of  Queen  Victor ia,  n.  p.  438. 


170  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

Britain  and  the  other  signatory  Powers  would  act  in  that 
manner.  For  its  part,  it  intended  to  uphold  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  "whatever  the  consequences."  Preparatory 
measures  of  defence  were  also  adopted  to  give  effect  to 
this  appeal  for  the  support  of  the  Powers.  Belgium  had 
every  right  to  expect  that  her  appeal  would  be  respected 
because,  of  the  four  States  wliich  have  been  permanently 
neutrahzed  by  international  law,  viz.  Switzerland  (1815), 
Belgium  (1831,  1839),  Luxemburg  (1867),  the  [Belgian] 
Congo  (1885),  not  one  has  been  attacked.  On  the 
contrary,  in  the  case  of  Belgium,  on  every  occasion  on 
which  she  appealed  to  the  treaty  constituting  her  a  neutral 
State,  that  treaty  was  respected,  even  in  less  important 
matters^.  History  will  therefore  record  the  verdict  that, 
during  99  years,  there  has  occurred  no  violation  of  the 
territory  of  an  internationally  neutralized  State,  and  that 
Germany  has  been  the  first  nation  since  Waterloo  to 
commit  such  a  violation.  To  find  a  parallel,  we  must  go 
back  to  the  ages  of  barbarism. 

As  regards  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  at  the  crisis, 
Germans,  from  the  Kaiser  downwards,  have  affected  so 
much  surprise  that  a  few  words  seem  called  for  as  to  our 
action  in  times  past  when  the  independence  of  the  Low 
Countries  was  threatened  by  a  Great  Power. 

I  must  almost  apologize  for  the  hackneyed  nature  of 
the  facts  I  am  about  to  name.     Since  the  reign  of  Edward  I 

*  E.  Descamps,  La  Neutraliti,  de  la  Belgique  (1902),  pp.  335,  652. 
Professor  Westlake  {Review  of  International  Lata,  1901),  states  that 
neither  the  neutral  State  nor  any  of  the  signatories  can  annul  the 
obligations  which  the  original  compact  imposes.  See,  too,  Descamps, 
Vl^tat  neutre  d  Titre  permanent  (Paris  and  Brussels,  1912),  ch.  v,  §  6. 
On  April  29,  1914,  von  Jagow  assured  the  Reichstag  (Committee  that 
Belgian  oeutralitj  would  be  respected. 


THE   RUPTURE  177 

no  English  ruler,  endowed  with  energy  and  patriotism,  has 
allowed  a  Great  Power  to  conquer  or  annex  the  Flemish 
and  Dutch  provinces.  Our  first  important  naval  battle, 
that  ofi  Sluys  (1337),  was  fought  to  keep  the  French  out 
of  Flanders.  The  names  of  Sir  Phihp  Sidney,  Cromwell, 
Marlborough,  and  Wellington,  further  recall  to  us  the 
numerous  campaigns  whereby  Britons  assured  either  the 
independence  of  those  provinces,  or  at  least,  their  govern- 
ance by  Austria  on  terms  not  unfavourable  to  them  and 
productive  of  security  to  England.  On  the  other  hand, 
hostile  Powers  have  from  early  times  sought  to  possess 
those  coasts  whence  an  invasion  of  our  shores  can  most 
readily  be  attempted. 

To  resume:  the  following  facts  are  clear  and  indis- 
putable: (1)  Belgian  neutrahty  had  never  yet  been 
violated ;  (2)  apart  from  sinister  plans  in  1866  and  1875,  the 
signatories  to  the  fundamental  pact  of  1839  had  always 
been  prepared  to  fulfil  their  obligations  to  Belgium ;  (3)  the 
defence  of  the  Low  Countries  against  aggression  by  any 
Great  Power  is  the  most  prominent  and  persistent  feature 
of  British  foreign  pohcy  from  the  time  of  Edward  I  to  that 
of  George  V.  The  events  leading  to  the  many  battles 
fought  in  the  Netherlands,  from  Sluys  to  Waterloo,  were 
manifestations  of  the  same  motive,  which  led  us  to  protest 
against  the  construction  of  Dutch  forts  dominating  the 
Scheldt  esLuary,  while  Holland  did  not  defend  her  eastern 
frontier  against  G  ermany.  This  guiding  principle  of  British 
policy  is,  I  repeat,  so  obvious,  so  well  known  to  every  his- 
torical student,  that  it  cannot  be  unknown  to  statesmen 
and  pubhcists  in  Germany.  Accordingly,  we  are  j  ustified  in 
branding  as  hypocritical  the  clamour  which  has  there  been 
raised  against  us  for  taking  a  step  which  honour  and 

B.  lb  12 


178  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

sound  policy  alike  prescribed^.  That  German  professors 
should  take  the  lead  in  these  outbursts  of  malice  is  not 
the  least  extraordinary  incident  amidst  all  the  mad  events 
of  this  annus  mirahilis.  Further,  that  the  German 
Chancellor,  Bethmann-Hollweg,  should  ever  have  made  to 
a  British  ambassador  the  cynical  proposals  of  July  29  is 
to  be  explained  by  his  total  inexperience  in  diplomatic 
affairs,  for  which  Professor  Lamprecht  vouches^. 

As  to  the  stories  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality 
by  British  or  French  troops,  or  aviators,  whereby  German 
officials  and  journalists  sought  to  excuse  Germany's  pro- 
ceedings towards  Belgium,  they  are  sufficiently  refuted, 
firstly,  by  the  bewildering  inconsistencies  of  the  stories 
themselves^,  and  secondly,  by  the  action  of  the  Chancellor, 
who,  when  those  inconsistencies  were  patent  even  at  Berlin, 
took  refuge  in  the  statement  that  necessity  knows  no  law, 
and  that  it  was  absolutely  essential  for  Germany  to  **  hack 
"her  way  through,"  i.e.  to  Paris.  Here  at  least  there 
was  no  pretence.  Bethmann-Hollweg  may  at  least  claim 
the  merit  of  having  stated  the  usual  Prussian  procedure 
with  the  usual  Prussian  frankness.  But  the  measure  of 
his  political  intelligence  may  be  grasped  by  the  incoherent 
fury  which  he  displayed  towards  Sir  Edward  Goschen  at 
their  final  interview.     A  statesman  who  had  the  faintest 

•  The  Chancellor's  speech  to  the  Reichstag  on  December  2  is  a  tissue 
of  falsehoods  as  will  be  seen  by  the  British,  French,  and  Russian  State 
Papers,  How  can  he  maintain  that  the  British,  unprovoked,  suddenly 
attacked  imsuspecting  Germany,  when,  on  July  26,  she  suddenly  re- 
called her  fleet  from  Norway,  a  step  which  led  to  our  countermanding, 
on  July  27,  the  demobilization  of  the  British  fleet  ?  The  Konigin 
Luise  began  mine-laying  oflE  Felixstowe  within  fourteen  hours  of  the 
declaration  of  war. 

•  Lamprecht,  p.  110. 

•  e.g.  Belgian  Grey  Book,  Nos.  21,  22, 


THE   RUPTURE  179 

consciousness  of  the  blunders  which  had  brought  Great 
Britain  into  the  field,  would  have  sought  to  retrieve  those 
blunders  and  render  an  accommodation  possible  at  an 
early  date. 

Perhaps  the  explanation  of  this  inconceivable  folly  may 
be  found  in  the  priority  accorded  to  military  considerations 
at  that  time.  It  is  probable  that,  during  the  Kaiser's 
cruise,  those  considerations  triumphed  over  the  dictates 
of  complaisance  towards  an  ally  (Italy)  and  neutrals, 
which  diplomacy  enjoins.  The  international  situation 
was  sufficiently  complex  to  call  for  prudence  and  self- 
restraint.  But  a  decision  in  favour  of  rapid  and  aggressive 
action  at  all  costs  was  evidently  formed  by  the  close 
of  July.  The  Kaiser  on  his  return  threw  in  his  lot 
with  the  forward  party  and  used  his  influence  to  cajole 
Russia  while  his  western  army  dealt  a  smashing  blow  at 
Paris.  The  Meuse  Valley  via  Namur  had  long  been 
approved  by  soldiers  as  the  quickest  and  easiest  line  of 
advance  to  the  French  capital.  The  16-inch  howitzers 
which  Krupp  had  kept  secret  were  with  reason  expected 
to  demolish  all  fortifications  except  the  very  few  of  the 
most  modern  type.  If,  therefore,  Belgium  resisted,  she 
would  easily  be  trampled  down ;  and  the  estimate  of  three 
weeks  for  the  victory  over  France  was  not  extravagant 
in  view  of  the  complete  equipment  and  vast  numbers  of 
the  German  forces  of  the  west.  Everything  had  been 
provided — maps  of  Belgium  for  the  soldiery,  concrete 
foundations  outside  the  Belgian  fortresses,  while  Krupp 
had  withheld  from  Antwerp  some  of  the  heavy  guns  long 
before  ordered  for  the  completion  of  its  defences.  On 
the  River  Scheldt  above  Antwerp  had  been  erected  a 
large  and  solidly  built  German  factory,  which  proved  at 

12—2 


180  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

the  crisis  to  be  furnished  with  abundance  of  heavy  timbei 
and  other  appliances  that  enabled  the  invaders  rapidly  to 
cross  the  river  and  thus  harass  the  retreating  Belgian  and 
British  forces^.  Other  proofs  might  be  cited  as  to  the 
careful  preparations  for  invading  the  whole  of  Belgium, 
not  merely  the  Meuse  Valley  as  was  at  first  supposed. 
The  project  was,  not  merely  to  strike  at  Paris,  but  to 
acquire  Antwerp,  Ostend,  and  the  northern  ports  of 
France. 

This  fact,  which  is  now  obvious  enough,  is  referred  tp 
here  because  it  throws  hght  on  the  procedure  of  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  on  July  29  in  the  interview  already  described. 
He  then  offered  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen  that  Belgium 
should  recover  her  independence  if  she  had  not  opposed 
the  Germans  during  their  march.  That  a  brave  people 
should  not  at  some  points  oppose  the  invaders,  if  the 
due  amount  of  rigour  be  adopted,  is  inconceivable;  but, 
even  supposing  that  the  Belgians  had  not  resisted,  their 
doom  was  sealed;  for  the  custom  of  nations  does  not 
recognize  a  neutrality  wliich  its  possessor  does  not  uphold. 
Therefore  the  German  Chancellor's  proposals  could  have 
but  one  end  in  view,  annexation. 

His  proposals  were  assessed  by  the  British  Government 
at  their  due  value,  and  on  July  30  were  decisively  rejected. 
So,  too,  was  his  proposal  of  a  general  neutraUty  agreement 
between  the  two  Powers;  and  the  revelations  made  by 
Mr  Asquith  on  October  2  as  to  the  manner  in  which 
Germany  had  previously  used  that  expedient  so  as  to  tie 
our  hands  in  face  of  all  eventualities,  sufficiently  explain 
the   motive   underlying   the   not   dissimilar   proposal   of 

Figaro,  Nov.  7,  1914, 


THE   RUPTURE  181 

July  29.  It  was  evidently  a  bait  wherewith  to  hook  us 
while  GermaDy  worlred  her  will  on  Belgium^ 

Sir  Edward  Grey  now  requested  both  the  French  and 
German  Governments  to  give  assurances  of  their  respect 
for  Belgian  neutrality.  The  reply  of  France  was  so 
frank  and  complete  as  to  refute  the  stories  of  French 
aggression.  That  of  Germany  to  both  the  Belgian  and 
British  ambassadors  was  unsatisfactory.  On  July  31 
von  Jagow,  the  Foreign  Secretary,  declared  to  the  former 
that  Germany  had  no  intention  whatever  of  violating 
Belgian  territory,  but  he  could  not  make  a  declaration  to 
that  effect  without  prejudicing  the  chances  of  Germany 
in  the  event  of  war  ensuing 2.  (It  was  the  day  of  her 
ultimatum  to  France.)  To  Sir  Edward  Goschen  he  replied 
thus:  He  thought  that  any  reply  the  German  Ministers 
might  give  "could  not  but  disclose  a  certain  amount  of 
*' their  plan  of  campaign,  in  the  event  of  war  ensuing, 
"and  he  was  therefore  very  doubtful  whether  they  would 
"return  any  answer  at  all."  His  surmise  was  correct. 
True,  on  August  1,  Prince  Lichnowsky  made  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey  certain  offers,  to  which  some  importance  has  been 
attached  in  certain  quarters,  but,  as  they  contradicted 
the  declarations  of  his  chiefs  at  Berlin,  they  must  be  dis- 
missed as  possessing  no  official  character.  The  divergence 
between  his  statements  and  that  of  his  Government  had 
previously  been  noticeable.  On  August  1  it  was  most 
marked^. 

During  that  interview  with  Prince  Lichnowsky, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  stated  that  the  British  Government 

1  British  White  Paper,  Nos.  85,  101. 
•  Belgian  Grey  Book,  Nos.  9,  11-13. 
8  British  White  Paper,  Nos.  43,  46,  122,  123. 


182  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

was  not  committed  to  any  course  of  action,  an  assertion 
consonant  with  his  previous  declarations,  that  the  Austro- 
Serb  dispute  in  no  way  concerned  us^  It  is  also  worthy 
of  notice  that,  on  August  2,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  giving  to 
the  French  envoy,  M.  Cambon,  the  promise  of  our  naval 
support  in  case  the  French  fleet  were  attacked  by  that 
of  Germany,  was  careful  to  add  that  that  offer  was  subject 
to  the  assent  of  the  British  Parliament.  The  fact  proves 
that  the  Entente  with  France,  which  is  believed  to  refer 
almost  entirely  to  naval  affairs,  does  not  and  cannot 
override  the  authority  of  Parliament^. 

Matters  now  came  swiftly  to  the  climax.  On  August  2 
Germany  sent  her  troops  into  Luxemburg;  but,  as  she 
represented  that  act  as  prompted  solely  by  administrative 
reasons  so  as  to  prevent  the  French  making  use  of  the 
railway  through  the  Grand  Duchy,  Great  Britain  did 
not  treat  that  infraction  of  neutrality  as  constituting  a 
casus  belli.  Further,  it  did  not  vitally  affect  the  safety 
of  France,  as  was  the  case  when  Germany  proceeded  to 
violate  Belgian  neutrality ^  On  August  3  she  demanded 
permission  from  Belgium  to  despatch  troops  into  that 
land.  Her  pretext  now  was  that  this  proceeding  would 
help  Belgium  to  prevent  the  violation  of  her  territory. 
But,  as  by  this  time  France  had  given  an  explicit  promise 
to  respect  Belgian  neutrality  (a  fact  which  was  already 
perfectly  well  known  at  BerUn*),  the  Government  of 
Brussels  at  once  detected  the  hollo wness  of  the  pretext; 

»  British  White  Paper,  Nos.  87,  116,  119. 
■  Ibid.  No.  148. 

•  As  Prussia  in  1867  withdrew  her  troops  from  Lnxembnrg  (where 
■he  had  them  since  1815)  she  had  some  slight  claim  to  rooccupy  it  fn 
time  of  crisis.     (See  Descamps,  p.  73.) 

•  British  White  Paper,  No.  122. 


THE  RUPTURE  183 

and  it  is  in  the  light  of  this  monstrous  demand  on  Belgium 
that  we  must  view  the  eager  appeal  of  the  German  Chan- 
cellor to  Great  Britain  on  August  4th,  to  remain  neutral, 
while  German  troops  overran  Belgium^.  His  despatch 
was  preceded  by  one  from  King  Albert  containing  a  manly 
appeal  for  the  support  which  Great  Britain  had  always 
accorded,  especially  in  1870  during  the  Franco-Prussian 
War.  British  support  was,  of  course,  forthcoming;  but 
Sir  Edward  Grey  made  one  more  efiort  to  convince  the 
German  Government  of  the  seriousness  of  the  step  which 
it  was  then  contemplating.  On  hearing  that  German 
troops  had  entered  Belgium,  he  despatched  an  ultimatum, 
demanding  that  Germany  should  respect  the  neutrahty 
of  Belgium,  on  pain  of  encountering  the  hostihty  of  the 
United  Kingdom.  As  the  Court  at  Berlin  refused  to  draw 
back,  war  ensued  at  the  end  of  August  4. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  he  should  have  declared 
more  emphatically  at  an  earlier  stage  what  our  conduct 
would  be  in  such  a  crisis.  To  this  it  will  suflB.ce  to  reply 
that  any  declaration  on  his  part  which  assumed  that 
Germany  was  about  to  violate  Belgian  soil,  while  she  was 
hotly  disclaiming  any  such  intention,  would  have  aggra- 
vated the  crisis,  instead  of  averting  it.  He  made  it  as 
clear  as  diplomatic  procedure  admits,  that  Great  Britain 
regarded  the  Belgian  Question  as  one  of  extreme  gravity, 
on  which  we  must,  at  the  worst,  take  decisive  action. 
Moreover,  the  fact  that  the  British  fleet  was  kept  to- 
gether, instead  of  dispersing  for  the  manoeuvres,  was 
a  circumstance  calculated  to  make  more  impression  on 
the  statesmen  at  Berlin  than  any  number  of  diplomatic 
representations.  They  therefore  have  no  ground  for 
*  British  White  Paper,  No.  167. 


1S4  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

complaining  that  tliey  were  not  duly  warned.  On  the 
whole,  British  diplomacy  may  be  pronounced  to  have 
Bteeied  steadily  a  middle  course  such  as  ought  to  have 
averted  a  collision.  If  it  failed,  it  was  because  the  men 
at  Berhn  were  resolved  at  all  costs  to  carry  out  their  plans 
as  regards  Belgium.  Again,  the  final  verdict  on  British 
versus  German  diplomacy  came  from  Rome.  The  Italian 
statesmen  were  far  better  judges  of  the  merits  of  the 
dispute  than  any  outsiders  can  be;  and  their  action 
tells  decisively  in  favour  of  the  conduct  of  the  United 
Kingdom^. 

In  view  of  the  facts  set  forth  in  this  and  former  lectures, 
and  still  more  in  those  of  the  French,  Belgian,  and  Russian 
despatches,  which  I  have  been  unable  to  compress  into 
these  lectures,  no  reasonable  person  can  entertain  any 
doubt  as  to  the  aggressive  designs  of  Germany.  She 
intended  first  to  crush  France,  then  to  repel  the  Russian 
forces  and  wage  defensive  campaigns  in  East  Poland 
which  would  wear  out  Russia.  The  Kaiser's  telegrams  to 
the  Tsar  may  have  been  designed  to  postpone  the  Russian 
mobilization,  which  he  expected  in  any  case  to  be  slow 
owing  to  the  strike.  That  he  desired  to  avert  war  with 
Russia  is  inconceivable  in  view  of  his  action  in  sending 
the  imperious  ultimatum  of  July  31.  Russia  was  bound 
by  honour  to  succour  France,  who  was  known  to  be  in 
deadly  danger^.  She  was  equally  bound  to  try  to  save 
Serbia  from  the  Austrian  forces  then  at  her  gates.  There- 
fore the  Kaiser  must  have  counted  either  on  disgracing 
Russia  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  or  on  compelling  her  to 

*  See  speech  of  Italian  Premier  in  Times  of  Dee.  6,  1914. 
»  British  White  Paper,  Nos.  99,  105 ;  Fieiicii  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  106, 
114,  118,  127. 


THE   RUPTURE  185 

fight  at  a  time  equally  favourable  to  himself  and  unfavour- 
able to  the  Tsar. 

His  conduct  towards  Great  Britain  was  somewhat  of 
the  same  nature.  If  his  Chancellor's  proposals  of  July  29 
had  been  accepted,  Great  Britain  would  forthwith  have 
felt  the  paralysing  sense  of  shame  which  is  more  deadly 
than  fifty  defeats.  Disgraced  in  the  eyes  of  the  world, 
stricken  in  all  probability  with  civil  war,  she  would 
easily  have  succumbed  in  the  final  round  of  the  w^orld- 
conflict.  For  it  is  inconceivable,  having  regard  to  the 
Kaiser's  lengthy  and  laborious  intrigues  in  Turkey^  and 
South  Africa  that  he  was  not  seeking  for  an  opportunity 
to  overthrow  his  chief  antagonist.  The  British  Empire 
met  him  everywhere;  and  his  restless  spirit,  like  that  of 
his  far  greater  exemplar,  could  not  brook  a  state  of  things 
in  which  the  British  race  occupied  the  best  lands  of  the 
world.  From  the  standpoint  of  a  German  Chauvinist 
the  conflict  between  the  two  Empires  was  inevitable ;  but 
the  eager  precipitation  of  Germany  in  clutching  at 
Antwerp  and  Ostend,  disclosed  her  ulterior  designs  and 
brought  into  the  field  the  Island  Power  which,  up  to  the 
end  of  July,  steadily  refused  to  believe  in  the  imminence 
of  war. 

If  all  Germans  are  Chauvinists  then  the  war  was 
unavoidable ;  and  it  is  now  known  from  the  Secret  Report 
of  the  German  Government  that  in  the  spring  and  summer 
of  1914  official  influence  was  used  in  order  to  excite  public 
opinion  to  the  state  of  exaltation  in  which  war  was 
acclaimed  as  ushering  in  the  hour  of  Germany's  greatness. 
If,  I  say,  this  is  the  permanent  conviction  of  the  German 

^  Note  the  naive  admission  of  the  German  Chancellor  in  his  speech 
of  December  2,  that  the  Turks  were  obliged  to  join  in  the  war. 


186  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

people,  then  war  will  possibly  be  the  occupation  of  tiie 
human  race  during  as  long  a  period  as  occurred  under  the 
baneful  sway  of  Napoleon  I. 

But  surely  defeat  must  bring  calmer  thoughts.  The 
Germans  must  cease  to  plan  a  Weltpolilik  that  endangers 
the  existence  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Belgium,  Holland, 
Russia,  the  Balkan  States,  and  Japan,  probably,  also,  of 
the  United  States.  In  Talleyrand's  famous  phrase  they 
must  cease  to  be  world-conquerors  and  become  "good 
"  Europeans."  They  will,  before  long,  realize  that  the 
rdgime  of  force,  which  three  triumphanc  wars  have  taught 
them  to  acclaim  as  the  chief  factor  in  German  progress, 
must  lead  to  disaster.  In  the  nature  of  things,  force 
begets  force;  and  the  vaster  and  more  aggressive  the 
schemes  championed  by  their  War-Lord,  the  more  certain 
is  it  that  other  nations  will  unite  to  resist  them  to  the  very 
death.  That  is  the  outstanding  lesson  of  the  events  of  a 
century  ago  in  which  Prussia  bore  her  part  nobly  against 
schemes  of  universal  domination.  The  songs  of  Arndt  and 
the  exploits  of  BlUcher,  to  which  she  now  appeals  on  behalf 
of  her  war  of  conquest,  ought  to  recall  her  to  the  ideals 
of  national  independence  and  of  resistance  to  an  aggressive 
imperialism,  for  which  a  century  ago  she  strove  shoulder 
to  shoulder  with  the  British  and  Russian  soldiery.  Of 
late  she  has  been  maddened  by  the  lust  of  conquest  which 
brought  ruin  to  Napoleonic  France.  Let  her  hark  back 
from  Treitschke  to  Niebuhr,  from  Nietzsche  to  Fichte, 
from 

"  DeutBchland,  Deutschland,  fiber  alles,  tiber  alles  in  der  Welt," 
to  Die  Wacht  am  Rhein. 

In  that  happier  day,  which  is  surely  ahead  after  these 
horrors  are  past,  Germany  will,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  discover 


THE   RUPTURE  187 

that  international  law,  on  which  she  has  insanely  trampled, 
may  prove  to  be  her  safest  support.  For  when  the  din 
of  war  dies  down,  we  shall  realize  that  behind  the 
lust  of  conquest  there  was  an  elemental  force  impelling 
the  German  people  forward.  Their  population  is  ever 
increasing ;  and  they  must  have  more  elbow-room  in  some 
of  the  sparsely  inhabited  lands.  On  this  occasion  they 
have  sought  the  disastrously  wrong  method  of  war. 
Just  as  Napoleon  the  Great  mercilessly  exploited  the 
nascent  strength  of  French  democracy,  so,  too,  his  imi- 
tator has  now  made  use  of  the  natural  desire  of  his  people 
for  expansion  to  bring  about  conflicts  of  even  wider 
extent  and  greater  fury.  In  both  cases  the  methods 
employed  were  disastrous;  but  we  must  recognize  the 
naturalness  of  the  impelling  force  behind  both  Emperors. 
A  century  ago  there  was  no  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  as 
to  the  vital  interests  of  nations.  To-day  there  is  such  a 
Court,  the  Hague  Tribunal.  The  wiser  and  better  course 
for  Germany  would  have  been  to  seek  to  enlarge  its 
powers  so  as  to  include  the  consideration  of  her  important 
vital  problem,  and  the  adoption  of  some  scheme  which 
promised  a  peaceful  solution. 

In  the  course  of  the  reaction  in  favour  of  inter- 
national law,  to  which  its  insane  violation  must  lead, 
the  Hague  Tribunal  will  surely  acquire  an  added  dignity, 
a  wider  scope,  and  surer  guarantees,  in  the  discharge  of 
its  beneficent  functions.  The  task  will,  doubtless,  prove 
to  be  difficult;  and  cynics  will  point  to  the  Holy  Alliance 
of  the  monarchs  as  a  warning  example.  But,  though 
three  or  four  monarchs  failed  ninety  years  ago,  may  not 
the  collective  wisdom  of  all  the  nations  now  succeed? 
For  my  part  I  cannot  believe  that  the  ingenuity  of  the 


ISS  THE  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WAR 

human  race,  wbich  has  lately  gone  so  largely  towards 
perfecting  the  means  of  slaughter,  must  always  fail  in 
providing  a  remedy  for  slaugliter.  The  enlarged  and 
strengthened  Areopagus  of  the  nations  must  and  will 
discuss  such  questions  as  the  excessive  pressure  of  popu- 
lation in  one  State,  and  it  will  seek  to  direct  the  surplus 
to  waste  or  ill-cultivated  lands.  In  that  more  intelligent 
and  peaceful  future  Germans  will  not  need  to  "hack  their 
way  through."  The  fiat  of  mankind  will,  I  hope,  go 
forth  that  they  shall  acquire,  if  need  be,  parts  of  Asia 
Minor,  Mesopotamia,  and  South  Brazil.  America  will 
reahze  that  the  world  cannot  for  ever  bow  down  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  especially  as  the  United  States  have 
become  a  colonising  Power,  but  that  parts  of  South 
America  may  safely  be  thrown  open  to  systematic  coloni- 
sation by  a  nation  hke  Germany.  Above  all,  the  Council 
of  the  Nations  will  decide  that  an  efiete  rule  hke  that  of 
the  Turks  must  give  way  before  that  of  more  progressive 
peoples.  If  this  is  the  outcome  of  the  present  awful 
conflict,  it  will  not  have  been  waged  wholly  in  vain. 

Note.  On  December  5,  1914  the  Italian  Premier,  Signer 
Giolitti,  declared  that  Austria,  on  August  9,  1913,  announced 
privately  to  Germany  and  Italy  her  intention  of  proceeding  against 
Serbia.  Italy  refused  to  co-operate.  It  is  clear,  then,  that  Austria's 
coup  of  July  23,  1914  had  long  been  planned,  and  that  the  murder 
of  the  Archduke  aiEorded  the  pretext. 


l-H 

1 

.—1 

1— 1 

o 

P=J 

CO 

o 

O 

»• 

d 

Tl< 

1  " 

<N        1 

r-t          j 

•-. 

p4 

vii 

»o 

o 

«^ 

i-H 
I— 1 

i-l 

Ph 

(N 

o 

00 

M 

•^ 

d 

<* 

(N 

pH 

O 

»- 

H 

t-                    1 

»o 

O 

O               e^ 

o 

1— 1 

1 

Oi 

o 

1—4 

pq 

<N 

1 

O                  j       l> 

o 

d 

Tj< 

<N 

'^ 

H 

00 

o 

lO 

05 

1 

00 

o 

fe 

o 

o 

t* 

)0 

d 

rJ< 

C) 

r-{ 

-* 

H 

(N 

CO                         o 

l-H 

la 

CO 

1 
o 

CD 

l-H 

^  i  " 

^                                j      O                j      >o 

O 

o 

^      j     CO                   o 

N 

p-4 

o 

CO 

p4 

CO 

O              1 

1—1 

»o 

l-H 

l-H 

1 

o 

o 

1-4 

p^     ^ 

<N 

pH                        o 

00 

O 

(M 

d 

(M 

o 

r-i              }       (M 

r— 1 

o 

l-H 

H 

CO 

o 

o 

o 

<N 

^H 

00 

CO 

o 

Ci 

l-H 

pR 

o 

1—1 

o 

CO                O 

o 

I-H 

d 

(N 

1— * 

CO 

CO 

O 

o 

^ 

TJH 

o 

O                          CO 

l-H 

o 

r-H 

2 

o 

CT) 
l-H 

ph* 

o 

o 

o 

d 

o 

'^ 

1—4 

p4 

<M 

o 

CO 

1 

CO 

o 

(—1 

fR 

-* 

rH 

d 

1— 1 

I-) 

H 

«5 

rJH 

1* 

a 

O 

S     3     fl 

ft  ^ 
Pi4  ^ 

£2 

1 

2 

<u 

2 

CO 

ft 

m 

e3 
O 
W 
O 
o 

04 

1 

oa 

APPENDIX  II 

GERMAN  PLANS  IN  SOUTH-WEST  AFRICA 

{Extracts  reprinted  by  permission  from  the  London  Weekly  Journal, 

*'SoiUh  Africa.") 

(By  the  Special  Commissioner  of  the  Transvaal  ChronicUt  in  the  autumn 

of  1912.) 

No.  6. 

It  IS  common  knowledge  amongst  all  Germans  on  tlie  spot 
that  Bismarck's  aim  and  desire  was  to  effect  a  footing  in  South 
Africa — i.e.  the  Transvaal,  even  if  at  the  risk  of  insult  to  the 
Boer  Government  in  the  days  long  gone  by.  Baulked,  however, 
by  the  fact  of  the  Bechuanaland  annexation,  the  scheme  to 
construct  a  strategical  railway  from  the  Swakop  via  Windhoek 
to  Johannesburg  failed.  So  did  a  further  scheme  by  which 
**a  few  regiments  of  Prussian  soliders  could  be  landed  at 
Delagoa  Bay  to  force  a  passage  into  the  Transvaal!"  {vide  a 
Transvaal  Secret  Service  document).  The  amount  of  ammuni- 
tion near  Angra  Pequena  in  1883  gave  rise  to  grave  suspicion 
at  the  Foreign  Office  in  Downing  Street,  for  the  country  had 
once  been  British,  and  movements  of  troops,  etc.,  in  1885  were 
watched  by  British  officers  after  the  quitting  of  Palgrave  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  Hottentot  and  Herero  wars  in  1887. 

No.  7. 

There  are  ten  thousand  trained  German  soldiers  in  German 
South-West  Africa.  Arms,  ammunition,  military  supplies, 
and  stores  to  last  an  army  of  10,000  men,  fully  equipped,  for 
six  years,  are  now  being  rushed  into  the  country.  Five 
thousand  trained  soldiers,  with  military  equipment  and  stores 
for  two  years,  are  now  concentrated  within  150  nriles  of  the 
Union  border.    German  official  statistics  show  that  there  are 


GERMAN  PLANS  IN  SOUTH-WEST  AFRICA     191 

only  8000  native  males  above  the  age  of  15  in  the  whole 
southern  portion  of  the  country,  and  nearly  all  north  of  the 
area  where  the  troop3  are  concentrated.  These  natives  possess 
no  rifles,  and  two- thirds  are  in  military  camps  under  constant 
police  supervision.  There  are  about  30,000  adult  native 
males  in  the  northern  portion  of  the  country.  The  Germans 
assert  that  they  are  afraid  of  outbreaks  among  these  natives 
of  the  north.  It  would  take  two  days  at  the  most  to  bring  a 
strong  German  force  to  the  Union  frontier.  It  would  take  14 
days  to  bring  a  similar  force  from  where  they  are  concentrated 
to  this  "dangerous"  area.  The  force  concentrated  near  the 
Union  border  is  therefore  not  intended  for  such  native  disturb- 
ances.    What  is  it  there  for? 

Recently  several  inspired  German  papers  have  demanded 
an  increase  in  the  South-West  African  naval  squadron  and 
garrison.  At  present  the  number  of  men  serving  with  the 
regular  forces  in  German  South-West  Africa  is  2300.  But  we 
must  not  forget  that  nearly  2000  German  men  enter  the  country 
annually,  of  whom  a  large  number  are  officials.  Every  one  of 
these  is  a  trained  soldier.  Recently  there  has  been  a  particu- 
larly keen  official  search  through  the  country  for  all  German 
subjects  fit  for  instant  military  service.  In  fact,  unusual 
activity  prevails.  Many  young  fellows  are  trying  to  get  out 
of  liability  for  service  by  escaping  to  the  Cape 

The  white  population  of  German  South-West  Africa  in 
January,  1910,  according  to  official  statistics,  was  11,791;  of 
these  8960  are  males,  an  increase  of  males  of  2996  as  compared 
with  the  year  previous.  There  has  been  an  equally  great 
increase  since.  The  numbers  given  include  the  military. 
About  10,000  men  can  now  take  the  field,  and  provision  is 
made  for  10,000  in  guns,  ammunition,  supplies,  and  provisions 
now  being  stored  in  the  country. 

A  glance  at  the  bills  of  lading  for  1910  shows  that  to  every 
white  man,  woman,  and  child  provisions  equal  to  five  and 
three-quarter  tons  are  imported  into  the  country.  These 
bills  of  lading  are  guarded  almost  sacredly,  and  access  to  them 
ifl  only  possible  by  scheming  and  bribing  the  officials  in  charge 
of  them.  Why?  Because  the  military  supplies  are  not 
published  under  the  heading  of  imports,  but  only  what  is 
being  imported  by  the  civil  population.  This  is  significant, 
and  must  be  borne  in  mind  when  speaking  of  military  supplies. 


192  APPENDIX  II 

At  the  present  moment  a  six  j^ears'  supply  of  provisions 
and  other  stores  is  stored  at  a  point  north  of  Aus,  180  miles 
from  the  coast,  400  miles  travelling  from  Raman's  Drift,  on 
the  Union  frontier.  The  idea  is  that  should  a  foe  land  at 
Liideritz  Bay  the  population  could  be  brought  up  within  a  day, 
some  120  miles  of  railway  blown  up,  the  condensers  destroyed, 
thus  leaving  the  enemy  a  long  time  without  water  in  the 
desert  sands  around  Angra  Pequena 

Now,  German  officers  and  civilians,  when  questioned,  tell 
one,  with  an  ominous  smile,  that  the  concentrating  of  troops, 
etc.,  enormous  supplies  in  arms  and  ammunition,  are  directed 
against  the  Ovambos.  If  that  is  so,  then  why  are  they  distant 
over  1000  English  miles  from  Ovamboland  proper,  as  the  crow 
flies?  Placed,  in  fact,  at  the  extreme  opposite  corner  to  the 
scene  of  the  alleged  unrest.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  on  visiting 
the  farthest  point  in  southern  Ovamboland  where  the  authori- 
ties would  allow  me  to  go,  I  found  that  the  Ovambos  are  by 
no  means  a  warlike  people.  All  this  talk  of  trouble  with  the 
Ovambos  is  the  merest  moonshine.  Again,  not  a  single  black 
man  is  allowed  the  retention  of  firearms  of  any  kind.  All 
these  natives  are  absolutely  unarmed.  Police  activity  is  by 
no  means  slack,  every  effort  being  made  to  locate  any  hidden 
firearms,  but  nothing  is  ever  found. 

A  N.C.O.  I  spoke  to  declared  that  a  portion  of  the  Ovambos 
at  the  extreme  northerly  part  of  Amboland,  hitherto  a  mere 
protectorate  whose  boundary  to  this  day  is  undefined,  was 
inhabited  by  a  chief  who  took  a  large  number  of  rifles  from  the 
Portuguese  during  the  skirmishes  in  Southern  Angola,  prior 
to  the  Herero  trouble  with  the  Germans.  But  on  making 
official  inquiries  upon  my  return  to  Windhoek  later,  no  one 
could  verify  the  report.  If  the  Ovambos  were  really  the  cause 
of  all  this  arming  to  the  teeth  on  the  part  of  the  Germans, 
how  is  it  that  the  Portuguese  trading  stations  south  of  the 
Kunene  River  are  not  molested?  To-day  Portuguese  traders 
may  be  seen  peacefully  at  work,  single-handed,  in  what  is 
called  German  territory,  and  conquering  the  country  by 
peaceable  means.  I  have  had  several  conversations  with  both 
Ovambo  leaders  and  police  patrols  whilst  at  Grootfontein 
North  during  September  of  last  year.  There  was  nothing 
■which  led  me  to  believe  that  trouble  of  any  sort  was  brewing. 


GERMAN  PLANS  IN  SOUTH-WEST  AFRICA    193 

No.  8. 

Windhoek  is  the  capital  of  German  South- West  Africa, 
and  one  would  have  thought  that  there — and  not  right  away 
down  south  near  the  British  border — the  military  centre  with 
supplies  would  be  infinitely  greater  and  on  a  larger  scale. 
Especially  should  this  be  the  case  when  one  remembers  that  it 
lies  some  400  English  miles  near  the  "dreaded"  Ovamboland. 
Principally  from  my  own  observations  conducted  on  the  spot 
and  from  information  supplied  from  a  trustworthy  official 
source  and  the  ready  assistance  afforded  me  by  my  friend,  I 
found  that  at  the  time  of  my  visit  a  few  months  since,  smiths, 
farriers,  painters,  carpenters,  and  saddlers  had  more  than  their 
hands  full  in  coping  with  the  amount  of  work  thrust  on  them ; 
saddlers  and  harnessmakers  were,  in  fact,  working  overtime 
at  night  to  satisfy  the  officers  from  the  various  depots  mentioned 
in  the  last  article,  and  to  supply  their  wants 

When  completed  a  great  network  of  railways  for  strategical 
purposes  leading  out  to  the  Union  border  will  be  available. 
To-day  mails,  say  from  Liideritz  Bay  to  Windhoek,  are  carried 
by  steamer  only,  a  most  irregular  service.  Telegraphic  com- 
munication, of  course,  is  long  established,  and  many  more 
new  branch  lines  are  under  construction,  under  this  head. 
The  railway  is  constructed  throughout  on  the  Union  pattern, 
or  what  is  still  called  the  Cape  gauge,  except  the  Otawi  line, 
which  is  narrow  gauge,  and  a  small  section  between  Swakop- 
mund  and  Karibib,  half-way  to  Windhoek,  all  of  which  is 
about  to  be  altered  to  Cape  gauge.  Work  already  has  been 
commenced  from  the  Windhoek  side.  The  Germans  hope 
one  day  to  link  up  with  the  South  African  railways  from  Kalk- 
fontein  South  via  Warmbad,  to  a  point  at  the  border  presum- 
ably. Thus  their  troops  could  be  hurried,  on  the  completion 
of  the  railways  now  building,  a  thousand  miles  by  rail  from 
the  north  through  to  the  south  to  the  Union  border  in  the 
space  of  a  few  days. 

No.  9. 

Let  me  quote  a  passage  which  appeared  in  the  columns  of 
the  London  Magazine  of  March,  1910,  signed  by  "Anglo- 
German."  The  writer  says,  tn^er  aZia  .•  "  During  a  recent  stay 
in  Germany,  I  was  introduced,  by  a  man  whom  I  knew  to  be 

B.  L.  13 


194  APPENDIX  11 

one  of  the  chief  functionaries  of  the  institute  known  as  the 
*  Commerce  Defence  Leasjue,'  to  a  friend  of  his  who  had  just 
returned  from  German  South-West  Africa.  On  a  subsequent 
meeting  I  entered  into  conversation  with  this  gentleman,  and 
made  some  inquiries  concerning  the  country.  He  said  little 
headway  was  made,  and  little  was  looked  for.  Men  and  money 
were  being  freely  expended,  without  present  return.  The 
only  good  harbour  was  in  the  hands  of  the  British  (Walfisch 
Bay),  as  were  all  the  islands  on  the  coast. 

"^Vlly,  then,"  I  asked,  "do  the  Germans  persist  in  their 
occupation  of  the  country?'* 

He  answered  frankly,  smiling  craftily:  "We  Germans  look 
far  ahead,  my  friends.  We  foresee  another  debacle  in  South 
Africa,  and  we  are  on  the  spot.  Thanks  to  the  pioneers  of  our 
League,  our  plans  are  all  matured.  The  League  finance  the 
scheme,  and  the  Government  supplies  the  military  forces. 
Walfisch  Bay  will  before  long  be  German  territory,  by  cession 
— or  otherwise  (?),  but  in  the  meantime  British  free  trade 
opposes  no  obstacles  to  us,  and  we  can  pursue  our  pui-pose 
unmolested." 

"  What  is  that  purpose  ? " 

"Surely  you  are  not  so  blind  as  to  need  enlightenment?" 
was  his  reply.  "Germany  has  long  since  regarded  South 
Africa  as  a  future  possession  of  her  own.  When  the  inevitable 
happens,  and  Great  Britain  finds  her  hands  full  elsewhere,  we 
are  ready  to  strike  the  moment  the  signal  is  given,  and  the 
Cape,  Bechuanaland,  Rhodesia — all  the  frontier  States — will 
fall  like  ripe  apples  into  our  grasp." 

I  might  here  state  that  the  Germans  are  apt  to  count  the 
unhatched  chickens,  flushed  with  the  success  of  their  intrigues. 
Frequently  I  have  heard  it  stated,  whilst  in  the  country,  even 
from  Marines,  that  one  day  the  German  ensign  would  "fly  on 
the  Lion's  Head,"  and  that  in  the  event  of  trouble  between 
England  and  Germany  the  Boers  would  side  with  the  invading 
forces  into  the  Union  of  South  Africa. 

I 


INDEX 


Abdul  Hamid   11,  83,  86,  99,  119, 

127,  130 
Adriatic    121 
iEgean    118 
Aehrenthal     (Baron    von)      125, 

136 
Afghanistan    12,  77,  88,  156 
Agadir    69,  75,  80,  81,  140,  149 
Aix-la-Chapelle    31 
Albania    119,  124,  131,  132 
Albert,  King    183 
Alexander  of  Battenberg    26 
Alexander,  King    121,  136,  169 
Alexander  II    8 
Alexander  III    104 
Alexandretta    88 
Algeria    69 
Algesiras    77,  78,  125 
Algiers    144 
Alsace  Lorraine  5,  47,  Lecture  V, 

92,  157 
America    41,  188 
Ampthill  (Lord),  see  Russell,  Odo 
Anatolia  88 
Angra  Pequena    13,  14 
Antwerp  49,  64,  84,  175,  179,  180, 

185 
Arabi  Pasha    11 
Argentina    55 
ArgyU  (Duke  of)    12 
Armenia    121,  122 
Amdt    186 

Arthur  (Port)    52,  123 
Asia  Minor    82,  84,  88,  122,  126, 

132,  188 
Asquith  (Mr)    180 
Athens    101,  133 
Australia    143 


Austria,  see  also  Central  Powers 
10,  11.  74,  78,  85,  97,  105,  115, 
118,  119,  120,  121,  123,  124, 
126,  127,  128,  129,  130,  131, 
132,  133,  134,  135,  136,  137, 
147,  152,  160,  162,  163,  164, 
165,  166,  168,  172,  173,  177 

Bagdad  Lecture  IV,  82,  83,  84, 
85,  87,  88,  89,  121.  122 

Balbo  (Count)    118 

Balfour  (Arthur)    83 

Balkan  Peninsula  85,  114,  118, 
121,  186 

Barclay  (Sir  T.)  100  w.  111,  112, 
113  w 

Basra    84 

Beaconsfield  (Lord)    78 

Bebel  (Herr)    73 

Bechuanaland    16 

Belfort    93,  94,  95 

Belgian  Congo    176 

Belgium  6,  8,  23,  24,  91,  154, 
161,  166,  174,  175,  176,  177, 
178,  179,  180,  181,  182,  183. 
184,  186 

Belgrade    133 

Beowulf    21 

Berhn  4  n.  5,  8,  13,  15,  26,  57,  58, 
76,  76,  77,  78.  80,  86,  87,  90. 
98,  99,  102,  111,  113,  114,  119, 
121,  123,  130,  132,  133,  134, 
141,  143,  144,  151,  155,  157, 
159,  162,  164,  165,  166,  173, 
175,  178,  181,  183.  184 

Bernhardi  (F.  von)  39,  63,  114, 
137,  145,  152,  157,  159,  162 

Bessarabia    135 


196 


INDEX 


Betham-Edwarda    105  n 

Bethmann  -  HoUwcg  (Chancellor) 
178,  180 

Bieberstein  (Baron  Marschall  von) 
85,  127 

Bismarck  4,  6,  6,  7,  9,  10,  11,  12, 
13,  14,  20,  21,  25,  26,  27,  40, 
44,  50,  66,  87,  92,  93,  94,  95, 
96,  97,  98,  99,  101,  102,  103  n, 
104,  106,  110,  130,  131,  163, 
155,  156,  157,  175 

Bloemfontein    60 

Blowitz  (H.  S.  de)    8,  98  n 

Bliicher    3,  21,  186 

Blumenthal  (Count  von)    93  n 

Boer  Republic  12, 13, 15, 16, 17,  71 

Bonn  University    33 

Bordeaux    94 

Bosnia-Herzegovina  86,  115,  119, 
124,  129,  158 

Bosphorus    84 

Botha  (General)    60 

Boulanger  (General)    100 

Bourgeois  (M.)    58 

Brazil  (South)    54,  56,  75,  188 

Bremen    12,  13 

Brittany    93,  116 

Broglie    4  n 

Brussels    148,  182 

Buchanan  (Sir  George)    167,  169 

Bucher    11,  12,  17 

Bucheron  (Dr)    37 

Bug    160 

Bukharest    133,  158 

Bulgaria  116,  120,  122,  129,  131, 
132,  135 

Bulow  (Prince)   59,  72,  128  n 

Bundy  (Mr)    59 

Bunsen  (Sir  M,  de)    164,  166 

Burgers  (President)    12 

Busch    11,  26,  50,  93,  103 

Caillaux  (Mme.)    140,  165,  166 

Calmet  (Dom)    110  n 

Cambon  (Jules)    159,  173,  182 

Cameroons    17,  76 

Canada    143 

Cape  Colony    14,  68 

Cape  Town    17,  143 

Carlsbad    127 

Carlyle  (Thomas)    3,  154 


Carthage    142 
Cassavetti  (Signor)     120  n 
Cassel    33 
Catherine  II     117 
Caucasia    82 

Central  Powers,  see  also  Germany 
and  Austria  3,  50, 134, 160, 162, 
167,  168,  169 
Ceuta    69 

Chamberlain  (J.)     19,  68 
Charlemagne    103 
Charles  XII  (of  Sweden)    44,  139 
China    52,  54,  100 
ChurchiU  (Winston)    148 
aass  (Herr)    80  n 
Clausewitz    156 
C16menceau    100 
Colmar    108 
Cologne    77 

Congo  Free  State    62,  147 
Constantinople   85,  89,  90, 98, 116, 

117,  121,  126,  127,  133,  172 
Crispi   59,  98  n,  131  n 
Cromwell  (Oliver)    177 
Cronstadt    165,  166,  172 
Crown  Prince    6,  39 
Cuba   61 
Cyprus    121 

Dahiy     123 

Damascus    88 

Danefif    132 

Daniell  (Herr)    64 

Danube    118,  119 

Dauphin6    93 

Davin  (Commandant)     147 

Debidour  (Mons.)     120  n 

Delagoa  Bay    13,  15,  57 

Delarey  (General)    60 

Delcasse  (Mons.)    69,  70,  71,  77 

Demolins  (Mons.)    108 

Denmark    3 

Derby  (Lord)    7 

Descamps  (E.)    176  n 

Deschanel  (Mons.)   71 

Dicey  (Edward)    29 

Diebitsch    117 

Disraeli   66 

Doberitz    32 

Draga,  Queen    136,  170 

Durham  (Miss  Edith)    123,  130 


INDEX 


197 


East  Africa    17 

Edward  I     176,  177 

Edward  VII    23,  61,  62,  70,'80,  86, 

112,  113,  120,  141 
Egypt     11,    14,  33,    41,    70,    82, 
88,  90,  99,  112,  121,  126,  134, 
144 
Eliot  (Sir  C.)    126  n 
Elkind  (L.)    30,  83  n,  104  n 
Ems  (River)    66 
England,  see  Great  Britain 
Esthonia    64 

Fashoda    69,  71 

Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria    129,  132 

Ferry  (Mons.)    99 

Fez    70,  80 

Fichte    186 

Fitzpatrick    56 

Flanders    177 

Flushing    175 

France  4,  6,  6,  8,  9,  11,  23,  43, 
69,  66,  72,  74,  75,  76,  77,  80,  81, 
91,  93,  96,  97,  98,  99,  101,  103, 
107,  108,  109,  111,  112,  121, 
123,  127,  130,  131,  139,  140, 
141,  144,  147,  157,  158,  160, 
162,  166,  167,  168,  169,  172, 
174,  179,  181,  182,  184 

Francis  Ferdinand  (Archduke)  91, 
115,  136,  160 

Francis  Joseph    124,  127,  137 

Frankfurt    12,  40 

Frankfurt  on  the  Oder    104 

Frederick  the  Great  21,  22,  23,  26, 
27,  96,  104,  153,  155,  157 

Frederick  William  I    102 

Frederick  WiUiam  11  22,  153, 
156 

Frederick  William  m  29,  153, 
156 

Frederick  William  IV    21,  23 

Frederick-Charles  (Prince)    104 

Frederick  (Empress)    26 

French  Congo    131 

Frere  (Sir  Bartle)    \2n,  13 

Freycinet  (Mons.  de)    98,  99 

FrobeniuB   142,  159 

Gambetta    69 
Gambia   68 


Gardiner  (Dr  S.  R.)    2 

Gavaid  (C.)    7 

Geffcken  (Prof.)    6 

George  V    177 

German  East  Africa    17,  61 

German  New  Guinea    17 

German  South  West  Africa  15,  16, 
51,  Appendix  II 

Germany,  see  also  Central  Powers 
Lecture  III,  6,  10,  11,  13,  75, 
77,  78,  80,  81,  83,  86,  88,  89, 
92,  96,  97,  100,  103,  106,  107, 
109,  111,  112,  113,  123,  126, 
127,  130,  131,  133,  140,  141, 
144,  145,  146,  147,  148,  150, 
153,  155,  156,   157,   159,  163, 

165,  166,  167,  168,  173,  174, 
176,  177,  178,  181,  184,  187 

Gibraltar    18,  68,  69 

Gladstone  (W.  E.)  12,  15,  19, 
155,  175 

Gneisenau  21 

Goethe  157 

Goltz  (General  von  der)    83 

Goluchowski  (Count)    125 

Gontaut-Biron  (de)    4» 

Gortschakoff  (Prince)    6 

Goschen  (Sir  Edward)  8,  166.  174, 
178,  180,  181 

Granville  (Lord)    14,  18,  19,  61 

Great  Britain  3,  5,  8,  9,  11,  12, 
13,  16,  18,  50,  59,  68,  69,  72, 
74,  75,  76,  79,  81,  82,  85,  98, 
100,  112,  113,  114,  121,  123, 
125,  127,  142,  144,  145,  157, 
161,  162,  166,  167,  168,  172, 
174,  175,  176,  179,  182,  183, 
185,  186 

Great  Elector,  The    21 

Grey  (Sir  Edward)    79,  86,  113, 

166.  167,  168,  173,  181,  182, 
183 

Guinea  Coast    17,  68 

Hague  Conference    153,  175,  187 

Hamburg    12,  13 

Hapsburgs     118,    120,    146,    164, 

166 
Harden  (M.)    105  n 
Hardmge  (Sir  Charles)    79 
Hayti    61 

13—3 


198 


INDEX 


Headlam  (J.  W.)    98  n 

Hedjaz    121 

Hegci    46 

Heligoland    18,  19,  51 

Henckel  von  Donnersmai  ck(Prince) 

76 
Hinzclin    (E.)      101    n,     105    n, 

108  n 
Hinzpeter  (G.)    33  w,  34 
Hohcnlohe    (Prince)      19  n,     53, 

103,  110 
Holland    5,  142,  174,  177,  186 
Holy  Land    82 
Hungary    136 

Iberian  Peninsula    116 

India    41,  88,  126,  134,  143 

Indus  144 

Ischl    127 

Italy  11,  70,  74,  78,  98,  99,  116, 
123,  128,  130,  131,  137,  147, 
162,  159,  166,  167,  168,  169, 
179 

Jagow  (von)    165,  166,  181 

Jameson  (Dr)    67 

Japan    52,  54,  66,  123,  157,  186 

Jerusalem    83 

Johannesburg    69 

Jonescu  (Mons.)    133 

Joubert  (Piet)    13 

Kaiser,  see  William  II 

Kant    157 

Kazan  170 

Kellemiann    93 

Kiao-Chao    36,  53,  54 

Kiderlen-Wachter  (Herr)    80 

Kieff    170 

Kiel   18,  19,  52,  82,  105,  106,  143, 

140,  147 
Kirke    17 
Kleber    93 

Klein  (Herr)    101,  102 
Kochani    131 
Koniggratz    3 
Korea    123 
Kossovo    116 
Koweit    84,  86 

Kruger  (Paul)    13,  16,  56,  57,  59 
Krupp    132,  167,  159,  179 


Lamprecht  (Prof.)    32,  33,  36,  38, 

171,  178 
Lansdowno  (Lord)    70,  86,   112 
Laurent  (Mons.)    113  n 
Leipzig    108 
Lemaitre  (Jules)    113 
Leroy      (Mons.)       103  n,      108  n, 

113  n 
Leudet  (Mons.)    33  n,  34,  37  n 
Levant    54 
Leyds  (Dr)    57 
Liao-tung    52 

Lichnowsky  (Prince)    106,  181 
Lisbon    57 

Lloyd  George  (Mr)    81 
London     14,   18,  44,  66,   86,   87, 

96,  113,  126,  132,  151,  164 
Lorraine    140 
Lothringen    111 

Louis  XIV  and  XV  38,  47,  79,  92 
Lowe  (Mr)    92  n 
Liideritz  (Herr)    13,  14,  13 
Luxemburg    65,  176,  182 

Maas  (Herr)    108 
Macaulay  (T.  B.)    22 
Macedonia  119,  120,  121,  122,  123, 

124,  125,  126,  131,  132,  133 
Machiavelli    98 
McMahon  (Marshal)    174 
Madagascar    70,  100,  112 
Madrid    70 
Magyars    136 
Majuba    12,  156 
Manchuria    77,  114,  125 
Maria  Theresa    154 
Marlborough  (Duke  of)    177 
Marschall  von  Bieberstein  (Baron) 

86,  127 
Maximihan  I   32 
Mecca    88 
Merv    12 

Mesopotamia    82,  84,  85,  88,  188 
Metz    92.  93,  101,  110,  111,  112 
Meuse    118,  179,  180 
Mexico    140 
Milan,  King    120 
Minchin  (J.)     120 
Mitrovitza     120 
Mogador    69,  75 
Moltke    21,  93,  94,  95,  157 


INDEX 


199 


Mommsen  (Prof.)    61 

Montenegro     120,  158 

Morel  (E.  D.)    71  w,  74  n,  82  n 

Morier  (Sir  R.)  5,  6,  92  n,  101, 
102  71 

Morocco  Lecture  IV,  68,  69,  70, 
71,  72,  73,  74,  75,  76,  79,  80, 
131,  140,  141,  144,  146,  158 

Moscow    44,  170 

Moselle    65 

Miihlhausen    103 

Mukden    73 

Munich    5,  6,  111,  163 

Miinster  (Count)     18,  51 

Miirzsteg     123,  123 

Namur    179 

Nachtigal  (Dr)    17 

Napoleon  I  7,  22,  32,  41,  42,  43, 
47,  68,  79,  89,  106,  117,  137, 
139, 140. 142. 160.  171,  186,  187 

Napoleon  III     3,  156,  175 

Navies    Appendix  I 

Newfoundland    70,  112 

New  Hebrides    70 

New  Republic    15 

Ney    93 

Niebuhr     186 

Niemen     160 

Nietzsche    186 

Niger    68,  112 

North  Africa    11 

North  Sea     118 

Norway     178  n 

Novi  Bazar    120,  125,  123,  159 

Nyassaland    51 

Odessa    170 
Oppert  (Mr)    98 
Orange  Free  State    56 
Ostend    49,  84,  180,  185 
Ovambos    143 

Paris  44,  58,  66,  75,  76,  77,  86, 
87,  98,  100,  126,  130,  160,  165, 
178,  179,  180 

Paulsen  (Prof.)     47 

Pechmann  (Baron  von)     111 

Persia    79,  85,  87,  88,  133 

Peter,  King    ^"^9 

Peter  the  Qreat    116 


Peters  (Dr)     17 

Petrogiad    8,  44,  72,  79,  100,  105, 

123,    126,    127,  133,  138,  166, 

167,  168,  173 
Philip  II     78 
Pigeon  (Amedee)     33 
Pinon  (R.)    69  w,  71  » 
Pitt  (W.)  Junr.    2 
Plevna    119 
Poincare    (President)     140,    165, 

172 
Poland     174,  184 
Portugal    15,  142,  157 
Posen     103 
Potsdam   27,  36,  86,  87,  122,  158, 

172 
Pretoria     16,  56,  58 
Prussia  83, 102, 104, 153, 165, 156, 

186 

Quesnay    142 

Rachfal  (F.)    74  r?,  80  n 

Ramsay  (Sir  W.)    127  » 

Rapp    93 

Rasch  (E.)    101,  103 

Reval    126,  127 

Reventlow  (Count)  33  n,  58,  59, 
69  n,  72  n,  80  n,  100  n,  113, 
114  n.  123  n,  127  »,  128  », 
141.  i42 

Rhine    77.  118 

Rohlfs  (Herr)     17 

Rohrbach  (Dr  P.)  54.  84,  85,  88, 
139,  142,  143,  144  ri 

Rome  70,  99,  128,  131,  159,  108, 
172,  184 

Roon    21,  157 

Roosevelt  (Theodore)    78 

Rosobery  (Lord)     112 

Rouen     96 

Roumania    119,  135 

Rouvier  (Mons.)     96 

Rumbold  (Sir  Horace)   4,  83  n 

Russell  (Arthur)    6 

Russell  (Odo)    6,  7,  10 

Russia  8,  9,  10,  11,  12,  20,  58,  66, 
73.  77,  78,  79,  82,  84,  86,  87, 
89,  91,  97,  98,  105,  106,  114, 
117,  118,  119,  121,  122,  123, 
124,  125,  128,  135,   1^1    139, 


200 


INDEX 


144,  147,  161,  167,  158,  160, 
IGl,  104,  166,  167,  168,  169, 
170, 172, 173, 174, 179, 184, 186 

St  Jolin  (Frederick)    129  n 

St  Lucia  Bay    15 

St  Petersburg,  see  Petrograd 

Salisbury  (Lord)    10,  10,  20,  51 

Salonica    49,  119,  120,  126,  128, 

172 
Samoa    17 
Sanjak  of  Novi  Bazar    120,  125, 

128,  159 
Saxony    154,  155,  183 
SaxonoflE    138,  167 
Scheldt    175,  177,  179 
Schierbrand    (W.     von)      37   n, 

53  n 
Schiller    157 
Schleswig-Holstein    158 
Schnabele  (Herr)    104 
Sedan    3,  65,  174 
Seine    3,  96 
Serajevo    137,  163 
Serbia     115,   116,   120,   121,   122, 

128,   129,   131,   132,   135,   136, 

138,  152,   158,   162,   163,   164, 

166,  167,  170,  171,  172,  184 
Seton-Watson    (Mr)    136 
Shantung  Peninsula    53 
Siam    li2 
Siberia    48 

Sidney  (Sir  Philip)    177 
Silesia    154 
Sinaitic  Peninsula    90 
Skertchley  (Mr)    63 
Skiernewice    1 1 
Sluys    176,  177 
Sofia    132,  133 
Somaliland    51 
Soudan    70 

South  Africa    16,  66,  147,  App.  II 
Spain    18,  68,  69,  72,  79,  80 
Spice  Islands    51 
Steed   (W.)    125  n,  126  n,  128  », 

136 
Stockmar  (Baron)    23,  24 
Strassburg    92,  101,  111,  167 
Sublime  Porte,  see  Turkey 
Suez  Canal    88 
Suvarofi    117 


Switzerland    63,  176 
Syria    88,  90,  98 

Tacitus    21,  47 

Talleyrand    43.  78,  188 

Tangiers    68,  69,  73 

Tardieu    71  n,  73  n,  79  « 

Tchaikowsky    117 

Tetuan    69 

Thibet    79 

Thiers  (Mons.)    94,  96 

ThionviUo    110 

Tirpitz  (Admiral  von)    09 

Tittoni    120  w,  128  n 

Togoland  75 

Tokio    44,  66,  123 

Tongaland    15 

Tonquin    100 

Transvaal  Republic     12,   13,   14, 

15.  16,  56,  57 
Treitschke   45,  49,  109,  112,  114, 

142,  152.  153,  157,  186 
Tripoli   70,  99,  121,  130,  131 
Tsar    7,   26,   86,    165,    170,    171, 

184,  185 
Tschirsky  (von)    165 
Tunis    11,  98,  99,  130,  144 
Turkey    83,   84,   88,   89,   90,  98, 

119,  122,   125,  126,  129,   130, 

132.  134,  186 
Tyre    142 

United  States    78,  157,  186 

Vallona    131 

Venice    142 

Victoria,  Queen    6,  20,  27,  176 

Victoria  (sister  to  William  I)  26, 
27 

Vienna  40,  90,  105,  118,  120,  124, 
126,  130,  132,  133,  134,  135, 
136, 137, 138,  159, 164,  166, 173 

Waag  (Herr)    108 
Wales    116 
Walfisch  Bay    13 
Warren  (Sir  Charles)    16 
Warsaw    160 
Washington    66 
Waterloo    3,  176,  17? 
Wei-hei-wei   63 


INDEX 


201 


Wellington  (Duke  of)    177 

West  Africa    70 

Westlake  (Prof.)    176  n 

Wet  (General  de)    60 

Wilcocks  (Sir  W.)    85 

Wilde  (Oscar)    78 

Wilhelmshafen    146 

William  I  6,  8,  19,  21,  23,  25,  35 
95,  97,  105,  153 

WiUiam  II  3,  19,  Lecture  II,  25, 
26,  27,  29,  32,  35,  40,  43,  49, 
60,  56,  67,  60,  66,  73,  79.  83, 


86,  89,  90,  104,  105,  106,  107, 
109,  110,  112,  122,  125,  130, 
131,  137,  142,  154,  157,  165, 
169,  170,  171,  172,  176,  179, 
184,  186 

Ypres   67 

Zabem  167 
Zambesi  16 
Zanzibar  17 
Zoluland    16 


The  Lowell  Lectures,  1912 

THE  PERSONALITY 

of 

NAPOLEON 

By  J.  HOLLAND  ROSE 

Reader  in  Modern  History  to  the  University 
of  Cambridge,  Author  of "  The  Develop- 
ment of  the  European  Nations,"  "The 
Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic 
Era,"  etc. 
5^'    $2.50  net    By  mail,  $2,75 

This  volume  by  a  scholar  of  authority  includes  a  series 
of  studies  of  the  most  important  sides  of  Napoleon's  char- 
acter — (i)  Man  (including  the  salient  features  of  his 
character);  (2)  Jacobin;  (3)  Warrior;  (4)  Lawgiver;  (5) 
Emperor;  (6)  Thinker;  (7)  World  Ruler;  (8) Exile. 

This  method  of  treatment,  supported  by  numerous  ex- 
tracts from  Napoleon's  letters,  etc.,  will  offer  new  points  of 
view  in  an  oft-treated  theme. 

Though  Dr.  Rose's  pages  are  seasoned  with  anecdote, 
they  do  not  contain  an  irrelevant  incident,  and  the  result 
is  a  well-constructed,  lifelike  composite  picture  of  Napo- 
leon as  man,  warrior,  emperor,  and  ruler  of  the  world. 

"  At  once  an  excellent  summary  of  recent  research,  and 
the  most  convenient  introduction  to  the  study  of  the  great- 
est of  historic  men." — Nation  (London) 

"  As  an  analysis  of  character  and  as  an  original  portrait 
the  study  is  worthy  of  the  highest  consideration." — Chicago 
Tribune 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

New  York  London 


The  Confessions  of 
Frederick  the  Great 

and 
Treitschke's  "Life  of  Frederick" 

Edited,  with  a  Topical  and  Historical   Introduction,  by 

Douglas  Sladen 

12\    $1.25 

The  coupling  of  these  two  works  in  a  single 
volume  has  a  significance  apart  from  the  fact  that 
they  have  bearing — the  one  as  an  intimate  ex- 
pression, the  other  as  an  able  biographical  sketch 
— upon  one  of  the  great  figures  of  Prussian  and 
world  history.  Treitschke  strongly  influences  the 
philosophy  of  war  and  the  views  regarding  the 
destiny  of  the  German  nation  embodied  in 
Bernhardi's  much  discussed  book,  and  Frederick's 
CONFESSIONS,  in  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Sladen, 
is  the  soil  from  which  the  school  of  Treitschke 
and  Bernhardi  drew  sustenance. 

New  York  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons  London 


Deutschland  Uber  AUes 

Or  Germany  Speaks 

A  Collection  of  the  Utterances  of  Representative 
Germans — Statesmen,  Military  Leaders,  Scholars,  and 
Poets — in  Defence  of  the  War  Policies  of  the  Fatherland. 

Compiled  and  Analyzed  by 

John  Jay  Chapman 
/6°.    75c 


Alsace  and  Lorraine 

From  Caesar  to  Kaiser.  58  B.C.-1871  A.D. 

A  sketch  of  the  political  aflUiations  of  the  provinces 
before  the  creation  of  the  Reichsland  of  Elsass- 
Lothringen. 

By  Ruth  Putnam 

Author  of  "  A  Mediaeval  Princess,"  "  Charles  the  Bold," 
"  William  the  Silent,"  etc. 

With  Eight  Maps.     8^    $125 

Alsace — Romans,  Gauls,  and  Others  on  the  Soil  of 
Alsace — The  Treaties  of  Verdun  and  Other  Pacts  Affect- 
ing Alsace — The  Dream  of  a  Middle  Kingdom — The 
People  of  Alsace  in  the  15th  Century  and  After — The 
Thirty  Years  of  War  and  the  Peace  of  Westphalia — Louis 
XIV  and  Strasburg — Alsace  after  Annexation  to  France — 
Lorraine  in  Several  Phases  of  its  History — Alsace-Lorraine, 
1871-1914. 

New  York  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons         London 


France  Herself  Again 

By  Ernest  Dimnet 

The  well-known  historian,  Abb6  Ernest  Dimnet,  draws 
a  comparison  between  the  demoralized  France  of  1870 
and  the  united  France  of  to-day.  Headings:  The  De- 
terioration of  France ;  Under  the  Second  Empire;  Under 
the  Third  Republic ;  The  Return  of  the  Light ;  Immediate 
Consequences  of  the  Tangier  Incident;  Intellectual 
Preparation  of  the  New  Spirit;  Evidences  of  the  New 
Spirit;  The  Political  Problems  and  the  Future;  France 
and  the  War  of  1914. 

$2.50 


Japan  to  America 

Edited  by  Professor  Naoichi  Masaoka, 
of  Tokio.  A  Symposium  of  Papers  by 
Statesmen  and  Other  Leaders  of  Thought 
in  Japan. 

The  book  is  issued  under  the  auspices  of  the  Japanese 
Society  and  contains  an  introduction  by  Lindsay  Russell, 
President  of  the  Society.  It  gives  first-hand  information 
as  to  present  conditions  in  Japan,  as  to  the  ideals  and 
policies  of  Japanese  leaders,  and  on  the  all-important 
matter  of  the  state  of  public  opinion  in  Japan  in  regard 
to  the  continuing  interest  of  the  Empire  in  maintaining 
peaceful  relations  with  the  United  States. 

$1,25 


New  York         G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons  London 


The  Evidence  in 
the  Case 

In    the    Supreme    Court    of 
Civilization 

The  Case  of  The  Dual  Alliance  vs.  The  Triple  Entente 

By 
James  M.  Beck 

Late  Assistant  Attorney-General  of  the  U.  S. 

t2''.    $1.00 

In  this  volume  the  scholarly  author  sums  up, 
speaking  as  a  judge  in  a  world's  court  of  abso- 
lute impartiality,  the  causation  of  the  present 
European  War  and  the  relative  responsibilities 
of  the  nations  that  are  parties  to  the  War.  The 
author's  verdict  is  based  upon  the  official  docu- 
ments in  the  case,  and  these  dociunents  are 
presented  in  the  original  text  as  an  appendix  to 
the  argument. 

G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


Treitschke 

I2\     $1.50 

The   Writings  of   Bernhardi's   Teacher, 

Heinrich  von  Treitschke,  Together 

with   a   Life,   by   His   Close 

Friend)  Adolf  Hausrath 

The  works  of  this  great  German  historian 
have  shaped  the  present  policy  of  Germany  in 
its  attempt  to  secure  a  dominating  influence  in 
Europe  and  throughout  the  world.  The  follow- 
ing is  a  brief  simimary  of  the  subjects  presented 
in  this  distinctive  work  : 

I.  Treitschke's  Life  and  Work,  by  Adolf 
Hausrath.  2.  The  Army.  3.  International  Law. 
4.  German  Colonization.  5.  The  Two  Emperors. 
6.  In  Memory  of  the  Great  War.  7.  Germany 
and  the  Neutral  States.  8.  Austria  and  the 
German  Emperor.  9.  Russia  from  the  German 
Point  of  View.     10.  On  Liberty. 

Treitschke  was  a  close  friend  of  Bismarck,  and 
his  list  of  pupils  include  the  political  and  military 
leaders  of  the  present  generation,  such  as  the 
Emperor  William,  Bernhardi,  and  others. 

Lord  Acton  says  of  Treitschke:  "He  is  the 
one  writer  of  history  who  is  more  brilliant  and 
more  powerful  than  Droysen;  and  he  writes 
with  the  force  and  incisiveness  of  Mommsen, 
but  he  concerns  himself  with  the  problems  of 
the  present  day,  problems  that  are  still  demand- 
ing solution." 


New  York  G,  P.  Putnam's  SonS   London 


DUE  DATE 


rtl\'l 

^?^*^ 

jjjiy- 

^^ 

201-6503 

Printed 
in  USA 

r         COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 


0022385355 


9UO.9I 
R721 


r 


in 


